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Essays on the Role of Informed Trading in Stock Markets 
 
Abstract 
 
The first essay, Chapter 3, shows that uninformed investors require a price discount to 
hold the stock because they perceive a new information uncertainty risk when 
short-sale constraints are binding and informed trading is absent. Stock prices become 
less informative when short-sale constraints keep informed investors out of the market. 
The less informative prices create a new information uncertainty risk for uninformed 
investors because uninformed investors are unable to figure out the true value of the 
stock without knowing the private information of informed investors. The new 
information uncertainty risk effect becomes greater if stocks have greater information 
uncertainty, which reflects the convenience of learning fundamental news. 
 
The second essay, Chapter 4, examines two special new information uncertainty risk 
effects by controlling for trading volume. When volume is large, uninformed investors 
observe high buying pressure but cannot distinguish noise demand from 
information-based buying. They confront this new information uncertainty risk and 
demand premium to buy stock. Thus, overvaluation caused by short-sale constraints is 
reduced. When volume is small, uninformed investors convince that informed 
investors have negative information but do not know how bad the information is. 
They will not hold the stock under this new information uncertainty risk and therefore 
future return will becomes worse. 
 
The third essay, Chapter 5, studies the impact of informed trading to the momentum 
effect. It proposes that if momentum is a result of underreaction and if informed 
trading identifies stocks with underreaction, the presence of informed trading predicts 
future momentum effect. Consistently, the empirical results show that momentum 
effect arises when informed trading is present. Greater informed trading leads to 
greater momentum effect. Although information uncertainty is related to both 
informed trading and momentum, the identified relationship between informed trading 
and momentum is robust after controlling for uncertainty. 
 
Keywords: informed trading; information uncertainty; short-sale constraints; 
trading volume; momentum. 
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Chapter 1 
  
Introduction 
 
This thesis contains three essays on the role of informed trading in stock markets. 
Informed trading is the trading behaviour of informed investors who trade on their 
superior information. Informed investors have superior information because they 
either have private information or have excellent skills to analyse public information. 
Informed trading is important because informed traders move prices towards the full 
informational efficiency, which, however, is not continuously attainable because at 
least information itself changes over time. Therefore, the influence of informed 
trading in financial market should not be neglected. 
 
The first two essays, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, consider a new information uncertainty 
risk as perceived by uninformed investors when (1) short-sale constraints are binding; 
and (2) informed trading is absent. This new information uncertainty risk is motivated 
by three theoretical papers: Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006), Yuan (2006), and Marin 
and Olivier (2008). They study the asset pricing implications of short-sale constraints 
in an asymmetric information setting. In contrast to prior literature that focuses on the 
overvaluation effect of short-sale constraints, they suggest that asset price becomes 
less informative when informed investors are constrained by short-sale constraints. 
The less informative prices create a new information uncertainty risk for uninformed 
investors, since uninformed investors are unable to figure out the true value of the 
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stock without knowing the private information of informed investors. 
 
Specifically, Chapter 3 examines the general impact of the new information 
uncertainty risk on stock returns. That is, the new information uncertainty risk causes 
stock prices to decline when uninformed investors perceive the new information 
uncertainty risk because they are reluctant to hold the stock unless there is a price 
discount. Moreover, Chapter 3 further suggests the new information uncertainty risk 
effect can be affected by stock’s information uncertainty condition, which reflects the 
convenience of learning the fundamental value of stock. Accordingly, the level of 
stock’s information uncertainty is negatively related to the level of price’s informative 
condition. Therefore, chapter 3 proposes three testable hypotheses. First, stocks will 
have lower future returns if the level of informed trading is lower and when short-sale 
constraints are binding. Second, when information uncertainty is high, the new 
information uncertainty risk effect presented in the first hypothesis is strong. When 
information uncertainty is low, this effect rarely arises. Third, when information 
uncertainty is low and short-sale constraints are not binding, this new information 
uncertainty risk effect will not emerge. All these hypotheses are confirmed by the 
empirical results. 
 
Chapter 4, the second essay, further examines two special new information 
uncertainty risk effects. The three theoretical papers of Yuan (2006), Bai, Chang, and 
Wang (2006), and Marin and Olivier (2008) are actually focusing on two different 
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kinds of new information uncertainty risk effect. In particular, short-sale constraints 
are likely to bind when prices are high in Yuan (2006), which captures the 
overvaluation situation. In this case, new uncertainty dampens the upward price 
movement because uninformed investors are reluctant to hold asset because they 
cannot distinguish high noise demand from information-based buying. Hence, the first 
kind of new information uncertainty risk reduces the level of overvaluation. By 
contrast, Marin and Olivier (2008) and Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006) argue that 
short-sale constraints are likely to bind when asset prices are low. Without a high 
noise demand in the market, uninformed investors can only infer that informed 
investors are in possession of bad news since otherwise informed buying activities can 
be observed. Uninformed investors become aware of a new information uncertainty 
risk as they could not find out how negative the information really is. Thus, the 
second kind of new information uncertainty risk exacerbates downward price 
movement as uninformed investors demand an information-disadvantage premium to 
hold the stock. 
 
Chapter 4 confirms the two kinds of effects after controlling for trading volume. 
Firstly, the scenario in Yuan (2006) is captured by the high level of trading activities. 
Since short-sale constraints can create overvaluation, high level of trading activities 
combined with overvaluation represent high noise demand and buying pressure in the 
market. The empirical evidence shows that stock should have higher future return if 
the level of informed trading is lower when (1) the level of trading activities is high; 
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(2) short-sale constraints are binding. Secondly, the scenario suggested by Bai, Chang, 
and Wang (2006) and Marin and Olivier (2008) can be captured by the low level of 
trading activities. The low levels of trading activities and informed trading would 
convince uninformed investors that majority of investors hold downward beliefs and 
informed investors hold negative private information. This is because not only 
informed investors but also most of investors in the market stop buying stock. The 
empirical evidence also reports that stock will have lower future returns if the level of 
informed trading is lower and when (1) the level of trading activities is low; and (2) 
short-sale constraints are binding. 
 
The third essay, Chapter 5, concentrates on the impact of informed trading to the 
momentum effect. It proposes that if momentum is a result of underreaction and if 
informed trading identifies stocks with underreaction, the presence of informed 
trading predicts future momentum effect. Consistently, the empirical results show that 
momentum effect arises when informed trading is present. Greater informed trading 
leads to greater momentum effect. Although information uncertainty is related to both 
informed trading and momentum, the identified relationship between informed trading 
and momentum is robust after controlling for uncertainty.  
 
Nevertheless, information uncertainty still has influence on informed trading as high 
uncertainty tends to contribute to the predictability of informed trading, which is 
consistent with Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)’s information diffusion theory about 
 14
information uncertainty. Chapter 5 also sheds light on the information uncertainty 
effect on momentum. It reexamines Zhang (2006)’s findings by controlling for 
informed trading. The empirical findings, however, provide many contrary evidence 
to Zhang (2006)’s findings. High level of information uncertainty does not produce 
momentum unless the level of informed trading is relatively high. Furthermore, past 
winners with higher uncertainty could earn lower future returns when the level of 
informed trading is low. These findings suggest the reported relationship between 
information uncertainty and momentum requires careful interpretations. 
 
The three essays use the sample of NYSE and AMEX stocks during the period from 
January 1983 to December 2001. They also share one common proxy for informed 
trading: probability of information-based trade (PIN). The change in breadth of 
ownership (ΔBREADTH) is used to measure the short-sale constraints in Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4. Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 adopt analyst coverage (COV), firm age 
(AGE), and firm size (MV) as the proxies for information uncertainty. Chapter 4 uses 
trading volume (VOL), the total number of shares traded at each month t, to measure 
the level of trading activities. The past 11-month stock returns RETt-11, t-1 are used to 
examine price momentum strategies in Chapter 5 
 
The original frequency of PIN is yearly because the data of PIN is obtained from the 
1983 – 2001 annual PIN data in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2005). The original 
frequency of ΔBREADTH is quarterly as quarterly datasets of mutual funds holdings 
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are used to calculate ΔBREADTH (CDA/Spectrum s12 in the Thomson Reuters). All 
the original frequencies of COV, AGE, MV, VOL, and stock returns are monthly. 
COV is calculated based on the raw detail forecast data unadjusted for stock splits in 
I/B/E/S, and it is the number of analysts providing annual FY1 earnings estimates 
lagged 12 months from the end of the month. AGE is measured as the number of years 
since the firm was first covered by CRSP. The CRSP monthly tape provides data on 
firm age, firm size, and monthly returns. 
 
Since all the portfolios in the empirical tests are monthly rebalanced, the annual PIN 
data and quarterly ΔBREADTH data are adjusted into monthly frequency. The value 
of PIN at month t takes the value of PIN in that year. The value of ΔBREADTHt at 
month t is equal to the value of ΔBREADTHT in quarter T if month t belongs to 
quarter T. Although these monthly frequency values are the best approximate 
measures to their true values, they can introduce crucial flaws into the empirical 
findings in this thesis. For instance, the value of PIN in each month t will be always 
high if the annual value of PIN is high in the same year. However, the real monthly 
value of PIN should not be constant during the same year. When stocks are sorted into 
portfolios by the level of PIN, stocks are classified by their average value of PIN 
during that year but not their actual value of PIN at that month. The portfolios of PIN 
will contain the same stocks throughout the year. In addition, if portfolios are 
constructed by three-way sorting, for example, by COV, ΔBREADTH and PIN, then 
the obtained portfolios cannot represent the precise values for the three variables.  
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Therefore, the possible frequency mismatches may not lead to accurate results for the 
monthly portfolio analysis. 
 
The empirical examinations in this thesis are based on monthly rebalancing of 
portfolio analysis. This is because the focus of this thesis is the role of informed 
trading in price discovery, which emphasizes the price adjustment to the full 
information level. Since information always changes rapidly and informed trading can 
be restricted sometimes, the monthly rebalanced portfolio analysis should be more 
suitable for examining the role of informed trading in stock markets. If portfolios are 
not monthly rebalanced, the findings in this thesis are very likely to change. For 
example, the focus of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 is the new information uncertainty risk, 
which is encountered by uninformed investors when prices become less informative. 
When portfolios are quarterly or yearly rebalanced, then the time window for 
uninformed investors to understand the true value of stocks become longer. Moreover, 
the level of informed trading and information about stocks will also change 
dramatically in the longer period. As a result, uninformed investors may absorb more 
information and become less uncertain about the true value of stocks. Thus, the new 
information uncertainty risk may not arise. Similarly, the documented relationship 
between informed trading and momentum in Chapter 5 also depends on the monthly 
rebalanced portfolio analysis. When portfolios are quarterly or yearly rebalanced, then 
the level of informed trading during one quarter or one year cannot precisely indentify 
stocks with underreaction. As a result, the presence of informed trading may not lead 
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to momentum. This is because during the period of one quarter or one year, prices 
may have adjusted to fundamental news with the help of informed trading and the 
following trading by uninformed investors. 
 
This thesis also has other limitations. Although each essay has presented robustness 
checks like subperiod analysis, the empirical results can still be sample specific or 
because of the specific proxy variables used. Duarte and Young (2009) show that the 
PIN component related to illiquidity is priced. They suggest that liquidity effects 
unrelated to information asymmetry explain the relation between PIN and the 
cross-section of expected returns. Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) also suggest that the 
changes in breadth might not really reflect binding short-sale constraints, but 
represent the superior stock-picking skill of mutual fund managers who are smarter 
than individuals. While this thesis yields several predications that expected returns 
should be increasing (or decreasing) with the level of informed trading under certain 
some conditions, Patton and Timmermann (2009) suggest that the full set of 
monotonicity in expected returns should be exploited. They propose new and simple 
ways to test for Monotonicity in financial variables and compare the proposed tests 
with extant alternatives such as t-tests, Bonferroni bounds and multivariate inequality 
tests through empirical applications and simulations.  
 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overall literature 
review about previous studies that are related to this thesis. Chapter 3 presents the first 
 18
essay on informed trading, short-sale constraints, and information uncertainty. 
Chapter 4 gives the second essay on informed trading, short-sale constraints, and 
trading volume. Chapter 5 demonstrates the third essay on informed trading, 
information uncertainty, and momentum. Chapter 6 concludes this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
 
2.1. The Efficiency of Financial Markets 
 
Economics is the science of how to satisfy unlimited requirements with limited 
resources. Since market facilitates the allocation of resources, economists introduced 
the concept of “efficiency” to assess the market performance.  
 
In the case of financial economists, a market is efficient if it is “informationally 
efficient”. Asset prices are informational efficient if they fully and correctly reflect the 
relevant information. The Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) is intended to provide 
a benchmark for assessing the performance of financial markets according to the 
concept of informational efficiency. 
 
The EMH became the central proposition of finance during the 1970s. Fama (1970, 
1976) assembles a comprehensive review on market efficiency. He defines an efficient 
financial market as one in which prices always reflect the available information. In 
other words, the financial market is efficient if stock prices adjust instantaneously to 
new information.  
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Obviously, the stock prices of efficient market would provide unbiased signals for 
optimal resource allocation. Thus, the market truly performs well if the EMH holds. 
In order to examine whether the EMH holds, enormous empirical and theoretical 
studies have been developed. At first, a vast array of findings supports the EMH in 
early decades. However, more and more empirical evidence shows that the EMH has 
been challenged since 1980. 
 
Economists have developed theoretical idea to understand these financial phenomena. 
In particular, behavioural finance emerges. As a new approach to financial markets, 
behavioural finance assumes that some agents are not fully rational. Shleifer (2000) 
presents that behavioural finance theory rests on two foundations: “limits to arbitrage”, 
which show that arbitrage in real-world financial markets is far from perfect; 
“investor sentiment”, which focuses on how irrational investors actually form their 
beliefs, preferences and valuations, and more generally their demands for securities. 
 
2.1.1. The Challenges to the EMH 
 
Behavioural finance challenges the EMH with both empirical and theoretical 
evidence. 
 
The Empirical Challenges 
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In general, the EMH provides two broad categories of empirical predictions. First, 
when the news about the fundamental value of an asset emerges in the markets, its 
price should react and incorporate this news both quickly and correctly. Second, since 
the asset price must be consistent to its fundamental value, price should not move 
without any news about the value of this asset.  
 
The principal hypothesis following from quick and accurate reaction of prices to new 
information is that people cannot earn superior risk-adjusted profits from the stale 
information. Fama (1970) distinguishes between three types of stale information 
based on the three forms of the EMH. For the weak form, stale information is past 
prices and returns. The semi-strong form means that any publicly available 
information is stale. The strong form states that even the private information could be 
stale quickly. To be fair, most evaluations of the EMH have focused on weak and 
semi-strong form efficiency. 
 
During the period between 1960 and 1980, the empirical evidence appears almost 
universally confirms the predictions of the EHM. However, empirical evidence 
sustains the challenge to the EMH since 1980. Shiller (1981) provides an early 
important one on stock market volatility, which shows that stock market prices are far 
more volatile than could be justified by asset pricing models. Empirical finding like 
this is called as anomaly, which seems to be inconsistent with the EMH. Impressively, 
Anomalies have been claimed using data from financial markets all over the world.  
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Firstly, the weak form EMH suffers from anomalies such as contrarian and 
momentum that imply investor can make excess profits using past price information. 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) find that a long-term contrarian strategy, which consists 
in buying losers and selling winners based on a performance observed two to five 
years earlier, could generate positive returns in the following years. Momentum, first 
presented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), is much more significant. They show that 
movements in individual stock prices over the period of six to twelve months tend to 
predict future movements in the same direction. That is, while contrarian refers to the 
long-term trends, momentum reveals that the short-term trends persist. Subsequently, 
even Fama (1991) admits that stock returns are predictable from past returns. 
 
Secondly, the semi-strong form EMH has not fared better. It is challenged by many 
variables that predict future returns. At the beginning, the size and January effects are 
best known anomalies, which show a tendency of small firms to provide positive 
risk-adjusted returns, particularly in January and especially at the turn of the year 
(Banz 1981, Keim 1983). More recently, value and growth effects are widely 
documented. In general, value investing selects stocks with high ratios of dividend 
yield (D/P), book to market (B/M), earnings to price (E/P), or cash flow to price (C/P). 
In contrast, growth investing attempts to find stocks with low ratios of D/P, B/M, E/P 
or C/P. Most studies have convincingly presented that value stocks outperform growth 
stocks around the world (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 1994, Fama and French 
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1998, Davis, Fama and French 2000).  
 
Finally, empirical results also show that stock prices could react to non-information. 
In fact, many sharp changes in stock prices do not appear to accompany significant 
news. Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1991) report that the 50 largest day stock price 
movements came on days of no major announcements. Roll (1984, 1988) point out 
that shocks other than news appear to move security prices, in contrast to the EMH. 
Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) find that the inclusion in the S&P500 generates a 
substantial uninformed demand for the shares of the company. 
 
The Theoretical Challenges 
 
Following to the empirical challenges to the EMH, financial economists begin to 
criticize three theoretical foundations of the EMH.  
 
At first, the EMH assumes that investors are rational and hence they would value 
assets rationally. However, it is difficult to support the case that people in general, and 
investors specifically, are fully rational. Kahneman and Riepe (1998) indicate that the 
irrationality of investors is pervasive and systematic. Apart from the psychological 
evidence, it is well-known that many investors react to irrelevant information and 
trade on noise rather than information. Kyle (1985) and Black (1986) define these 
irrational investors as the “noise traders”.  
 24
 
Second, the EMH claims that even if some investors are not fully rational, markets 
could still be efficient as long as they trade randomly and hence their trades would 
cancel each other. This implies that the correlation in the strategies of the irrational 
investors is limited. In contrast, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) reveal that investor 
sentiment typically determines the common judgment errors made by a substantial 
number of investors. Shiller (1984) argues that the mistakes would become more 
severe when the noise traders behave socially and follow each others. Empirical 
studies also confirm that the aggregate trading of noise traders could be systematically 
correlated. Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2006a) demonstrate that the trading of individual 
investors is surprisingly systematic using trading records in U.S. stock markets. 
Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2006b) argue that noise traders indeed move the markets 
because they find that noise trader can affect stock prices using eighteen years of 
tick-by-tick transactional data for U.S. stocks. Finally, Shleifer (2000) presents that 
professional managers of pension and mutual funds are subject to the same biases as 
individual investors.  
 
At last, the EMH still can be achieved if rational investors could quickly undo any 
dislocation by the correlated trading of irrational investors. This situation claimed by 
Friedman (1953) and Fama (1965) implies two assertions. First, as soon as there is a 
deviation from the fundament value – in other words, a mispricing occurs - an 
arbitrage opportunity is created. Second, rational traders will immediately snap up this 
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opportunity, thereby correcting the mispricing. Ross (2004) defines an arbitrage 
opportunity as an investment strategy that guarantees a positive payoff in some 
contingency with on possibility of a negative payoff and with no initial net investment. 
Thus, rational investors in the EMH are typically referred to as “arbitrageurs” because 
of the belief that a mispriced asset immediately creates an opportunity for riskless 
profits.  
 
Unfortunately, there could be limits to the ability of arbitrageurs to correct the 
mispricing. This is known as “limits to arbitrage” in behavioural finance. Firstly, 
Barberis and Taler (2003) show that arbitrage can be risky and costly due to 
fundamental risk, implementation costs, and noise trader risk. As a result, the 
mispricing can remain unchallenged. Arbitrageurs have to bear fundamental risk since 
substitute securities are often highly imperfect. Implementation costs, such as 
transaction costs, short-sale constraints and borrowing constraints, can make it less 
attractive to exploit a mispricing. Noise trader risk, introduced by De Long, Shleifer, 
Summers, and Waldmann (1990a), is the risk that the mispricing being exploited by 
the arbitrageur worsens in the short run. While the security and its substitute security 
would converge ultimately, the price gap between them may become large temporarily. 
In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) emphasize that noise trader risk matters is 
extremely important for the arbitrageurs because of their agency feature. In real world, 
most arbitrageurs are professional portfolio managers, who are not managing their 
own money, but rather managing other investors’ money. If a mispricing that the 
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arbitrageur is trying to exploit worsens in the short run, generating negative returns, 
investors may withdraw their funds. Then the arbitrageur will be forced to liquidate 
position prematurely. Moreover, many arbitrageurs borrow money and securities from 
intermediaries to take advantage of mispricing. They have to pay interest and also 
face the risk of liquidation. After poor short-term returns, lenders will call their loans 
seeing the value of their collateral erode. 
 
Secondly, under some circumstances, arbitrageurs may prefer to trade in the same 
direction as the noise traders, thereby exacerbating the mispricing, rather than against 
them. Shleifer and Summers (1990) indicate that some speculators indeed believe that 
exacerbating the mispricing with noise traders is the way to beat them. De Long, 
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990b) show that if noise traders follow positive 
feedback strategies, arbitrageurs may prefer to trade in the same direction as the noise 
traders. Although eventually arbitrageurs help prices return to fundamentals, in short 
run they feed the mispricing rather than help it to dissolve. Abreu and Brunnermeier 
(2002) present that arbitrageurs could face synchronization risk as well, which derives 
from arbitrageurs’ uncertainty about when other arbitrageurs will start exploring an 
arbitrage opportunity. In the equilibrium of their model, the combination of 
synchronization risk and holding costs causes arbitrageurs time the market rather than 
correct mispricing right away. This leads to delayed arbitrage. As a consequence, 
mispricing can remain unchallenged and persist in growing over short or even 
intermediate period. 
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2.1.2. The Defence of the EMH 
 
While the EMH encounters seriously attacks, its advocators strike back as well. 
 
Anomalies and Market Efficiency 
 
Some financial economics argue that anomalies do not necessarily mean the death of 
EMH. At first, since every appraisal of market efficiency depends upon an asset 
pricing model, the test must assume an equilibrium model that defines normal security 
returns. If efficiency is rejected, this could be the case that market is truly inefficient, 
or because an incorrect equilibrium model has been assumed. Hence, Campbell, Lo 
and Mackinlay (1997) suggest that this joint hypothesis problem implies that market 
efficiency as such can never be rejected.  
 
In addition, the economic relevance of a presumed anomaly is also important. Jensen 
(1978) emphasizes the importance of trading profitability in assessing market 
efficiency. If anomalous return is not definitive enough for investors to make money 
trading on it, then it is not economically significant and hence market is still efficient. 
This definition of market efficiency highlights the practical respect and the 
importance of market microstructure issues such as transaction costs.  
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Finally, some researchers have found that anomalies often seem to disappear, reverse, 
or attenuate. Schwert (2003) indicates that most anomalies are more apparent than real 
in his survey on anomalies and market efficiency. Even if the anomalies existed in the 
sample period in which they were first identified, the practitioners who would take 
advantage of anomalies and consequently cause them to disappear.  
 
The Challenges to Behavioural Finance 
 
Neoclassical and behavioural finance are two revolutions in financial economics that 
came at different periods and largely from different people. The efficient market 
theory and traditional asset pricing framework stem from neoclassical finance, in 
which agents are fully rational. In contrast, assuming agents are not fully rational, 
behavioural finance claims that it explains the evidence that appears anomalous from 
the EMH and generates new predications that have been supported in empirical results. 
However, proponents of neoclassical finance also argue that behavioural finance 
remains controversial.  
 
Ross (2004) points out that at present, behavioural finance seems more defined by 
what it does not like about neoclassical finance than what it has to offer as an 
alternative. First, the anomalies are considered affronts to neoclassical or “rational 
finance”, and explanations are sought elsewhere. Second, sufficient noise and risk are 
introduced into the models in which arbitrageurs cannot enforce the correction of 
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mispricing induced by irrational traders.  
 
It is true that most of the people usually indeed misbehave as the suggestion from 
behavioural finance. To cope with this, the neoclassical theories rely on the abilities 
and motivations of some smart and well-financed investors. Meanwhile, the 
well-developed normative neoclassical portfolio theories also assist individual 
investors when they are tempted to stray from rationality. Thus, the theoretical need 
for the average investor to be rational is a straw man. Given the effort neoclassical 
finance has made to distance itself from preference assumptions and rely on the 
stronger principle of no arbitrage, Ross (2004) argues that the behavioural critique is 
ironic. 
 
Although neoclassical and behavioural finance are often seemed to be incompatible, 
Shiller (2006) suggests that the two approaches in fact have always been intertwined, 
and some of the most important applications of their insights will require the use of 
both approaches. 
 
2.1.3. Are Financial Markets Efficient? 
 
While financial markets efficiency is controversial, two well-known predictions of the 
EMH provide some ideas about whether markets are efficient and the directions for 
further research. The first statement is “prices are right”, which means that prices are 
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set and maintained by rational agents. The second statement is “no free lunch”, which 
implies that no investment strategy could earn excess risk-adjusted returns.  
 
These two propositions are important because they guide financial economists to 
investigate the market efficiency. Since both of them are true in an efficient market, 
many researchers take it for granted that they are the same. However, Barberis and 
Taler (2003) argue that they are not equivalent. If prices are right, then there is indeed 
no free lunch. But the absence of free lunch does not necessarily mean that prices are 
right. The rationale is that even if mispricing exists, arbitrageurs could not eliminate it 
away definitely. In the view of behavioural finance, the arbitrage can be limited. Thus, 
no free lunch can also be true in an inefficient market. In other words, the evidence 
that no one could beat the markets does not necessarily mean that the market is 
efficient. 
 
This distinction is crucial for evaluating the ongoing debate on market efficiency. First, 
many economists use the inability of professional money managers to beat the 
markets as strong evidence of efficiency. But, if the absence of free lunch does not 
implies prices are right, the performance of money managers tells little about whether 
prices reflect fundamental value. Second, although some researchers think the debate 
should focus on there is no free lunch, many economists believe that the emphasis 
should be whether prices are right. The ultimate concern of economists is that capital 
be allocated to the most promising investment opportunities. This depends much more 
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on whether prices are right than on whether there is any free lunch for taking. 
 
Considering this distinction, Shiller (2003) concludes that researchers should not 
expect market efficiency to be so egregiously wrong that immediate profits should be 
continually available. But market efficiency can be egregiously wrong in other senses 
such as it could not interpret sock market bubbles. Indeed, mispricing always emerges 
and even persists in financial markets. Therefore, the innovations of asset pricing 
theory are required.  
 
2.2 Momentum Literature 
 
The studies on momentum are always popular because it is the strongest challenge to 
EMH and economists try to explain it in all kinds of approaches.  
 
2.2.1. The Form of Momentum 
 
Generally, momentum refers to the tendency of stock prices to continue moving in the 
same direction for several months after an initial impulse. The most basic form of 
momentum is price momentum, where the initial impulse is simply a change in the 
price itself. Price momentum was found in aggregate US stock prices in late 1980’s 
(Poterba and Summers 1988), in individual US stock prices in the early 1990’s 
(Jegadeesh and Titman 1993), and in international markets in the later 1990’s 
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(Rouwenhorst 1998, 1999). Other forms of momentum have been measured using 
different initial impulses. Post-earnings-announcement drift is momentum following a 
surprise earnings announcement (Ball and Brown 1968, Bernard and Thomas 1989, 
1990), while earnings momentum is momentum following a revision in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 1996). 
 
2.2.2. Overreaction and Underreaction 
 
Traditional asset pricing model requires high returns to compensate for some kind of 
risk, but stocks that have superior performance recently, or have had positive earnings 
surprises, typically seem to have lower risk, not higher risk. Therefore, momentum 
cannot be explained by measures of risk (Grundy and Martin 2001, Griffin, Ji, and 
Martin 2003). In contrast, momentum arises more naturally under behavioural asset 
pricing model. 
 
Generally, behavioural explanations of momentum can be divided into two main 
categories. The first category, called as overreaction, stresses that irrational investors 
may overreact to stories of doubtful or intangible information (see, e.g., Daniel and 
Titman 2006). If overreaction develops gradually, then stock prices may display 
momentum for a period of time but will eventually reverse and return to fundamental 
value. For instance, herding phenomenon is one kind of overreaction. Sirri and Tufano 
(1998) show that individual investors are attracted to funds, fund categories, and fund 
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families that have performed well recently, consistent with the herding hypothesis. 
However, there is less evidence that herding generates short-run momentum that 
eventually reverses. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) present one closely related result. 
They show that hedge funds rode the technology bubble through the late 1990’s even 
after technology stocks are regarded to be overpriced by any conventional measure. 
These funds appeared to believe that positive short-term momentum would overcome 
poor long-term value, and their strategy was quite successful.  
 
Instead, the evidence for momentum generated by underreaction to fundamentals, 
which belongs to the second category, is stronger than the evidence for momentum 
generated by overreaction. This set of underreaction theories emphasizes a process of 
gradual adjustment to news (see, e.g., Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 1996). Stock 
prices initially underreact to the news, and then adjust over time so that the long-term 
response is the appropriate rational one. Moreover, underreaction theories suggest 
some potential mechanisms about how underreaction works. In Barberis, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998), there is a representative investor, who suffers from a conservatism bias, 
does not update beliefs sufficiently when new public information emerges. In Hong 
and Stein (1999), the emphasis is the heterogeneities across investors, who observe 
different pieces of private information at different times but fail to extract information 
from prices. If information diffuses gradually across the population, prices underreact 
in the short run. 
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2.2.3. Empirical Evidence 
 
Empirical studies test implications of behavioural theories and provide many 
interesting findings. First, momentum should be stronger when fundamental news is 
less obvious and harder to analyse. Zhang (2006) confirms that momentum is stronger 
in stocks that are hard to value such as young stocks, small stocks, stocks that are 
covered by relatively few analysts, stocks with widely dispersed analyst earnings 
forecasts, and stocks with volatile returns and cash flows. Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) 
show that momentum is greater when fundamental news is bad and hence not 
publicized by firm management. Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) also present that 
momentum is stronger when news comes out slowly over several months than when 
there is a large disclosure that is obvious even to inattentive investors. Furthermore, 
momentum effects exist not only within stocks but across stocks, particularly from 
large-cap and high-volume stocks to small-cap low-volume stocks, and from stocks in 
one industry to their suppliers and customers (Chordia and Swaminathan 2000, Lo 
and MacKinlay 1990, Menzly and Ozbas 2006). 
 
Second, Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) further demonstrate that momentum should 
be stronger when some behavioural forces push in the same direction. Since many 
individual taxable investors delay tax-loss selling until the end of the year, they are 
particularly likely to sell past losers and hold onto past winners at year-end. This 
effect strengthens momentum in December and weakens it in January. 
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Third, momentum should be stronger when rational investors face high transactions 
costs in their arbitrage trading. Johnson and Schwartz (2000) find that during the 
1990’s, earnings momentum and post-earnings-announcement drift weakened in 
liquid markets such as the US and the UK, but remained stronger in less liquid 
international markets. 
 
Finally, arbitrageurs could exploit the underreaction phenomenon. Cohen, Gompers, 
and Vuolteenaho (2003) study the aggregate holdings of US institutional investors and 
confirm that institutions buy shares from individuals in response to good cash-flow 
news. However, institutions are not simply following price momentum strategies as 
they sell shares to individuals when price goes up in the absence of positive cash-flow 
news.  
 
2.3. Short-Sale Constraints Literature 
 
Neoclassical asset pricing theories rely on the assumption that market participants can 
buy, sell and short sell securities at no cost. In practice, short selling a security is not 
as straightforward as simple selling or buying. There are various costs as well as legal 
and institutional restrictions that impose constraints on short selling. Although 
short-sale constraints have been attributed as an important factor in determining asset 
prices (see, e.g., survey by Rubinstein 2004), the nature and the significance of their 
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impact remain inconclusive. Note that although this thesis focuses on short-sale 
constraints in the stock market, their importance is recognized in other markets as 
well such as the fixed-income market (Krishnamurthy 2002). 
 
Generally, theoretical models in literature use the holding of assets to measure the 
condition of short-sale constraints. If the holding of assets cannot be less than zero, 
the short-sale constraints of assets are binding tightly. In this case, investors who want 
to reduce their holdings can only exit the market at most as they cannot take any short 
position. As a result, the selling pressure on the assets will be relieved by the binding 
short-sale constraints. According to Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006), short-sale 
constraints could limit two types of trades: (1) trade to share risk; and (2) trade to 
speculate on private information. Thus, binding short-sale constraints can reduce the 
allocational and informational efficiency of the market. When binding short-sale 
constraints limit risk-sharing trades, they shift the demand for the asset upwards and 
consequently its price. This is the most typical case in the market, and it is the spirit of 
Miller (1977). Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006) suggest that in the presence of 
information asymmetry, limiting short sales driven by private information increases 
the uncertainty about the asset as perceived by uninformed investors, which reduces 
the demand for the asset. When this information effect dominates, short-sale 
constraints actually cause asset prices to decrease and price volatility to increase. In 
addition, short-sale constraints can give rise to discrete price drops accompanied by 
increases in volatility when the uncertainty perceived by uninformed investors surges 
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in certain states. 
 
2.3.1. The Source of Short-Sale Constraints 
 
The Frictional Securities Lending Market 
 
At first, there are short-sale constraints that stem from the mechanics of shorting. To 
be able to sell a stock short, one must borrow it first. In order to borrow shares, an 
investor needs to find an institution or individual willing to lend shares. Financial 
institutions, such as mutual funds, trusts, or asset managers, typically do much of this 
lending. These lenders receive a fee in the form of interest payments generated by the 
short-sale proceeds, minus any interest rebate that the lenders return to the borrowers.  
 
This rebate rate is the fee that the lender of the stock must pay back to the borrower of 
that stock. This fee arises because in order to sell a stock short, an investor must 
borrow shares from an investor who owns them and is willing to lend them. The short 
seller must leave collateral with the lender in order to borrow the shares; in turn, the 
lender pays the short-seller interest—the “rebate” rate—on this collateral. Retail 
borrowers typically receive no interest on their proceeds, so the situation described 
above applies mainly to institutional short sellers. The difference or spread between 
the interest rate on cash funds and the rebate rate is a direct cost to the short seller, and 
is often referred to as the loan fee. The rebate rate serves to equilibrate supply and 
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demand in the stock lending market, much like the “repo” rate in the fixed income 
market. Obviously, if every investor were willing and able to lend shares in a 
competitive market, the lending fee would be close to zero. However, as Duffie (1996) 
and Krishnamurthy (2002) show, if some investors who are willing to hold overpriced 
assets do not lend, a strictly positive fee can arise. 
 
Apparently, rebates create costs for establishing a short position in a security. In 
addition, short sellers incur searching costs since the fact that security owners and 
those wishing to short have to find each other. This is because the security lending 
market is not a centralized market with a market-clearing price, and hence rebates 
only partially equilibrate supply and demand. While individual retail investors are 
particularly likely to be unable to short, there is also extensive evidence of 
institutional investors unable to short no matter how much they are willing to pay for 
borrowing shares.  
 
Even though short sellers establish their short positions successfully, they still face 
risks like recall risk. Once a short seller has initiated a position by borrowing stock, 
the borrowed stock may be recalled at any time by the lender. If the short seller is 
unable to find another lender, he is forced to close his position. There are several 
reasons that a shareholder might refuse to lend stock, or might withdraw his shares 
from the stock lending market. First, if the lender sells his stock, he must recall his 
stock loan so that he can deliver his shares to the buyer. Second, shareholders may 
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refuse to lend their stock because they fear that by helping short sellers, they will be 
helping drive stock prices down. Third, for individual investors, brokers typically only 
have the ability to lend out of margin accounts, not cash accounts. Fourth, some 
institutions do not have stock lending programs at all, perhaps because they feel their 
holdings are too small and the income generated by lending would not be enough to 
compensate for the fixed cost of setting up a lending program. 
 
Generally, it is easy and cheap to borrow most large cap stocks, but it can be difficult 
to borrow stocks which are small, have low institutional ownership, or which are in 
high demand for borrowing. A somewhat paradoxical description of the stock lending 
market is that it usually works very well, except when you want to use it, in which 
case it works terribly. In particular, it can be difficult or expensive to short stocks that 
many people want to short.  
 
Other Frictions for Short Selling 
 
In addition to the problems in the stock lending market, there are a variety of other 
frictions for short selling. Firstly, short selling is restricted by all kinds of regulations. 
For example, the SEC, the Federal Reserve, the various stock exchanges, underwriters, 
and individual brokerage firms in US impede short shelling by administer regulations 
and procedures, including the additional collateral requirement (Federal Reserve 
Regulation T), the up-tick rule (Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] Rule 
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10a-1), a higher tax rate on profits on short sales (which are treated as short-term 
capital gain), the risk of short squeeze, and others. Many institutions set up to 
encourage individuals to buy stocks, but few institutions set up to encourage them to 
short. For some institutional investors, short selling is prohibited by their charters. 
Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2002) report that about 70% of mutual 
funds explicitly state (in Form N-SAR they file with the SEC) that they are not 
permitted to sell short. 
 
Secondly, short sellers also face hostility from governments and society. Policy 
makers and the general public seem to have an instinctive reaction that short selling is 
morally wrong. In particular, short sellers are blamed in times of crisis or following 
major price declines. The general idea seems to be that short selling is bad, and when 
bad things happen, such as war, it probably involves short sellers in some way. For 
example, the New York Stock Exchange imposed special short selling regulations 
during World War I, in response to both a substantial market decline and a fear that 
enemy agents would drive down stock prices. Short sellers were extremely unpopular 
in 1930 as well because many politicians, journalists, and investors blamed them for 
the stock market crash. More recently, the SEC and various other regulatory 
authorities investigated whether terrorists had shorted stocks or had bought puts, 
armed with foreknowledge of the attacks, although there is no evidence of terrorist 
shorting activities. Following the dot-com bubbles in the early 2000’s, governments 
start to limit short selling. The authorities in Britain and Japan have sought to 
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discourage shorting and securities lending. A major lender of European stocks 
announced it was ceasing securities lending and urged others to do the same. 
 
Thirdly, short sellers also face hostility from the firms they short. Managers of firms 
do not like people who short sell their stock, especially if the short sellers are accusing 
the firms of fraud and even more especially when the fraud accusations are true. 
Consequently, sometimes companies will fight with their short sellers. 
 
Note that derivatives, such as options and futures, could provide alternative ways to 
take a short position in a security. However, derivatives trading has its own costs and 
restrictions (Ofek and Richardson 2003). 
 
2.3.2. The Overvaluation Effect of Short-Sale Constraints 
 
Extensive literature studies the overpricing impact of short-sale constraints. In 
particular, the combination of differences of opinion among market participants and 
short-sale constraints could deliver overvaluation to securities. 
 
The Source of Heterogeneous Beliefs 
 
First of all, it is important to know the possible sources of heterogeneous beliefs 
because short-sale constraints are supposed to restrict the pessimistic opinions. It 
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seems that asymmetric information might cause differences of opinion. The presence 
of private information suggests that investors could use it to trade and make a profit. 
However, Tirole (1982) and Milgrom and Stokey (1982) use no-trade theorem to rule 
out this possibility. They show that rational investors who share the same prior beliefs 
cannot expect to profit from speculating against each other based on differences in 
information. In particular, Tirole (1982) demonstrates that the no-trade theorem holds 
in dynamic Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE). In his model, the resale options 
suggested by Harrison and Kreps (1978) cannot arise in asset prices even if short-sale 
constraints are imposed.  
 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003a) summarized the approaches to avoid the no-trade 
result. First, the presence of traders, who trade for no-speculative reasons such as 
diversification or liquidity, would make the trading among speculators a positive-sum 
game. Several market microstructure models such as Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), 
Kyle (1985), and Wang (1993) adopt this approach with asymmetric information. The 
second option is to relax the assumption that agents share the same prior beliefs. This 
approach is pursued by Morris (1996), Biais and Bossaerts (1998), and Brav and 
Heaton (2002). Finally, the way out can be agents have behavioural biases that 
preclude full rationality. Hirshleier (2001) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) review 
various behavioural biases suggested by the psychology. In particular, some 
behavioural biases may generate heterogeneity of beliefs. For example, Brunnermeier 
and Parker (2003) present that heterogeneous beliefs can arise if agents gain utility 
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from adopting certain beliefs. Nevertheless, Overconfidence is the most well 
documented behavioural bias that can generate heterogeneous beliefs. 
 
Overconfidence is the tendency of people to overestimate the precision of their 
knowledge. Psychology studies, such as Alpert and Raiffa (1982), Brenner, Koehler, 
Liberman, and Tversky (1996), suggest that people are overconfident. Camerer (1995) 
argues that even experts can display overconfidence. Financial economists have 
developed theoretical models to analyse the implications of overconfidence on 
financial markets. Kyle and Wang (1997) adopt overconfidence as a commitment 
device over competitors to improve one’s welfare. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) use overconfidence to explain the predictable returns of 
financial assets. Odean (1998) demonstrates that overconfidence can cause excessive 
trading. Bernardo and Welch (2001) discuss the benefits of overconfidence to 
entrepreneurs through the reduced tendency to herd. In these studies, overconfidence 
is modelled as overestimation of the precision of one’s information. Scheinkman and 
Xiong (2003b) exploit the consequences of this overestimation in a dynamic model of 
pricing and trading. They regard overconfidence as a convenient way to generate a 
parameterized model of heterogeneous beliefs. Since overconfident investors believe 
more strongly in their own assessments of an asset’s value than in the assessment of 
others, heterogeneous beliefs arise. 
 
Theoretical Studies 
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In an earlier paper, Miller (1977) theorizes that in the presence of short-sale 
constraints, security prices tend to reflect a more optimistic valuation than the average 
opinion of potential investors and thus tend to be upward biased. This overvaluation 
argument is based on two conditions: (1) A security’s short sales are either prohibited 
or costly, and (2) investors have heterogeneous beliefs or information about the 
security’s value. The underlying intuition is quite straightforward. Pessimistic 
investors are forced to sit out of the market when short sales are not available, and 
thus some negative information is not reflected in prices, enabling enthusiastic buyers 
to bid prices above the level that average investors perceive as fair.  
 
Jarrow (1980) and Figlewski (1981) are among the first to model Miller’s (1977) idea 
rigorously in a static capital asset pricing model (CAPM) framework. In his general 
equilibrium analysis, Jarrow (1980) shows that the total effect of prohibiting short 
sales may be quite complex, owing to the substitution effect among stocks. When two 
equivalent markets that differ only with respect to short-sale restrictions are compared, 
the price of an individual risky asset under short-sale restrictions can be either higher 
or lower than the price of the same asset in the other market. Figlewski (1981) adopts 
a standard one-period model to show that when investors with unfavourable 
information are constrained from selling short, excess demand exists and equilibrium 
prices exceed the market-clearing price that would obtain if short-sale constraints did 
not exist. Figlewski’s (1981) conclusion is consistent with Miller’s (1977) intuition. 
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Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) obtain a similar result in their model that allows for risk 
aversion—stocks with short-sale constraints reflect optimistic beliefs and thus realize 
lower future returns. 
 
While the above static models analyse the overvaluation generated by optimistic 
beliefs, other studies adopt dynamic models to show that the price can be higher than 
the valuation of all investors because of the opportunity to speculate that arises when 
short selling is prohibited. In their dynamic model, Harrison and Kreps (1978) 
consider the trading dynamics of heterogeneous investors. They call that investors 
exhibit speculative behaviour if the right to resell an asset makes them willing to pay 
more for it than they would pay if obliged to hold it forever. They attribute this 
speculation to Keynes (1936), who finds that a trader speculate if his most interest is 
in cashing in capital gains rather than enjoying a future dividend stream. The 
speculation is particularly compelling when agents are risk-neutral since in this case 
no risk-sharing benefits arise from trading. Furthermore, short sales must be costly in 
order to make the resale option valuable in speculation. They show that speculative 
behaviour arises in the model under the assumptions that heterogeneous investors are 
risk-neutral and short sales are not possible. Thus, differences of opinions generate 
trading and speculation. 
 
Morris (1996) considers a special case of the model of Harrison and Kreps, where 
traders’ heterogeneous prior beliefs are updated rationally as information arrives. He 
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shows that even if traders’ posterior beliefs are converging to the true fundamental 
value, the speculative premium never disappears. As traders learn about the true 
distribution of some asset’s dividends, a speculative premium occurs as each trader 
anticipates the possibility of reselling the asset to another trader before complete 
learning has occurred. The speculative premium depends on differences in beliefs at 
all possible future contingencies. 
 
Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002) present a dynamic model to show that the 
prospect of lending fees may push the initial price of a stock above even the most 
optimistic buyer’s valuation. This happens because the optimistic investors not only 
expect returns from capital gains and from dividends, but also they expect to get extra 
fees from lending their stocks to short-sellers. This added benefit is of greatest 
significance when differences of opinion are particularly strong. 
 
Not only overpricing but also bubble can emerge when investors face short-sale 
constraints. Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993) show it is possible for short-sale 
constraints to generate finite bubbles. They distinguish between “expected” and 
“strong bubbles”. If each agent’s expected value of the asset is lower than the asset 
price, an expected bubble occurs. A strong bubble occurs if all agents know that the 
price is higher than the value of any possible dividend stream outcome. They show 
that the two conditions are necessary for an expected bubble to occur. First, the initial 
allocation must be interim Pareto inefficiency. Otherwise, no one will have the 
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incentive to buy the asset. This statement is analogous to the zero-sum argument in 
the proof of the no-trade theorem. In other words, this condition implies that there 
have to be gains from trade or at least some investors have to think that there might be 
gains from trade. Second, each agent must be short-sale constrained at some period in 
the future with positive probability. If an investor assigns positive probability to being 
short-sale constrained at some future contingency, he might like to hold on to an asset, 
even if the price is strictly higher than his marginal valuation of the asset. These two 
conditions above are necessary for expected bubbles as well as for strong bubbles 
because any strong bubble is also an expected bubble. Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite 
derive an additional necessary condition for strong bubbles. If a strong bubble occurs, 
everybody knows that no possible dividend realization can justify the price. To make 
this happen in equilibrium, traders must believe that the other traders do not know this 
fact. Therefore, strong bubbles can only occur if each trader has private information. 
This condition implies that strong bubbles can never arise in a market setting where 
net trades of all agents are common knowledge. 
 
Speculative bubble can arise under short-sale constraints if traders have 
heterogeneous beliefs. Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) indicate that the price of 
an asset exceeds fundamental value for two reasons. First, the price is biased upward 
because of heterogeneous initial beliefs. If these initial beliefs are sufficiently 
different, price only reflects the beliefs of the optimistic group as the pessimistic 
group simply sits out of the markets because of short-sale constraints. This is the 
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“optimism effect” (see, e.g., Miller 1977, Chen, Hong, and Stein 2002). Second, 
speculations can arise in the dynamics of trading. Investors pay prices that exceed 
their own valuation of future dividends as they anticipate find a buyer willing to pay 
even more in the future. This is the “resale option effect” (see, e.g., Harrison and 
Kreps 1978, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003b). 
 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003b) explore the speculative bubble with a 
continuous-time equilibrium model of speculative trading, which provides a flexible 
framework to analyse links between asset prices, trading volume, and price volatility. 
They use overconfident to generate heterogeneous beliefs among agents regarding 
asset fundamentals. There are three signals including dividend at each instant 
available to all agents for detecting fundamental value. According to their different 
interpretation of the signals, agents are divided into two groups. Each group 
overestimates the informativeness of a different signal and knows that its forecast 
differ from the other group’s. As information flows, the forecasts by agents of the two 
groups oscillate, and one group that is relatively more optimistic at one instant may 
become less optimistic than other group in the future. These fluctuations in relative 
beliefs generate trade. When evaluating the asset, agents consider not only their own 
view of fundamentals but also the fact that the owner of the asset has an option to sell 
it in the future to agents in other group. This option will be sent one by one. These 
characteristics make the option “American” and give it a recursive structure. The 
difference between the current owner’s demand price and his fundamental valuation, 
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which is exactly the resale option value, can be reasonably called a bubble. 
Fluctuations in the value of the bubble contribute an extra component to price 
volatility. Scheinkman and Xiong emphasize that the bubble is a consequence of the 
divergence of opinions generated by the overestimation of informativeness of the 
distinct signals. On average, agents in their model are neither optimists nor pessimists. 
 
Apart from bubbles, market crashes could occur under short-sale constraints as well. 
Hong and Stein (2003) develop a theory of market crashes based on differences of 
opinion among investors. Because of short-sale constraints, bearish investors do not 
initially participate in the market and their information is not revealed in prices. 
However, if other previously bullish investors bail out of the market, the originally 
bearish group may become the marginal “support buyers”, and more will be learned 
about their signals. Therefore, accumulated hidden information comes out during 
market declines. 
 
Empirical Studies 
 
Most empirical tests are carried out to test whether more short-sale constrained firms 
are overvalued. Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) present that one strand of the 
literature employs proxies for shorting demand or shorting supply. The idea behind 
looking at shorting demand is that some investors may want to short a stock but may 
be impeded by constraints; if one can measure the size of this group of investors, then 
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one can measure the extent of overpricing or the extent of private information left out 
of the market. The idea behind looking at shorting supply is that shorting a stock 
requires that one first borrow the shares, and thus a low supply of lendable shares may 
indicate that short-sale constraints are binding tightly. 
 
The oldest empirical literature on short-selling focuses on short interest ratios (shares 
sold short divided by shares outstanding) as a proxy for shorting demand. Figlewski 
(1981) examines the relationship between the level of short interest and subsequent 
stock returns. His tests assume that short interest proxies for the level of shares that 
would be sold short if short-sale constraints were nonexistent, and therefore, the 
amount of adverse information that was excluded from the market price. He provides 
some evidence that more heavily shorted firms underperform less heavily shorted 
firms. Note that his findings is not strong because while the least shorted firms 
produced positive abnormal returns with high statistical significance, the most shorted 
deciles did not produce statistically significant negative abnormal returns.  
 
Some papers also find statistically significant subsequent underperformance for 
heavily shorted firms. For example, Asquith and Meulbroek (1995) and Desai, 
Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran (2002) find significant abnormal returns for 
stocks with high short interest on, respectively, the NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges 
for 1976 to 1993 and 1988 to 1994. Note that the methodologies used in these two 
papers were not designed to provide a test of Miller (1977)’s overpricing story. 
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However, other papers, including Woolridge and Dickson (1994), Brent, Morse and 
Stice (1990), and Figlewski and Webb (1993), find little or no relation between the 
level of short interest and subsequent returns. Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and 
Balachandran (2002) argue that this could be due to the problematic nature of short 
interest. For example, a low level of short interest may not indicate low shorting 
demand: Stocks that are impossible to short could have a huge shorting demand, yet 
the level of short interest is zero. The weak results could also be due to the typical 
focus on levels of short interest, rather than changes. Alternatively, they argue that the 
weak results could be due to the use of small and/or biased samples in these early 
studies. 
 
Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) also claim that short interest proxy suffers limitations. 
They argue that variations in short interest may reflect variations in the transactions 
costs of selling short rather than in suppressed negative information. Thus, a stock 
with a low or zero value of short interest may simply be difficult or costly to sell short, 
which could potentially translate into more, rather than less, negative information 
being held from the market. They argue further that no clear-cut interpretation of the 
relationship between short interest and subsequent returns may exist because of 
D’Avolio (2002)’s finding. D’Avolio shows that for stock deciles sorted by short 
interest, neither the mean loan fee nor the percentage of stocks with high loan fees in 
the portfolio is monotonic in the actual short interest.  
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A variety of studies offer alternative approaches to measure the short-sale constraints 
by exploiting the fact that an unwillingness or inability to short may limit the 
revelation of negative opinions. For example, institutional or cultural norms may limit 
shorting. Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2002) find that only about 30% of 
mutual funds are allowed by their charters to sell short and only 2% actually do sell 
short. Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) use this fact to motivate their choice of breadth 
of mutual fund ownership as an indicator of the extent to which negative valuations 
are not expressed in prices. They find that reductions in breadth, which signal an 
increase in the amount of negative information withheld from the market, lead to 
negative subsequent abnormal returns on average during the sample period, 1979 to 
1998.  
 
Similarly, Nagel (2005) uses residual institutional ownership as a proxy for shorting 
demand by assuming low residual institutional ownership signals that negative 
information is being withheld from stock prices. He finds that underperformance in 
growth stocks and high dispersion stocks is concentrated among stocks with low 
institutional ownership. However, when he combines his sample period with that in 
Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), there is no longer a reliable pattern during the 1980 to 
2003 period between breadth of mutual fund ownership and future returns. Residual 
institutional ownership may also proxy for shorting supply, since low institutional 
ownership restricts the supply of available shares on loan. As in Chen, Hong, and 
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Stein (2002), it is not clear which channel (shorting demand or shorting supply) drives 
the results. Mutual fund and institutional investment, aside from representing only a 
portion of the investing universe, are also driven by nonshorting considerations such 
as investment style. 
 
Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005), one of the few papers that explicitly recognizes 
the competing effects of shorting supply and shorting demand, argue that stocks with 
high shorting demand and low shorting supply are the most likely to face binding 
short-sale constraints. They show that stocks in the highest percentile of short interest 
(their proxy for shorting demand) and the lowest third of institutional ownership (their 
proxy for shorting supply) underperform by 215 basis points per month during the 
1988 to 2002 period on an equal-weight basis. Note that they also face the same 
interpretation problems mentioned above since they proxy for shorting supply and 
demand using institutional ownership and short interest.  
 
While Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) do not disentangle the individual effects of 
shorting supply and shorting demand, Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) is the first 
paper to examine the link between the shorting market and stock prices by isolating 
shifts in the supply and demand for shorting. Their paper is unique because they are 
able to use actual data on loan fees and loan amounts (not proxies) from a large 
institutional investor to decompose the effect on stock prices into the part that is due 
to shorting demand, and the part that is due to shorting supply. They find that shorting 
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demand is an important predictor of future stock returns: an increase in shorting 
demand leads to negative abnormal returns of 2.98% in the following month. 
Furthermore, they show that the results are stronger in environments with less public 
information flow, suggesting that the shorting market is an important mechanism for 
private information revelation. 
 
Another empirical approach tries to obtain data on the direct costs of shorting from 
the stock loan market, which provides a measure of the constraints on short selling. 
The most commonly used metric is the rebate rate, in particular, the spread between 
the rebate rate and the market interest rate. The existing evidence on rebate rates has 
generally been limited to proprietary databases over short time periods. Using a 
database from a single lender from April 2000 through September 2001, D’Avolio 
(2002) reports that only 9% of the stocks in his sample are “on special” (defined here 
as a loan fee greater than 1% per annum) on a typical day. The other 91% typically 
have loan fees around 20 basis points per annum. In other words, the rebate rate is 
typically about 20 basis points less than the Federal Funds rate. He does find that 
stocks on special have higher short interest.  
 
Using a sample of rebate rates from a single lender from November 1998 through 
October 1999, Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002) conclude that short-sale constraints are 
unable to explain anomalous patterns in stock returns. Meanwhile, using proprietary 
data from July 1999 to December 2001, Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004) 
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document that stocks that violate put-call parity are more likely to underperform. 
Finally, using a small database of rebate rates hand-collected from the Wall Street 
Journal from 1926 to 1933, Jones and Lamont (2002) find that stocks with low rebate 
rates (high loan fees) experience low subsequent returns. However, the effect is 
modest. They only find large negative size-adjusted returns (−2.52% in the following 
month) among stocks that are both expensive to short and new to the loan crowd 
(another proxy for high shorting demand). 
 
Since derivatives such as option could provide alternative ways to take a short 
position in a security, one empirical approach considers the link between short-sale 
constraints and stock prices in the context of option introductions. For example, 
Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) focus on abnormal stock returns following option 
listings. Since traded put and call options arguably offer a low-cost way of 
establishing a short position, the listing of options can be viewed as the de facto 
alleviation of short-sale constraints. Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) find that post-1980 
option introductions are associated with negative abnormal returns in underlying 
stocks. Similarly, Ofek and Richardson (2003) use data on DotComs and show that 
short-sale constraints, in the form of stock option lockups, have a considerable and 
persistent negative impact on subsequent stock returns. However, these papers have 
limitations. Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) only analyses optionable stocks, which tend 
to be large, while Ofek and Richardson (2003) only explores Internet IPOs. In 
addition, Mayhew and Mihov (2005) find no evidence that investors take 
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disproportionately bearish positions in newly listed options. This may serve to weaken 
the causal link between a relaxation of short-sale constraints and stock prices in the 
context of option introductions.  
 
While the above empirical tests of the overpricing hypothesis examine the impact of 
short-sale constraints on stock prices, a different approach focuses on the degree of 
divergence in opinions. For example, Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) use the 
dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts to measure the dispersion of investor 
opinions and show that stocks with higher dispersion earn lower future returns than 
otherwise similar stocks. However, Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) argue that 
these pervious tests are imperfect because Miller (1977)’s hypothesis implies that both 
the dispersion of investors opinion and the short-sale constraints are necessary to 
stock price overvaluation. They examine the valuation effects of the interaction 
between these two conditions and show that high dispersion of investor opinions and 
short-sale constraints are both required to produce overvaluation. Mohanaraman 
(2003) also combine the two conditions to test the Miller (1977) story. He finds that 
high short interest stocks have lower returns the greater the dispersion in analysts’ 
forecasts.  
 
Another paper also examines the overvaluation effect of short-sale constraints based 
on the combination of two factors. Henry (2006) considers the effect of informed 
trading on the returns to stocks with high levels of short interest. Portfolios in his 
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paper that constructed by interacting short-sale constraint metrics with informed trade 
metrics produce more negative returns than portfolios constructed along only one 
dimension. Among highly shorted firms, portfolios with high levels of informed 
trading generally underperform but those with low levels of informed trading do not. 
The results suggest that the underperformance of high short interest stocks is driven 
by firms that have high levels of informed trading. However, this negative relationship 
between informed trading and returns is reversed for stocks with low to moderate 
short interest levels. 
 
2.3.3. Short-Sale Constraints under Asymmetric Information 
 
Nonetheless, whether short-sale constraints will always lead to overpricing is far from 
certain. While most of studies do not explore the short-sale constraints effects in an 
asymmetric information setting, some papers consider the asymmetric information 
setting. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) show that sort-sale constraints do not 
necessarily lead to overvaluation. They examine the effects of short-sale constraints in 
a rational expectations framework. In their model, short-sale constraints reduce the 
adjustment speed of prices to private information, especially to bad news, since 
investors with negative information are prohibited from shorting. However, short-sale 
constraints do not lead to an upward bias in prices in their model. This is because 
when investors forming their own beliefs, they could rationally take into account the 
fact that negative information may be not reflected in trading prices. In contrast to 
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Miller (1977) and other optimism models, Diamond and Verrecchia’s (1987) work is 
more in the efficient markets tradition. However, they make a strong assumption by 
introducing a risk-neutral market maker who has perfect knowledge of the economic 
environment and can perform Bayesian updating in the short period between two 
consecutive trades. 
 
More recently, three studies including Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006), Marin and 
Olivier (2008), and Yuan (2006) also focus on the asymmetric information setting and 
provide new insights on asset pricing under short-sale constraints. Firstly, Marin and 
Olivier (2006) provide an explanation to one puzzle that the price of individual stocks 
sometimes crashes without the arrival of fundamental news. They attribute this to one 
hypothesis that crashes may be caused by the absence of insider trading. Their theory 
indicates that rational uninformed investors may react more strongly to the absence of 
insider sales than to their presence (the “dog that did not bark” effect). Their empirical 
evidence supports this because they find that at the individual stock level insiders 
sales peak many months before a large drop in the stock price, while insiders 
purchases peak only the month before a large jump. 
 
Secondly, Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006) study how short-sale constraints affect asset 
price and market efficiency. They consider a fully rational expectations equilibrium 
model, in which investors trade to share risk and to speculate on private information 
in the presence of short-sale constraints. Short-sale constraints limit both types of 
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trades, and thus reduce the allocational and informational efficiency of the market. 
Limiting short sales driven by risk-sharing simply shifts the demand for the asset 
upwards and consequently its price. However, limiting short sales driven by private 
information increases the uncertainty about the asset as perceived by less informed 
investors, which reduces their demand for the asset. When this information effect 
dominates, short-sale constraints actually cause asset prices to decrease and price 
volatility to increase. Moreover, they show that short-sale constraints can give rise to 
discrete price drops accompanied by a sharp rise in volatility when prices fail to be 
informative and the uncertainty perceived by uninformed investors surges. 
 
Thirdly, Yuan (2006) argue that short-sale constraints when combined with 
information asymmetry dampen the upward price movement and thus make bubbles 
difficult to form. Her theory considers the situation that when a high level of noise 
demand increases the price, informed investors may be constrained out of the market 
due to short-sale restrictions. In this scenario, informed investors' private information 
is not embedded in the market clearing price, resulting a noisy price. Uninformed 
investors are less willing to purchase the asset since they cannot distinguish noise 
demand from information-based buying. Their demand becomes more elastic as the 
price increases, inducing a dampening effect. Hence, large upward price movements 
become less likely. 
 
Note that Yuan (2006) captures different market phenomenon from Marin and Olivier 
 60
(2008), and Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006). The differences are due to choice of model 
setup. In the model of Yuan (2006), there is a noisy demand or supply shock so that 
prices do not fully reveal private information, similar to the noisy rational 
expectations equilibrium (REE) model that used by Hellwig (1980). Instead of this 
independent noise trading, the latter two studies introduce noise trading through 
informed investor hedging need on their non-tradable asset. Following Bhattacharya 
and Spiegel (1991), Marin and Olivier (2008) extend the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
model by substituting noise trading with rational trading driven by stochastic hedging 
needs. In addition, they introduce a simple constraint on asset holdings. Bai, Chang, 
and Wang (2006) also extend Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980) framework with 
differently informed investors. They consider fully rational expectations equilibrium 
model, in which investors trade to share risk and to speculate on private information 
in the presence of short-sale constraints. 
 
Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980) model was developed to address the partial 
information transmission role of prices. That is, prices perform a role in conveying 
information from informed investors to uninformed investors. Informed investors 
possess superior information because they have bought an identical signal of the risky 
asset’s private information. In addition, the aggregate supply of the risky asset is set to 
be random. Uninformed investors can only partially infer the private signal from the 
prices because they cannot disentangle the price change due to the noise aggregate 
supply from the change which is due to the informed trading. On the other hand, 
 61
Hellwig’s model (1980) captures the information aggregation role of prices. If there is 
not only one piece of private information but there are many informed investors with 
different pieces of private information, the equilibrium price corresponds to some 
aggregate of all the pieces of private information. In this case, the aggregation of 
private information through price depends on investors’ preferences. Intuitively, the 
price impact of investor i’s private information should depend on the reaction of 
investor i to this information, which in turn should depend on investor i’s preference. 
Hellwig study the aggregation of information in a large market, in which individual 
investors have no influence on the price. In particular, the relative importance of the 
information available to investor i depends on his preferences. His information is 
relatively the more important, the less risk averse he is. Furthermore, the equilibrium 
price will reflect only those components of information that are common to a large 
number of informed investors. In other words, the market is a good aggregator of 
information, if there are many informed investors with many independent sources of 
private information. In this case, the “noise” in the information available to any 
individual investor is filtered out and does not affect the price. 
 
This modelling difference causes several significant differences in results. In 
particular, short-sale constraints are likely to bind when prices are high in Yuan (2006), 
which captures the phenomenon that informed investors are short-sale constrained 
when the high asset price is caused by a high level of noise demand, a scenario similar 
to the “tech” bubble. A decrease in price informativeness in this case lowers the 
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likelihood of bubbles but will not cause crashes. By contrast, in Marin and Olivier 
(2008), and Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006), short-sale constraints are likely to bind 
when asset prices are low. This is because informed investors are endowed with 
excess non-traded risky assets. To hedge this non-traded risk, they have to short-sell 
the traded asset that is positively correlated with the non-traded asset. Consequently, 
the sharp drop of price informativeness due to short-sale constraints causes a crash in 
the price of the traded asset. Therefore, they capture a different set of market 
conditions.  
 
Furthermore, the source of uncertainty in Yuan (2006) is also different from that 
identified in these two studies. In Marin and Olivier (2008), and Bai, Chang, and 
Wang (2006), at a given price, informed investors' demand can be inferred and so is 
their constraint status. By comparison, in Yuan (2006), informed investors' constraint 
status cannot be inferred with certainty since the high price could be caused either by 
a high realization of private signals or by a high level of noise trading. This introduces 
an additional source of perceived uncertainty to uninformed investors and causes 
equilibrium price more skewed and more volatile. 
 
2.4. Asymmetric Information Literature 
 
Financial markets are driven by news and information. Although standard asset 
pricing theory assumes that all market participants possess the same information, 
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different investors hold different information in reality.  
 
2.4.1. The Importance of Information 
 
The fact that information matters in financial markets is because of the close 
relationship between information and price. First, information could have significant 
impact on prices. Since asset entails uncertain future payments, asset prices are driven 
by expectations about these future payoffs. In order to make trading decisions, traders 
evaluate their expectations based on their information. Thus, their information could 
affect their trading activity and, hence the asset prices. Second, investors can learn 
information from price system. Since the actions of informed traders are driven by 
their information set, uninformed traders can infer part of the private information held 
by informed traders from the current movement of an asset’s price. Thus, 
Brunnermeier (2001) presents that prices have a dual role: an index of scarcity or 
bargaining power and a conveyor of information.  
 
Information asymmetry typically occurs when some investors have better or more 
timely information than others. The source of this asymmetry can simply be the 
superior knowledge that informed traders obtain both private and public information 
but uninformed traders only have public information. Secondly, even if all traders 
received the same news, they still might interpret it differently. Typically one has to 
make use of other information to figure out the impact of this news on the asset’s 
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value. Hence, traders with different background information might draw different 
conclusions from the same news. 
 
Finally, the impossibility of perfect information efficiency enhances the impact of 
asymmetric information. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that market prices 
cannot fully reveal all relevant information since, if they did, no one would have an 
incentive to spend resources on gathering information in the first place. Traders who 
collect information must make extra profit from doing that. Consequently, the 
competitive equilibrium with costly, endogenous information acquisition does not 
exist if markets are perfect informationally efficient. This is known as the 
“Grossman-Stiglitz paradox”. 
 
Therefore, financial markets cannot be well understood without considering 
asymmetric information. As a result, the study of asset pricing under asymmetric 
information arises. 
 
2.4.2. No-Trade Theorem and Partially Revealing Equilibrium 
 
There are huge trading activities in financial markets. The high trading volume is 
often attributed to the speculation of investors. Investors might speculate if they hold 
different opinions about the value of assets, which might be due to different 
information among traders. However, counter to this intuition, asymmetric 
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information alone cannot explain the high trading volume in financial markets. 
 
No-trade theorem shows that asymmetry in information will not lead to trade if it is 
common knowledge that all traders are rational and the current allocation is ex ante 
Pareto efficient (Milgrom and Stokey 1982, Tirole 1982). An event is common 
knowledge in a certain state if all agents know that the true sate lies in this event and 
all know that all know this and so on, ad infinitum. Note that the no-trade theorem 
goes further than market efficiency and argues that even if you do know something 
that others do not, you still cannot profit from that knowledge. Ross (2004) explains 
that the key to this result is that the method by which people acquire information is 
common knowledge, which roughly means that while someone else does not know 
what you know, they do know that you might know something useful and that you 
know that they know it, and so on. As a result, trader will have the idea that why 
should I trade with others since if they want to trade with me, they must think they 
can make money at my expense.  
 
Currently, the preferred way to rule out the no-trade theorem is by positing a noisy 
rational expectations equilibrium model. Following Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), 
most models exogenously introduce noise in order to make the equilibrium price only 
partially revealing. 
 
Brunnermeier (2001) defines an equilibrium that is partially revealing if less informed 
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traders cannot determine whether the unexpected price changes are due to others’ 
information of common interest or information of their private interest. The literature 
refers to trade due to information of common interest as informational trading, 
whereas trade due to information of private interest is called uninformed trading or 
noise/liquidity trading. 
 
Thus, investors receive different information in partially revealing equilibrium. 
Consequently, they will have different beliefs and hence, trade for holding different 
assets.  
 
2.4.3. Asset Pricing under Asymmetric Information 
 
Since the traditional asset pricing theory abstracts from the trading mechanics, O’Hara 
(2003) argues that it ignores the central fact that market microstructure literature 
focuses: Asset prices evolve in markets. Much of market microstructure analyses 
differences in information between investors, and how the flows of differential 
information generate trade, spreads and price changes (O’Hara 1995, Madhavan 2000, 
Harris 2003). Therefore, Easley and O’Hara (2003) suggest that a junction of 
traditional asset pricing and market microstructure paradigms would be beneficial for 
asset pricing under asymmetric information. 
 
O’Hara (2003) provides an elegant interpretation for why asymmetric information 
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could affect prices. In the standard story, with an infinite number of assets and an 
infinite number of agents with the same information, diversification can remove any 
asset-specific risk. In particular, if risks are uncorrelated across assets, then 
diversifying makes the risk totally vanish, and hence investor could simply hold one 
share of every asset. If the risks are correlated, then only market risk remains, this is 
the CAPM story. Thus, in either case, the idiosyncratic risk attaching to individual 
assets is not important.  
 
However, she suggests that, this is not the case if there is differential information. 
Information creates a risk for uninformed traders as the trading gains of the informed 
come from the trading losses of the uninformed. Unfortunately, the uninformed are 
unable to diversify the risk that the informed are making their profit. Thus, unless 
prices are fully revealing, or public information is perfect, this kind of 
non-diversifiable risk remains.  
 
So, why the uninformed investors continue to trade? She argues that they recognize 
risk and they demand compensation for bearing it. Uninformed investors know they 
will lose to better informed investors, but they have portfolio choices to make. These 
choices allow them to choose assets in which their risk of losing to better informed 
investors is lower. Therefore, this risk should be compensated in equilibrium. Traders 
demand extra returns to induce them to hold assets in which information risk is great. 
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Theoretical Evidence 
 
Akerlof (1970) suggests that the asymmetric information among traders creates an 
“adverse selection problem” (or “lemon’s problem”): uninformed traders cannot 
discern the extent to which the price change is due to informed or uninformed demand. 
This problem triggers the substantial research on how asymmetric information affects 
asset prices. In particular, the literature on partially revealing rational expectations 
shows how differential information affects asset prices.  
 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) consider a noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium 
(REE) in which investors are competitive price takers who learn from prices. In 
equilibrium, while some investors refrain from collecting information, others incur 
cost in gathering information and get compensated in the form of superior expected 
investment performance such that the two groups of investors have the same overall 
expected utility.  
 
Grossman and Stiglitz’s model captures the partial information transmission role of 
prices, but does not illustrate the information aggregation role of prices. This is 
because information is not dispersed among the traders in their model. This additional 
aspect is analysed by Hellwig (1980) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981).  
 
Moreover, Hellwig raises another problem: traders behave “schizophrenically” in a 
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competitive REE. On the one hand, each trader takes the equilibrium price as given 
when making his trading decision. On the other hand, he tries to infer information 
from the price, which means that he thinks that private information is reflected in the 
price. To deal with this problem, Admati (1985) extends Hellwig’s setting to a model 
with multiple risky assets and infinitely many traders. Thus in this “large market” 
model each informed trader becomes “small” in an appropriate sense. In this model, 
her analysis shows how investors face different risk-return tradeoffs when differential 
information is not fully revealed in equilibrium. 
 
Wang (1993) presents a two-asset, dynamic REE model that asymmetric information 
has three effects on asset prices. First, uninformed investors require a risk premium to 
compensate them for the adverse selection problem. Second, informed trading also 
makes prices more informative, thereby reducing the risk for the uninformed and 
lowering the risk premium. Third, the increasing asymmetry in information among 
investors can cause price volatility to increase because the adverse selection problem 
becomes more severe. Moreover, the optimal investment strategy of the informed 
investors depends not only on the value of the underlying true state variables but also 
on the reaction of uninformed investors. At last, he suggests that it can be optimal for 
less informed traders to chase the trend.  
 
Brennan and Cao (1997) use a similar idea to explain how superior information about 
home country assets can help explain international equity flows. They show that when 
 70
domestic investors possess a cumulative information advantage over foreign investors 
about their domestic market, investors tend to purchase foreign assets in periods when 
the return on foreign assets is high and to sell when the return is low. 
 
Jones and Slezak (1999) construct a multi-asset dynamic rational expectations model 
to investigate the implications of asymmetric information on both cross-sectional and 
dynamic properties of asset returns. They demonstrate that the model is capable of 
generating a variety of behaviour, some of which are roughly consistent with 
well-established empirical regularities, including (1) the size effect, (2) the 
asymmetric lead-lag between the returns on large and small firms over short horizons, 
(3) the weak relationship between beta (from CAPM) and expected return, and (4) the 
success of other variables (e.g., book-to-market) at explaining the cross section of 
expected returns. 
 
Easley and O’Hara (2004) build a multi-asset partially revealing REE model to 
examine the role of information in affecting a firm's cost of capital. They show that if 
information about an asset is private, rather than public, then uninformed investors 
demand a higher rate of return on the asset to compensate for the risk of trading with 
better informed traders. In equilibrium, the quantity and quality of information affect 
asset prices. 
 
Empirical Evidence 
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Despite that information, particularly private information, is not directly observable, 
the microstructure literature provides ways for empirical research. Firstly, Kyle (1985) 
provides Kyle λ , which measures the responsiveness of prices to signed order flow. 
It can be estimated by regressing price changes on signed order flow. This measure is 
developed based on the idea that liquidity suppliers in securities markets are always 
aware that other traders may have better information. In particular, Kyle (1985) 
models the behaviour of a single market maker who sets a ‘‘break-even’’ price in 
response to the net combined order flow of informed and uninformed traders. The 
market maker’s price sensitivity to order flow, also called the ‘‘price impact’’, is set to 
balance the market maker’s losses from trades with the informed against gains from 
trades with the uninformed. Thus, the price impact is a function of the degree of 
asymmetric information in the market. 
 
Secondly, the probability of information-based trade (PIN), from Easley, Kiefer and 
O’Hara (1997b), refers to the measure of the importance of private information in a 
microstructure setting. PIN, which can be estimated from data on trades, measures the 
fraction of orders that arise from informed traders. The PIN measure is a private 
information measure because it is a function of abnormal order flow. The underlying 
assumption is that public information is directly incorporated into prices without the 
need of trading activity, whereas private information is reflected in excess buying or 
excess selling pressure (abnormal order flow). In other words, order flow captures 
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information that is not common knowledge because, if it were common knowledge, 
the specialist would have automatically moved prices to the appropriate level and 
there would not have been any trading activity. 
  
There is a substantial literature adopts the above two measures to test the impact of 
asymmetric information on prices. For the papers on the Kyle λ  measure, for 
example, see Glosten and Harris (1988), Hasbrouck (1991), Foster and Viswanathan 
(1993), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), and Amihud (2002). The papers on PIN 
measure include, for instance, Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1996, 1997a, b), Easley, 
Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996), and Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002). 
 
All these papers provide evidence that asymmetric information affects asset prices. 
For instance, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Amihud (2002) argue that 
stocks with high λ  are less attractive to uninformed investors. Easley, Hvidkjaer and 
O’Hara (2002) use a structural microstructure model to estimate the probability of 
information-based trade in each NYSE common stock yearly for the period 1983 to 
1998. They show that stocks with higher rates of return require higher rates of return. 
This result suggests that the risk of informed trading is priced. 
 
While models of adverse selection risk in literature generally assume that market 
makers offset expected losses to informed traders with expected gains from the 
uninformed, Odders-White and Ready (2008) suggest that focusing only on the 
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expected loss to informed traders provides an incomplete picture. They recognize that 
measures of the expected loss capture a combination of two effects: (1) the probability 
of a private information event, and (2) the likely magnitude of the information. Thus, 
they develop a method of separately estimating the probability and magnitude of 
private information using returns and trade imbalances. Their findings suggest that 
firms with similar expected losses can have markedly different probabilities and 
magnitudes of private information events. For example, large firms have smaller, 
more frequent information events, while small firms experience larger, less frequent 
events. These differences cannot be observed by simply studying adverse selection 
costs (e.g., spreads or price impacts). They suggest that their separation on the 
probability and magnitude of information events is important and their estimation 
method is a reasonable alternative when the PIN estimation cannot be used. 
 
More recently, Duarte and Young (2009) examine whether PIN is priced because of 
information asymmetry or because of other liquidity effects that are unrelated to 
information asymmetry. They find that the original PIN model of Easley, Kiefer and 
O’Hara (1997b) cannot match the pervasive positive correlation between buy and sell 
order flow or the relatively large variances of buy and sell order flow. They develop 
an extension of the PIN model to accommodate these mismatch problems by allowing 
for simultaneous positive shocks to both buy and sell order flow. This extension 
model can be used to compute a new measure of asymmetric information, AdjPIN. 
Since AdjPIN is orthogonal to expected returns in a Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression, 
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PIN is not priced because it is a proxy for information asymmetry. They further use 
the extended model to develop a measure of illiquidity unrelated to information 
asymmetry, PSOS (probability of symmetric order-flow shock). In addition to being 
related to illiquidity, PSOS is strongly correlated with PIN while the correlation 
between PSOS and AdjPIN is relatively low. Thus, PSOS is the component of PIN 
that proxies for illiquidity unrelated to asymmetric information. Since the estimated 
relation between expected returns and PSOS is strong, the relation between PIN and 
expected returns is due to the fact that PIN is also a proxy of illiquidity not related to 
private information. They therefore conclude that liquidity effects unrelated to 
information asymmetry explain the relation between PIN and the cross-section of 
expected returns. 
 
2.5. Information Uncertainty Literature 
 
Although it seems that information uncertainty is closely related to asymmetric 
information, they can be very different from each other. The essence of asymmetric 
information means that different people hold different information, while information 
uncertainty focuses on the information environment of firms which determines the 
convenience of acquiring and studying information.  
 
2.5.1. The Concept of Information Uncertainty 
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In the prior literature, information uncertainty is often modelled as the information 
asymmetry component of the cost of capital (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1991, 
Easley and O’Hara 2001, Verrecchia 2001) or estimation risk (e.g., Barry and Brown 
1985, Coles and Loewenstein 1988, Klein and Bawa 1976). More recently, Jiang, Lee, 
and Zhang (2005) and Zhang (2006) propose that information uncertainty means the 
ambiguity with respect to the implications of new information for a firm’s value, 
which potentially stems from two sources: the volatility of a firm’s underlying 
fundamentals and poor information. Specifically, they argue that information 
asymmetry means some agents know more about a firm’s value than others, while 
information uncertainty refers to the value ambiguity, or the degree to which a firm’s 
value can be reasonably estimated by even the most knowledgeable investors at 
reasonable costs. High uncertainty firms, for example, are companies whose expected 
cash flows are less knowable, perhaps because of the nature of their business or 
operation environment. These firms associated with higher information acquisition 
costs, and estimates of their fundamental values are inherently less reliable and more 
volatile. 
 
2.5.2. Asset Pricing under Information Uncertainty  
 
The empirical findings on information uncertainty are normally difficult to reconcile 
with traditional asset pricing models. Specifically, prior studies have found that 
younger firms (Zhang 2006), firms with higher volatility (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and 
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Zhang 2003), higher volume (or turnover) (Lee and Swaminathan 2000), greater 
expected growth (LaPorta 1996), higher price-to-book (PB) ratios (Fama and French 
1992), wider dispersion in analyst earnings forecast (Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina 
2002), and longer implied duration in their future cash flows (DeChow, Sloan, and 
Soliman 2003), all earn lower subsequent returns. 
 
These empirical results are puzzling because in standard asset pricing models, 
non-systematic risk is not priced, and various information uncertainty proxies should 
have no ability to predict future returns. More recently, Easley and O’Hara (2003) 
examine information risk in asset pricing. However, this kind of model focuses on 
information asymmetry and predicts that higher information uncertainty should be 
associated with higher information risk or greater information acquisition costs and 
hence higher (not lower) expected returns. 
 
While the rational framework under asymmetric information could not provide 
explanations for empirical evidence of information uncertainty, behavioural finance 
establishes the approach. Hirshleifer (2001) posits that greater uncertainty about a set 
of stocks leave more room for psychological biases. Therefore, the misvaluation 
effects of almost any mistaken-beliefs model should be strongest among firms about 
which there is high uncertainty and poor information. For example, Daniel, Hirshleifer, 
and Subrahmanyam (1998, 2001) show that return predictability should be stronger in 
firms with greater uncertainty because investors tend to be more overconfident when 
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firms’ businesses are hard to value. 
 
Thus, Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) argue that when information uncertainty of firms 
is higher, investors’ individual valuations are more diffused and solid feedback on the 
quality of their private signal is more difficult to obtain. Thus, investors in 
high-uncertainty firms tend to overweight their private signals, and place too little 
weight on public news and news about firm fundamentals. Using several different 
proxies for information uncertainty, Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) show that high 
uncertainty firms tend to be overpriced and hence earn lower future returns. 
Furthermore, high uncertainty firms will exhibit greater price and earnings momentum 
effects.  
 
Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) argue that another important feature of a high 
uncertainty environment is the ability to constrain arbitrage. With greater value 
ambiguity, rational traders face elevated information acquisition costs and greater 
information risk associated with noisy value estimates. Perhaps even more importantly, 
they confront the increased likelihood of informational cascades. For instance, 
Bikchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) show that when each individual receives a 
noisy private signal, it is often optimal to follow the behaviour of the preceding 
traders without regard of his own information. Thus, Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) 
argue that when firm value is highly uncertain, rational investors will adapt by relying 
more heavily on the recent actions of others than on their own signals. An important 
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consequence of this behaviour is that rational forces can actually exacerbate, rather 
than correct, deviations of price from fundamental value. Therefore, the increased 
likelihood of informational cascades also contributes to greater price and earnings 
momentum effects among high uncertainty firms. 
 
2.5.3. Information Uncertainty and Information Disclosure 
 
Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) also adopt information uncertainty as the measure of 
information diffusion speed. They consider analyst coverage as proxy for rate of 
information flow. Thus, information uncertainty is closely related information 
disclosure. Plenty of accounting studies have documented the effect of information 
disclosure on returns. Verrecchia (2001) provide a survey of the theoretical work, and 
Healy and Palepu (2001) give a survey of the empirical work. These reports show that 
while the theoretical argument that accounting disclosure can reduce information 
uncertainty and cost of capital is appealing, but the overall empirical evidence is 
mixed. More recently, Zhang (2006) show that the effects of information uncertainty 
on future returns following good and bad news offset each other in unsigned analysis 
might explain why previous studies often find an insignificant effect of accounting 
disclosure. He also suggests a potential additional role for accounting disclosure. That 
is, more transparent disclosure might reduce information uncertainty and speed the 
absorption of new information into the stock prices. 
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Chapter 3 
  
Informed Trading, Short-Sale Constraints,  
and Information Uncertainty 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
It is puzzling that the prices of individual stocks sometimes decline without the arrival 
of fundamental news. There are many possible answers to this phenomenon. In 
contrast with the traditional asset pricing models (such as CAPM, APT of Ross 1977, 
and representative agent asset-pricing model of Lucas 1978), recent studies that focus 
on various market frictions provide fresh views. This chapter empirically examines 
one possible explanation that based on the combination impact of short-sale 
constraints and information asymmetry on stock prices. According to three key papers 
including Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006), Yuan (2006), and Marin and Olivier (2008), 
the unusual declines of stock prices can be due to the reaction of uninformed investors 
to a new information uncertainty risk. In particular, uninformed investors will require 
a price discount to hold the stock because they will perceive a new information 
uncertainty risk when short-sale constraints are binding and informed trading is 
absent.  
 
The theory behind this new information uncertainty risk effect is that the trading 
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activities of informed investors help their private information gets incorporated into 
stocks prices and hence prices adjust to the fundamental value continuously. Thus, 
stock prices become less informative when binding short-sale constraints keep 
informed investors from trading on their private information. The less informative 
prices create a new information uncertainty risk for uninformed investors, since 
uninformed investors are unable to figure out the true value of the stock without 
knowing the private information held by informed investors. Because of this new 
information uncertainty risk, uninformed investors are reluctant to hold the stock 
unless there is a price discount. While the three key papers concentrate on asset 
pricing implications of short-sale constraints in an asymmetric information setting, 
this chapter focuses on the role of informed trading in this new information 
uncertainty risk effect and proposes the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Stocks will have lower future returns if the level of informed trading is 
lower and when short-sale constraints are binding.  
 
In addition, this chapter argues that the new information uncertainty risk effect can be 
affected by stock’s information uncertainty condition. Information uncertainty here, as 
presented in Zhang (2006), means the ambiguity with respect to the implications of 
new information for a firm’s value. It potentially stems from two sources: the 
volatility of a firm’s underlying fundamentals and poor information. In other words, 
information uncertainty reflects the convenience of learning the fundamental value of 
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stock. Accordingly, the level of stock’s information uncertainty is negatively related to 
the level of price’s informative condition. If stock has greater information uncertainty, 
the new information uncertainty risk perceived by uninformed investors will be 
stronger because (1) they would find it is harder to study the true value of stock; (2) 
they have to rely more on informed investors’ private information. If stock has lower 
information uncertainty, the new information uncertainty risk perceived by 
uninformed investors will be smaller because (1) they could learn the true value of 
stock easier; (2) they will not be eager to acquire informed investors’ private 
information. Therefore, the impact of information uncertainty on the new information 
uncertainty risk effect is represented by the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Hypothesis 1 is mostly valid when information uncertainty is high. 
When information uncertainty is low, stocks with low level of informed trading and 
binding short-sale constraints rarely experience lower future returns.  
 
According to the above analysis, the new information uncertainty risk effect should 
not arise when information uncertainty is low and short-sale constraints are not 
binding. This is because, in this scenario, uninformed investors understand that it is 
not very hard to learn the true value of stock and the lack of informed trading 
generally mean the absence of private information. Hence, the case that the new 
information uncertainty risk effect will not emerge is summarized by the following 
hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 3: Low level of informed trading will not affect future stocks returns when 
information uncertainty is low and short-sale constraints are not binding. 
 
The empirical results in this chapter confirm the three hypotheses using monthly data 
on NYSE- and AMEX-listed stocks from 1983 to 2001. Specifically, the existence of 
informed trading is measured by the probability of information-based trade (PIN). The 
binding short-sale constraints are defined as the reductive changes in breadth of 
ownership (ΔBREADTH). Analyst coverage (COV), firm age (AGE), and firm size 
(MV) are used as the proxies for the information uncertainty of stocks. Different 
portfolios are formed to test the three hypotheses. 
 
The empirical results confirm the existence of new information uncertainty risk effect. 
Firstly, Hypothesis 1 is supported by the evidence that high-minus-low PIN hedging 
portfolio earns significant positive return among stocks with binding short-sale 
constraints (negative low-ΔBREADTH). Secondly, Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 
are verified by the portfolio returns under the three-way sorting by information 
uncertainty, short-sale constraints and informed trading proxies. When information 
uncertainty is high (low-COV, low-AGE, or low-MV) and short-sale constraints are 
binding, low-PIN stocks always underperform high-PIN stocks. When information 
uncertainty is low (high-COV, high-AGE, or high-MV) and short-sale constraints are 
binding, low-PIN stocks rarely underperform high-PIN stocks. When information 
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uncertainty is low and short-sale constraints are not binding, low-PIN stocks do not 
underperform high-PIN stocks. 
 
However, the information risk theory proposed by Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara 
(2002) can also explain the evidence that supports Hypothesis 1. The information risk 
theory argues that stocks with more information asymmetry have higher expected 
returns. Thus, Hypothesis 1 alone cannot fully support the new information 
uncertainty risk effect. Comfortingly, the results that support Hypothesis 2 and 
Hypothesis 3 can show some distinct features of the new information uncertainty risk 
effect. Since these features cannot be explained by the information risk theory, the 
new information uncertainty risk effect can be further justified. The performances of 
three-way sorting portfolios show that when information uncertainty is low, high-PIN 
stocks generally do not perform better than low-PIN stocks no matter short-sale 
constraints are binding or not. In addition, when information uncertainty is low, the 
case that low-PIN stocks underperform high-PIN stocks is possible only if short-sale 
constraints are binding. While these findings cannot be rationalized with the 
information risk theory, they coincide perfectly with the new information uncertainty 
risk effect. 
 
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it is the first study that 
empirically verifies the existence of the new information uncertainty risk effect 
created by the presence of short-sale constraints and the absence of informed trading. 
 84
Thus, Chapter 3 establishes a possible explanation for stock price decreasing without 
the arrival of any fundamental news. Second, it further explores the link between 
information uncertainty and the new information uncertainty risk. According to the 
findings, one efficient way to eliminate the new information uncertainty risk is to 
reduce the level of information uncertainty. Third, previous literature mainly considers 
the existence of informed trading as a signal of asymmetric information. Chapter 3 
suggests that the nonexistence of informed trading is also important. Finally, previous 
literature generally focuses on how short-sale constraints influence the relation 
between investors’ expectations and asset prices. Chapter 3 implies that short-sale 
constraints can also influence the risk as perceived by investors. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is outlined as follows. Section 3.2 reviews related 
literature. Section 3.3 constructs the sample and describes the data characteristics. 
Section 3.4 discusses empirical results from the portfolio analysis. Section 3.5 
concludes this chapter. 
 
3.2. Related Literature 
 
Literature generally shows that short-sale constrains can cause overpricing because of 
two reasons. First, short-sale constraints keep more pessimistic investors out of the 
market and hence prices tend to reflect a more optimistic valuation than they 
otherwise would. This is the “optimism effect” (see, e.g., Miller 1977, Chen, Hong, 
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and Stein 2002). Second, speculations can arise in the dynamics of trading under 
short-sale constraints. That is, investors pay prices that exceed their own valuation of 
future dividends as they anticipate find a buyer willing to pay even more in the future. 
This is the “resale option effect” (see, e.g., Harrison and Kreps 1978 and Scheinkman 
and Xiong 2003b). Although most empirical studies suggest that short-sale 
constrained firms are overvalued, financial economists pursue more appropriate 
measure of short-sale constraints all the time. Since the level of short-sale constraints 
cannot be directly observed, different kinds of proxies are proposed.  
 
Three are several categories of measures of short-sale constraints. Firstly, the 
old-fashion papers use high short interest ratios (shares sold short divided by shares 
outstanding) as a proxy for shorting demand (e.g., Figlewski 1981, Figlewski and 
Webb 1993, Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran 2002). However, the 
short interest proxy suffers limitations. For instance, Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) 
argue that variations in short interest may reflect variations in the transactions costs of 
selling short rather than in suppressed negative information. The second literature 
category instead focuses on the fact that short sales depend on stock ownership by 
mutual funds and institutions because of the assumption that most lendable shares are 
from institutional owners (Chen, Hong, and Stein 2002, Nagel 2005). The third 
category recognizes the competing effects of shorting supply and shorting demand, 
and argues that stocks with high shorting demand and low shorting supply are the 
most likely to face binding short-sale constraints (Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter 2005). 
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Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) disentangle the individual effects of shorting 
supply and shorting demand and find that shorting demand is an important predictor 
of future stock returns. Fourthly, another empirical approach tries to obtain data on the 
direct costs of shorting from the stock loan market. They generally look at the rebate 
rate on borrowed stock (D’Avolio 2002, Geczy, Musto, and Reed 2002, Ofek, 
Richardson, and Whitelaw 2004, Jones and Lamont 2002). Fifthly, some papers 
consider the link between short-sale constraints and stock prices in the context of 
option introductions. This is because derivatives such as option could provide 
alternative ways to take a short position in a security (Danielsen and Sorescu 2001, 
Ofek and Richardson 2003). Finally, Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) examine 
the valuation effects of the interaction between dispersion of investor opinions and 
short-sale constraints. They argue that most of pervious tests are imperfect because 
Miller (1977)’s hypothesis implies that both the dispersion of investors opinion and 
the short-sale constraints are necessary to stock price overvaluation.  
 
By contrast, some papers consider the asymmetric information setting and suggest 
that short-sale constraints do not necessarily cause overvaluation. Using a rational 
expectations model, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) provide an alternative view by 
modelling the effects of short-sale constraints in a rational expectations framework. 
They show that the price of a stock with binding short-sale constraints adjusts more 
slowly to unfavourable private information than it does to favourable private 
information. But they argue that in a rational market, traders will recognize the 
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existence of short-sale constraints and will adjust their beliefs such that no overpricing 
of securities will exist, on average. More recently, Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006), 
Marin and Olivier (2008), and Yuan (2006) argue that the lack of informed trading 
could lead to a new information uncertainty risk to uninformed investors when 
short-sale constraints are binding. When the degree of information asymmetry is 
significant, short-sale constraints can affect stock prices.  
 
Specifically, in the fully rational expectations equilibrium model of Bai, Chang, and 
Wang (2006), investors trade for sharing risk or/and speculating on private 
information. Short-sale constraints limit both types of trades. Limiting short sales 
driven by risk-sharing shifts the demand for the asset upwards. Limiting short sales 
driven by private information increases the uncertainty about the asset as perceived by 
uninformed investors and hence reduces the demand for the asset. When this 
information effect dominates, short-sale constraints actually cause asset prices to 
decrease and price volatility to increase.  
 
Marin and Olivier (2008) also suggest uninformed investors may react more strongly 
to the absence of insider sales (informed trading) than to their presence. In their noisy 
rational expectations model, once insiders’ holdings reach the floor set by the 
constraints like short-sale constraints, insiders can no longer deliver bad news into 
prices. Thus, uninformed investors can only infer that insiders are in possession of bad 
news but not how bad the news really is. This results in a crash in price since 
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uninformed investors’ beliefs decrease and their perceived level of uncertainty 
increases.  
 
In Yuan (2006)’s noisy rational expectations equilibrium model, uninformed investors 
are uncertain whether trading constraints restrict informed investors from transmitting 
information to prices, and thus they demand an information-disadvantaged premium 
in holding stocks. This creates a large price decline. However, she focuses on the 
scenario in which information asymmetry combined with short-sale constraints 
dampens the upward price movement.  
 
While asymmetric information is helpful for discovering new role of short-sale 
constraints, theoretical literature, including Grossman and Stiglitiz (1980), Admati 
(1985), Wang (1993), Jones and Slezak (1999), and Easley and O’Hara (2000), 
suggests that asymmetric information alone can affect asset returns. Easley and 
O’Hara (2004) show that uninformed investors understand they will lose to the 
informed investors who know private information, and so requires a greater expected 
return to hold the asset with more information risk. Easley and O’Hara (2004) show 
that assets with more private and less public information should have greater expected 
returns. Despite that information, particularly private information, is not directly 
observable, the microstructure literature provides ways for empirical research. Firstly, 
Kyle (1985) provides Kyle λ , which measures the responsiveness of prices to signed 
order flow. It can be estimated by regressing price changes on signed order flow. 
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Secondly, the probability of information-based trade (PIN), from Easley, Kiefer and 
O’Hara (1997b), refers to the measure of the importance of private information in a 
microstructure setting. PIN, which can be estimated from data on trades, measures the 
fraction of orders that arise from informed traders. Moreover, Vega (2006) shows that 
PIN is not exclusively an insider trading measure as it also captures informed trading 
by investors who are particularly skillful in analysing public news. 
 
In the prior literature, information uncertainty is often modelled as the information 
asymmetry component of the cost of capital (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1991, 
Easley and O’Hara 2001, Verrecchia 2001) or estimation risk (e.g., Barry and Brown 
1985, Coles and Loewenstein 1988, Klein and Bawa 1976) and therefore increases 
expected stock returns. However, recent studies, including Jiang, Lee, and Zhang 
(2005) and Zhang (2006), do not equal information uncertainty to information 
asymmetry. They argue that information asymmetry means some agents know more 
about a firm’s value than others, while information uncertainty refers to the value 
ambiguity, or the degree to which a firm’s value can be reasonably estimated by even 
the most knowledgeable investors at reasonable costs. High uncertainty firms are 
companies whose expected cash flows are less knowable, perhaps because of the 
nature of their business or operation environment. These firms associated with higher 
information acquisition costs, and estimates of their fundamental values are inherently 
less reliable and more volatile. 
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3.3. Data and Sample 
 
The sample of Chapter 3 is restricted by the data resources of Cass Business School of 
City University London (CASS). Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) is the 
databases for this chapter but CASS only subscribed limited datasets. Thus, the 
choices of proxies for informed trading, short-sale constraints and information 
uncertainty depend on the available datasets at CASS.  
 
3.3.1. Informed Trading Proxy 
 
The level of informed trading is measured by the probability of information-based 
trade (PIN). There are other popular proxies like bid-ask spread and price impact that 
are used to measure the degree of asymmetric information. However, the degree of 
asymmetric information does not necessarily capture the level of informed trading 
since informed investors may not fully trade on their private information because of 
limitations like short-sale constraints. Instead, PIN can directly measure the level of 
informed trading as it is a function of abnormal order flow. However, PIN is a 
controversial proxy for information asymmetry. Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) 
find that PIN is an important determinant of cross-section of expected returns. 
Mohanram and Rajgopal (2007) find that PIN is not priced beyond Easley, Hvidkjaer, 
and O’Hara (2002)’s sample period of 1984 - 1988. Duarte and Young (2009) show 
that the PIN component related to illiquidity is priced. They suggest that liquidity 
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effects unrelated to information asymmetry explain the relation between PIN and the 
cross-section of expected returns. Nevertheless, the focus of this chapter is not the 
information asymmetry effect but the joint effect of short-sale constraints and 
informed trading. Thus, PIN is still a suitable informed trading proxy for this chapter 
as informed trading can be identified by abnormal order flow imbalance.  
 
Easley and O’Hara (1992) define PIN as the estimated arrival rate of informed trades 
divided by the estimated arrival rate of all trades during a pre-specified period of time. 
Formally, the Institute for the Study of Security Markets (ISSM) and NYSE Trade and 
Quote (NYSE TAQ) datasets are required to estimate PIN. However, CASS has not 
subscribed ISSM dataset and only subscribed NYSE TAQ dataset from 2004. 
Although the datasets for estimating PIN are not available, the annual PIN data 
estimated in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2005) can be obtained from Soeren 
Hvidkjaer's website. Because the frequency of portfolio is monthly in this chapter, the 
value of PIN in each month t takes the value of PIN in that year.  
 
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2005) estimate the annual PIN for the sample of all 
ordinary common stocks listed on the NYSE and the AMEX for the years 1983 - 2001 
because the market microstructure of NYSE and AMEX are most closely consistent to 
that of their PIN model. Thus, this chapter also focuses on NYSE- and AMEX-listed 
stocks during the period of 1983 to 2001. They exclude REITs (Real Estate 
Investment Trusts), stocks of companies incorporated outside of the U.S, and 
 92
closed-end funds. They also exclude a stock in any year in which it did not have at 
least 60 days with quotes or trades, as they cannot estimate their trade model reliably 
for such stocks. In addition, since they form portfolios based on year-end firm size, 
they exclude stocks for which this information is not available. In addition, they 
eliminate stocks with a year-end price below $1.  
 
Their final sample of PIN estimates includes 1863 to 2414 stocks in the years 1983 - 
2001. In particular, among nearly 40,000 stock-years, they were able to obtain PIN 
estimates for all but 475. These failures were generally because of the days of 
extremely high trading volume in last six years of the sample, which caused 
computational underflow in the optimization program. In addition, this occurs almost 
exclusively for the largest stocks rather than for smaller stocks. For example, while 
only 47 of the 2037 stocks (3.6%) in the 2001 year-sample do not obtain PIN 
estimates, these stocks account for 23.7% of the total market capitalization in the 2001 
year-sample. This limitation suggests interpreting the results for large stocks with 
caution. Appendix 3.1 provides the basic information of the PIN estimates in Easley, 
Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2005). 
 
3.3.2. Short-Sale Constraints Proxy 
 
According to the data availability at CASS, the only choice for short-sale constraints 
proxy is the change in breadth of ownership proposed by Chen, Hong, and Stein 
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(2002). This is because CASS does not have datasets for estimating other common 
short-sale constraints measures such as short interest and institutional ownership. 
Breadth is defined roughly as the number of owners with long positions in a particular 
stock. If the owners cannot take a short position, when they have information 
suggesting they should short, they will at least reduce their holdings to zero. Thus, a 
reduction in the number of owners is evidence of more investors who are sitting on 
the sidelines with their pessimistic valuations not registered in the stock's price. Since 
Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) assume that the amount of negative information 
withheld from the market can represent the level of tightly binding short-sale 
constraints, the reductions in breadth should mean short-sale constraints are binding 
and forecast lower subsequent returns. Because Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) do not 
have comprehensive ownership data, they look at quarterly data on mutual fund 
ownership instead of a more complete measure of breadth of ownership. Moreover, 
since mutual funds rarely take short positions, mutual funds that do not have long 
positions can represent that these funds sitting on the sidelines, i.e., having no position 
at all.  
 
However, the breadth of mutual fund ownership proxy has drawbacks. Because 
ownership data do not cover all potential investors subject to short-sale constraints, 
the breadth of mutual fund ownership is part influenced by movements in the relative 
holdings of mutual fund versus other classes of investors. The reduction in breadth 
that means tightly binding short-sale constraints should capture the scenario in which 
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the aggregate holdings of the mutual fund sector are unchanged, but the shares are less 
broadly held within the mutual fund sector. However, a reduction in breadth could be 
the case that shares have net moved out of the mutual fund sector and into other class 
of investors, for example, the hands of individuals. Thus, the changes in breadth might 
not really reflect binding short-sale constraints, but represent the superior 
stock-picking skill of mutual fund managers who are smarter than individuals. In 
addition, the market movements can also affect the changes in breadth. During market 
downturn times, stocks generally suffer poor performance and mutual funds managers 
cannot take too much risk, and hence mutual funds managers are very likely to reduce 
their holdings in stocks. Therefore, reductions in breadth of ownership may not really 
reflect binding short-sales constraints, but rather because of stock market downturn. 
Similarly, stock market boom can lead to increases in breadth of ownership, and hence 
the increases in breadth do not necessarily mean that short-sale constraints are not 
binding. 
 
The datasets of Mutual Funds Holdings (CDA/Spectrum s12) in the Thomson Reuters 
databases are used to compute the change in breadth of ownership. This database 
contains information on quarterly equity holdings of mutual funds based in the United 
States from 1982 to 2002. Mutual funds are required by SEC regulation N30-D to 
disclose their portfolio holdings twice a year. CDA/Spectrum collects data from these 
filings and supplements the data through voluntary quarterly reports published by the 
mutual funds for their shareholders. None of the funds is excluded according to its 
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investment objectives. According to Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), the calculation of 
the change in breadth of ownership requires the mutual funds to be in both quarter T 
and quarter T-1. From this group, the change in the breadth of ownership for a stock in 
quarter T, denoted as ΔBREADTHT, is the number of funds who hold the stock at 
quarter T minus the number of funds who hold the stock at quarter T-1 and divide by 
the total number of funds in the sample at quarter T-1. Finally, since the frequency of 
portfolio is monthly in this chapter, ΔBREADTHt at month t is equal to the value of 
ΔBREADTHT in quarter T if month t belongs to quarter T. 
 
3.3.3. Information Uncertainty Proxy 
 
Since individual proxy may capture other things except information uncertainty, this 
chapter adopts three proxies for information uncertainty: analyst coverage (COV), 
firm age (AGE), and firm size (MV). This is because they are closely related to firm’s 
information environment and they are easily and directly observed by uninformed 
investors. Another advantage is that they can keep the sample size consistent as each 
firm can have fully available information for all three proxies.  
 
Firstly, analyst coverage, measured as the number of analyst following the firm in the 
previous year, can determine the amount of available information on the firm for 
investors. Analysts collect, digest, and distribute information about the fundamental 
news of firm. Firms with higher analyst coverage means a larger number of analysts 
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provide the relevant information, which implies less information uncertainty about the 
firm. The Institutional Brokers Estimates System (I/B/E/S) provides consensus and 
detail forecasts from security analysts. Following Zhang (2006), analyst coverage 
(COV) is calculated based on the raw detail forecast data unadjusted for stock splits in 
I/B/E/S. Specifically, COV is the number of analysts providing annual FY1 earnings 
estimates lagged 12 months from the end of the month.  
 
Secondly, firm age can measure information uncertainty because firms with a longer 
history would provide more available information to the market (Barry and Brown 
1985). Thus, young firms with short history have higher uncertainty. Following Zhang 
(2006), firm age is measured as the number of years since the firm was first covered 
by Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP).  
 
Thirdly, one natural information uncertainty measure is firm size, which can be 
calculated as the market capitalization based on data in CRSP. Small firms tend to be 
unique and less diversified. They may also have fewer scales of running conditions 
such as the number of suppliers, customers, shareholders and products. Therefore, less 
information on small firms could be available to the market and it might costs 
investors more to collect small firms’ information. The CRSP monthly tape in WRDS 
also provides data on monthly returns. 
 
There are all kinds of proxies for information uncertainty in literature. For example, 
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Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) summarize that stocks with high information 
uncertainty refer to firms with higher volatility (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang 2003), 
higher volume (or turnover) (Lee and Swaminathan 2000), greater expected growth 
(LaPorta 1996), higher price-to-book (PB) ratios (Fama and French 1992), wider 
dispersion in analyst earnings forecast (Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina 2002), and 
longer implied duration in their future cash flows (DeChow, Sloan, and Soliman 
2003). In addition, these high-uncertainty stocks are observed to earn lower future 
returns. This is because many of these variables are related to other features such as 
differences of opinion. Previous studies generally use dispersion in analyst forecasts 
to examine the overvaluation effect (Miller 1977). Deither, Malloy, and Scherbina 
(2002) find that as the degree of overpricing increases as the dispersion of valuations 
rises. In addition, turnover is also used to measure differences of opinion among 
investors. Hong and Stein (2007) indicate that dynamic models with disagreement 
among investors and short-sale constraints imply a positive correlation exists between 
trading volume and the degree of overpricing. Therefore, many information 
uncertainty proxies may introduce unnecessary biases into the empirical results, 
specially, the proxies for dispersion of opinion. By contrast, analyst coverage alone 
does not have significant price impact. Moreover, the computation of dispersion 
requires each firm has at least two analyst forecasts, and hence dispersion will have 
smaller sample size than analyst coverage. 
 
3.3.4. Sample Selection Criteria 
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Finally, a stock has to satisfy the following criteria to be included in the sample. First, 
stocks with a price less than $5 are excluded to minimize the problem of bid-ask 
bounces and extreme illiquidity of small stocks (Jegadeesh and Titman 2001). Second, 
this chapter requires all grouping variables are jointly available at end month t as 
portfolios are rebalanced monthly. These grouping variables include three information 
uncertainty proxies (MVt, AGEt, and COVt), short-sale constraints proxy 
(ΔBREADTHt) and informed trading proxy (PINt). Stocks without firm size have 
been excluded. Since PIN is the key variable, stocks are excluded if they have missing 
value of PIN. Following Aslan, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2007), the missing 
value of COVt or ΔBREADTHt takes value of zero.  
 
3.3.5. Risk-adjusted Returns 
 
To achieve precise conclusion for the empirical tests, this chapter takes common risk 
factors into account. Fama and French (1996) argue that many of the CAPM 
average-return anomalies are related, and that they are captured by the three-factor 
model in Fama and French (1993). In the three-factor model, RM - RF is the excess 
return on a proxy for the market portfolio, SMB is the difference between the return 
on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks, and HML is 
the difference between the return on a portfolio comprised of high book-to-market 
stocks and the return on a portfolio comprised of low book-to-market stocks. The 
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variable HML represents the value premium; high book-to-market stocks are value 
stocks, and low book-to-market stocks are growth stocks. Similarly, the variable SMB 
represents the size premium. However, the three-factor model does not explain the 
returns to momentum portfolios (see Jegadeesh and Titman 1993, Grundy and Martin 
2001). Carhart (1997) suggests adding a factor-mimicking portfolio based on 
momentum (UMD), i.e. the returns on a diversified portfolio long in recent winners 
and short in recent losers, to the three factor model. 
 
This chapter adjusts high-minus-low PIN hedging portfolio returns for common risk 
factors. In particular, the returns of high-minus-low PIN hedging portfolios are 
adjusted by the three factors: 
Ri = αi + βi (RM - RF) + siSMB + hiHML + ei., 
and four-factor model: 
Ri = αi + βi (RM - RF) + siSMB + hiHML + miUMD +ei.. 
 
All the four factors are downloaded from Kenneth French’s website. According to 
Fama and French (1993) and the descriptions on Kenneth French’s website, the 
following details provide the procedures that construct the four factors. 
 
(1) The Fama-French Three Factors 
 
The Fama-French factors are constructed using the 6 value-weight portfolios formed 
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on size and book-to-market. The 6 size/book-to-market portfolios, which are 
constructed at the end of each June, are the intersections of 2 portfolios formed on 
size (market equity, ME) and 3 portfolios formed on the ratio of book equity to market 
equity (BE/ME). The size breakpoint for year t is the median NYSE market equity at 
the end of June of year t. BE/ME for June of year t is the book equity for the last fiscal 
year end in t-1 divided by ME for December of t-1. The BE/ME breakpoints are the 
30th and 70th NYSE percentiles. SMB and HML for July of year t to June of year t+1 
include all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks that have market equity data for 
December of year t-1 and June of year t, and (positive) book equity data for year t-1. 
 
SMB (Small Minus Big) is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the 
average return on the three big portfolios, 
   SMB =1/3 (Small Value + Small Neutral + Small Growth) - 1/3 (Big Value + Big 
Neutral + Big Growth).    
        
HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the 
average return on the two growth portfolios, 
   HML =1/2 (Small Value + Big Value) - 1/2 (Small Growth + Big Growth).    
        
Rm-Rf, the excess return on the market, is the value-weight return on all NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP) minus the one-month Treasury bill rate 
(from Ibbotson Associates). 
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(2) The Momentum Factor 
 
Fama and French use six value-weight portfolios formed on size and prior (2-12) 
returns to construct UMD factor. The six value-weight portfolios, which are formed 
monthly, are the intersections of 2 portfolios formed on size (market equity, ME) and 
3 portfolios formed on prior (2-12) return. The monthly size breakpoint is the median 
NYSE market equity. The monthly prior (2-12) return breakpoints are the 30th and 
70th NYSE percentiles. 
 
UMD is the average return on the two high prior return portfolios minus the average 
return on the two low prior return portfolios, 
   UMD =1/2 (Small High + Big High) - 1/2(Small Low + Big Low).    
        
The six portfolios used to construct UMD each month include NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ stocks with prior return data. To be included in a portfolio for month t 
(formed at the end of the month t-1), a stock must have a price for the end of month 
t-13 and a good return for t-2. In addition, any missing returns from t-12 to t-3 must 
be -99.0, CRSP's code for a missing price. Each included stock also must have ME for 
the end of t-1. 
 
3.3.6. Summary Statistics 
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Table 3.1 provides the summary statistics of the sample in this chapter. Panel A 
contains mean monthly statistics for the firm-month observations by year. The sample 
contains on average 1,750 firms per month from 1983 to 2001. The unusual decrease 
in the number of firms from 1999 is because the sample size is determined by the 
number of PIN estimations. Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2005) indicate that the 
extremely high daily trading volume in later years could cause failures for estimating 
PIN. Furthermore, they present that this occurs almost exclusively for the largest 
stocks rather than for smaller stocks. As it is shown in Panel A, firm size keeps 
increasing from 1983 to 2001. The average number of analyst coverage is around 8, 
and the average firm age is about 22 in each year. The monthly mean of the change in 
breadth of ownership changes from year to year without a consistent pattern. The 
monthly mean of PIN in the sample is 0.199, and its approximate trend is decreasing 
from 1983 to 2001. 
 
Panel B shows the correlation matrix. The Pearson and Spearman correlations for 
these five variables are quite similar. The correlations between ΔBREADTH and the 
other four variables are all weak, suggesting that short-sale constraints are 
straightforward to all kinds of firms. Consistent with Aslan, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and 
O’Hara (2007), three variables including firm size, analyst coverage, and firm age are 
positively correlated with each other, and all of them are negatively correlated with 
PIN. In addition, these correlations are generally strong. These results are not 
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surprising because firms with high information uncertainty such as small firms, young 
firms, and firms with low analyst following are typically subject to high degree of 
private information.  
 
Panel C provides a close look at the relationship between firm size and other four 
variables. Following Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), firms are assigned into size 
quintiles, determined by NYSE market capitalization breakpoints (obtained from 
Kenneth French’s website). The mean value of ΔBREADTH is closely related to firm 
size, ranging from 0.01% for stocks in the bottom-size quintile, to 0.19% for stocks in 
the top-size quintile. Meanwhile, the standard deviations of ΔBREADTH show 
similar patterns with respect to firm size. More importantly, the mean values and 
standard deviations show that there is much more variation in ΔBREADTH across 
large stocks comparing with small stocks. This pattern, empathized by Chen, Hong, 
and Stein (2002), implies that the bottom- and top-ΔBREADTH will be dominated by 
large firms. Similarly, analyst coverage suffers the same problem. However, both firm 
age and PIN avoid this problem. Although their mean values and standard deviations 
are also closely related to firm size, they still have meaningful variations in both small 
and large firms. 
 
3.4. Empirical Results 
 
To investigate the new information uncertainty risk effect empirically, stocks are 
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assigned to portfolios based on certain characteristics. This standard approach in asset 
pricing, pioneered by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), reduces the variability in returns.  
 
3.4.1. Portfolio Returns Sorted by One Variable 
 
Table 3.2 examines the individual impact of analyst coverage (COV), firm age (AGE), 
firm size (MV), short-sale constraints (ΔBREADTH) and the probability of 
information-based trading (PIN) on stock returns. In particular, at each month t, stocks 
are assigned into five classes of analyst coverage (COVt), with the class breakpoints 
determined separately within each size (MVt) quintile in the same month. The COVt 
classes are then recombined across the five MVt quintiles, and hence five COVt 
groups obtained. This procedure ensures that within each COVt group, stocks do not 
have roughly the same size. The procedure is necessary because, as it is shown in 
Panel C of Table 3.1, there is much more variation in COV across large stocks. If it 
was an unconditional ranking on COV independent of MV, then the extreme (lowest 
or highest COV) groups would be dominated by large stocks. Because the change in 
breadth of ownership (ΔBREADTH) suffers the same problem as COV, stocks are 
sorted into ΔBREADTH groups by following the above steps as well. For the other 
three variables (MV, AGE, and PIN), stocks are simply sorted into five groups at each 
month t based on the value level of variable at that month. Equally weighted 
portfolios are formed within each subgroup, and portfolios are held for one month. 
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Table 3.2 reports the average monthly portfolio returns. At first, higher uncertainty 
(low-MV, low-COV, or low-AGE) stocks forecast lower returns but only 
high-minus-low COV hedging portfolio yields positive return of 0.19% at 10% 
significance level. Thus, as Zhang (2006) suggests, information uncertainty is not a 
cross-sectional risk factor. Second, hedging portfolio that longs high-ΔBREADTH 
stocks and shorts low-ΔBREADTH stocks earns a positive return of 1.05% at 1% 
significance level. This is consistent to the finding of Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), 
who present that reductions in breadth should forecast lower returns. Finally, the 
information risk theory in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) is confirmed because 
stocks with higher probabilities of information-based trading have higher rates of 
return. The return of high-minus-low PIN hedging portfolio is 0.31% at 10% 
significance level. 
 
3.4.2. Portfolio Returns Sorted by Information Uncertainty Proxy and PIN 
 
Table 3.3 examines the interaction of PIN and information uncertainty variable. 
Stocks are classified into five categories based on information uncertainty proxy at 
each month. The sorting method for COV is special. At each month t, stocks are 
assigned into quintile classes of COVt, with the quintile breakpoints determined 
separately within each MVt quintile. The COVt quintiles are then recombined across 
MVt classes. Within each uncertainty category, stocks are then sorted into five 
quintiles by the level of PINt. For the resulting 25 subgroups, equally weighted 
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portfolios are constructed and their one-month-ahead returns are reported in Table 3.3. 
Information uncertainty proxy refers to COV, AGE, and MV in Panel A, B, and C 
respectively. 
 
Table 3.3 shows that stocks with high level of informed trading generally have 
superior performance when information uncertainty is high. Firstly, all three panels 
show that when information uncertainty is small there is barely a difference between 
high-PIN and low-PIN stocks. The return differentials between high-PIN and low-PIN 
firms are 0.06% within high-COV category, 0.06% within high-AGE category, and 
0.16% within high-MV category, which are very small and not statistically significant. 
Secondly, two of three panels have strong statistically significant positive 
high-minus-low PIN hedging portfolio returns within high information uncertainty 
category (0.49% within low-AGE group and 0.85% within low-COV group).  
 
These findings are consistent with the information risk theory. If information 
uncertainty is low, there is hardly any private information in this transparent 
information environment. Hence, the overall information risk is small and high-PIN 
stocks will not outperform low-PIN stocks. If stocks have high information 
uncertainty, they also tend to have high degree of private information. As a result, 
stocks with higher level of informed trading should have higher future returns. 
Therefore, information uncertainty has an impact on informed trading. Based on the 
strong correlation between information uncertainty variables and PIN in Panel B of 
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Table 3.1 and other firm-specific variables related to PIN, Aslan, Easley, Hvidkjaer, 
and O’Hara (2007) use data of market and accounting characteristics including firm 
size, firm age, and analyst coverage to develop a proxy for PIN, denoted as PPIN. 
They find that information risk as captured by PPIN is both statistically and 
economically significant for asset prices.  
 
Informed trading, on the other hand, can also affect information uncertainty of stocks. 
Because informed trading moves prices toward the full information levels, low level 
of informed trading leads to less informative prices and hence the uncertainty of 
stocks increases. High informed trading improves information efficiency and thereby 
reducing information uncertainty (Wang 1993). Finally, the new information 
uncertainty risk proposed in this chapter is also introduced by the absence of informed 
trading combined with binding short-sale constraints.   
 
The above analysis underlines that the investigation on the new information 
uncertainty risk effect should take information uncertainty into account. 
 
3.4.3. Portfolio Returns Sorted by Short-Sale Constraints Proxy and PIN 
 
In order to examine Hypothesis 1, Table 3.4 assigns stocks into portfolios based on 
short-sale constraints proxy and informed trading proxy. At each month t, stocks are 
sorted into five classes of the change in breadth of ownership ΔBREADTHt, with the 
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class breakpoints determined separately within each firm size MVt quintile. The 
ΔBREADTHt classes are then recombined across MVt quintiles. Within each 
ΔBREADTH t category, stocks are then sorted into five groups by the level of PINt. 
For the resulting 25 subgroups, equally weighted portfolios are constructed and held 
for one month. 
 
In Table 3.4, high-minus-low PIN hedging portfolio only produces significant positive 
return if stocks are subject to lowest or highest level of ΔBREADTH. These two 
hedging portfolios have similar statistically significant positive returns. Thus, stocks 
with higher PIN could earn higher returns when short-sale constraints are binding 
tightly or not binding at all. The information risk theory could fit with either case as 
trading on private information is always profitable. Note that both low-PIN and 
high-PIN stocks have higher returns in high-ΔBREADTH subgroup than 
low-ΔBREADTH subgroup. To a great extent, this can be due to the fact that higher 
ΔBREADTH stocks have higher subsequent returns. More importantly, Hypothesis 1 
is verified since stocks with binding short-sale constraints (low-ΔBREADTH) with 
low level of informed trading (low-PIN) have lower future returns. However, 
Hypothesis 1 alone is not enough for confirming the existence of the new information 
uncertainty risk effect as the information risk theory could interpret its evidence as 
well. Therefore, it is important to examine the unique features of the new information 
uncertainty risk effect by controlling for information uncertainty. 
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3.4.4. Portfolio Returns under Three-Way Sorting 
 
Table 3.5 uses a three-way sort by information uncertainty, short-sale constraints, and 
informed trading proxies to analyse the new information uncertainty effect under 
different levels of information uncertainty.  
 
Each month t, stocks are firstly classified into three information uncertainty groups 
based on the level of uncertainty. In order to ensure that within each analyst coverage 
(COVt) subgroup, stocks do not have roughly the same size, the sorting method on 
COVt in Panel A is special as before. Stocks are assigned into three COVt classes, 
with the class breakpoints determined separately within each size (MVt) quintile. The 
COVt classes are then recombined across the five MVt quintiles, and hence three 
COVt groups obtained. The sorting method on firm age (AGE) in Panel B and firm 
size (MV) in Panel C is normal as stocks are simply sorted into three categories by the 
level of uncertainty at month t. For each information uncertainty group, stocks are 
then sorted into three groups based on the level of the change of breadth of ownership 
(ΔBREADTHt). For each uncertainty and the change of breadth subgroup, stocks are 
further sorted into three divisions by the level of informed trading (PINt). This 
three-way sort classifies stocks into 27 portfolios. Portfolios are equally weighted and 
their performances are tracked over one-month head. Table 3.5 reports the raw and 
risk-adjusted returns for all hedging portfolios that long high-PIN stocks and short 
low-PIN stocks. 
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First of all, the first columns of three panels in Table 3.5 present the similar 
performances for stocks with binding short-sale constraints (low-ΔBREADTH) and 
high information uncertainty (low-COV, low-AGE, or low-MV). That is, these stocks 
have lower subsequent returns if the level of informed trading is lower. The raw return 
differential between high- and low-PIN of these stocks is significantly positive in 
Panel B and Panel C except Panel A. Moreover, the Fama-French three-factor and the 
four-factor risk-adjusted returns of all hedging portfolios that long high-PIN and short 
low-PIN stocks are strong significantly positive in all there panels. These results 
obviously confirm the first part of Hypothesis 2 that Hypothesis 1 is mostly valid 
when information uncertainty is high. 
 
Table 3.5 also reports supporting evidence for the second part of Hypothesis 2 that 
when information uncertainty is low, stocks with low level of informed trading and 
binding short-sale constraints rarely experience lower future returns. Both Panel A and 
Panel C show that within high-uncertainty (low-COV, or low-MV) and 
low-ΔBREADTH groups, the raw and risk-adjusted returns of high-minus-low 
hedging portfolios are not statistically significant different from zero. Only Panel B 
shows that within high-AGE and low-ΔBREADTH group, this hedging portfolio 
earns significant positive raw return (0.32% t = 1.85) and the four-factor risk-adjusted 
return (0.31% t = 1.79). These results are consistent with the new information 
uncertainty risk effect. Although low information uncertainty helps uninformed 
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investors to understand the true value of stock, it cannot completely eliminate the 
potential new information uncertainty risk since uninformed investors can perceive 
that risk as long as short-sale constraints are binding and informed trading is absent. 
 
Finally, all three panels of Table 3.5 justify Hypothesis 3 as well because none of the 
raw, the three-factor and the four-factor risk-adjusted returns are statistically 
significant different from zero for all high-minus-low PIN hedging portfolios within 
low-uncertainty (high-COV, high-AGE, or high-MV) and high-ΔBREADTH groups. 
When short-sale constraints are not binding (high-ΔBREADTH), uninformed 
investors generally do not believe that informed investors are kept from trading on 
their private information. In addition, low information uncertainty implies that it is 
convenient to obtain information about the fundamental value of stock. Thus, the 
absence of informed trading will not introduce the new information uncertainty risk 
about stock to uninformed investors. 
 
While the above findings support the new information uncertainty risk effect, it is 
important to see whether the information risk theory interpret these findings. Similar 
to Hypothesis 1 in Table 3.4, the information risk theory can explain the superior 
performance of high-PIN stocks with high information uncertainty and binding 
short-sale constraints. However, the results provided by stocks with low information 
uncertainty present challenges to the information risk theory. Table 3.3 has shown that 
the information risk effect does not arise when information uncertainty is low. By 
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contrast, Panel B of Table 3.5 shows that high-PIN stocks outperform low-PIN stocks 
when information uncertainty is low (high-AGE) and short-sale constraints are 
binding (low-ΔBREADTH). More importantly, among stocks with long history, 
high-PIN stocks only outperform when short-sale constraints are binding. This 
importance of short-sale constraints cannot be explained by the information risk 
theory either.  
 
The intuition behind Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, however, can explain these 
results well. Short-sale constraints are important because binding short-sale 
constraints keep informed investors from trading on private information, and hence 
prices become less informative and uninformed investors understand there is 
unexposed important private information. Thus, uninformed investors still have a 
chance to perceive a new information uncertainty risk even though stocks have 
transparent information environment (low information uncertainty). If short-sale 
constraints are not binding, informed investors can trade on private information and 
enrich the informativeness of prices without limitation, and uninformed investors will 
not believe the absence of informed trading means the unexposed important private 
information. Therefore, the new information uncertainty risk will not arise, especially 
when information uncertainty is low. 
 
According to the above analysis, Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 are vital for the valid 
of the new information uncertainty risk effect. This is because they not only directly 
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present additional supports for the new information uncertainty risk effect, but also 
provide a way to distinguish the new information uncertainty risk theory from the 
information risk theory. 
 
3.4.5. Subperiod Analysis 
 
Table 3.6 provides the subperiod analysis for Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, which 
are relatively much more curial than Hypothesis 1. This robustness check can examine 
if the new information uncertainty risk effect is time-specific. The two subperiods 
include 1983 to 1992 and 1993 to 2002. The results of three-way sort by information 
uncertainty, short-sale constraints, and informed trading proxies are presented in Panel 
A for analyst coverage, Panel B for firm age, and Panel C for firm size respectively. 
These results only include the raw and risk-adjusted returns for all hedging portfolios 
that long high-PIN stocks and short low-PIN stocks. Overall, Table 3.6 confirms 
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 again. When information uncertainty is great and 
short-sale constraints are binding, low-PIN stocks generally underperform in either 
subperiod. When information uncertainty is small and short-sale constraints are 
binding, hedging portfolios only have significant positive return in the subperiod 1983 
to 1992. When information uncertainty is small and short-sale constraints are not 
binding, all hedging portfolios do not earn significant positive four-factor 
risk-adjusted returns in either subperiod. 
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3.4.6. Comments on Robustness 
 
To ascertain that the new information uncertainty risk effect documented here is not 
caused by specific sample, specific proxies or an obvious explanation, this chapter has 
employed several ways to demonstrate robustness. 
 
Firstly, this chapter proposes Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 to explore the role of 
information uncertainty in the new information uncertainty risk effect. On the one 
hand, information uncertainty is important because it is naturally related to the new 
information uncertainty risk. Uninformed investors perceive the new information 
uncertainty risk because they are extremely uncertain about the true value of stock. 
Since information uncertainty of stock has an influence on uninformed investors’ 
judgments about the true value of stock, information uncertainty can affect the 
information uncertainty risk. On the other hand, information uncertainty should be 
taken into account because it can be used to distinguish the new information 
uncertainty risk effect from the information risk effect. According to Bai, Chang, and 
Wang (2006), Yuan (2006), and Marin and Olivier (2008), Hypothesis 1 is developed 
to capture the new information uncertainty risk effect. Although Table 3.4 provides 
supporting evidence to Hypothesis 1, the information risk theory could also explain 
the results in Table 3.4. Nevertheless, information uncertainty can be used to identify 
the unique features of the new information uncertainty risk effect. As it is shown in 
Section 3.4.4, the information risk theory fails to interpret the importance of binding 
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short-sale constraints to the poor performance of stocks with low level of informed 
trading. 
 
Secondly, this chapter tries to adopt alternative proxies to examine the new 
information uncertainty risk effect. Due to data limitation, the only proxy of informed 
trading is probability of information-based trading (PIN), and the only proxy of 
short-sale constraints is the change in breadth of ownership (ΔBREADTH). While the 
primary proxy of information uncertainty is analyst coverage (COV), this chapter also 
uses firm age (AGE) and firm size (MV) to measure information uncertainty. The 
three kinds of information uncertainty proxies in Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C of 
Table 3.5 lead to similar results for Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3. 
 
Finally, this chapter provides subperiod analysis in Section 3.4.5. The two subperiods 
include 1983 to 1992 and 1993 to 2002. The subperiod analysis shows that 
Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 are valid in each subperiod. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter empirically examines a new information uncertainty risk effect, which 
can provide possible explanation for the phenomenon that the prices of individual 
stocks sometimes decline without the arrival of fundamental news. According to Bai, 
Chang, and Wang (2006), Yuan (2006), and Marin and Olivier (2008), which study 
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asset pricing under short-sale constraints in an information asymmetry setting, this 
chapter proposes that uninformed investors perceive a new information uncertainty 
risk when short-sale constraints are binding and informed trading is absent. As a result, 
uninformed investors require a price discount to hold the stock. 
 
This new information uncertainty risk effect arises because prices become less 
informative when short-sale constraints stop informed investors from trading on 
private information. Hence, uninformed investors become more uncertain about the 
true value of stocks without the unexposed private information held by informed 
investors. In addition, this chapter further suggests that information uncertainty of 
stocks can affect this new information uncertainty risk effect because information 
uncertainty of stock represents the convenience of learning the fundamental value of 
stock. 
 
The empirical findings confirm this new information uncertainty effect as stocks with 
higher level of informed trading will have lower future returns when short-sale 
constraints are binding. Moreover, this effect is strong when information uncertainty 
is high, and it rarely arises when information uncertainty is low. When information 
uncertainty is low and short-sale constraints are not binding, this new information 
uncertainty risk effect will not emerge. Although the information risk theory can also 
explain that stocks with low informed trading have lower subsequent returns, it cannot 
explain the important impact of short-sale constraints to the performance of these 
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stocks when information uncertainty is low, which is the unique feature of the new 
information uncertainty risk effect. 
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Appendix 3.1: Summary Statistics of PIN Estimates  
in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2005) 
 
This table provides the basic information on the yearly PIN estimates in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and 
O’Hara (2005). The source of these information is Panel A of Table 1 in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and 
O’Hara (2005). nEst is the number of stocks for which pin estimates were obtained, while nNotEst 
is the number of stocks for which estimates could not be obtained. fracCap is the total year-end the 
market value of the stocks for which pin estimates were not obtained divided by the total market 
value of the sample.  
 
Year nEst. nNotEst. fracCap 
1983 2,094 4 0.000 
1984 2,038 5 0.001 
1985 1,993 3 0.000 
1986 1,914 5 0.001 
1987 1,974 7 0.001 
1988 1,956 4 0.019 
1989 1,900 9 0.007 
1990 1,858 5 0.000 
1991 1,945 14 0.002 
1992 2,008 20 0.032 
1993 2,151 11 0.013 
1994 2,209 6 0.001 
1995 2,219 20 0.007 
1996 2,246 64 0.119 
1997 2,320 67 0.234 
1998 2,371 43 0.187 
1999 2,228 66 0.252 
2000 2,099 75 0.311 
2001 1,990 47 0.237 
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 
 
This table provides the summary statistics for NYSE and AMEX stocks during the period 1983 - 
2001. Panel A reports the mean monthly statistics for all stocks. Panel B shows the correlation 
matrix, in which the Pearson's correlations are shown above the diagonal with Spearman's 
correlation below. Panel C demonstrates the mean and standard deviation values by NYSE Market 
Capitalization quintiles. No. of firms per month is the monthly average number of firms in the 
sample. Firm size (MV) is the market capitalization (in millions of dollars) at the end of month t. 
Firm age (AGE) is the number of years since the firm was first covered by CRSP. Analyst 
coverage (COV) is the number of analysts providing annual FY1 earnings estimates lagged 12 
months from the end of the month. ΔBREADTHT is the change in breadth of ownership from the 
end of quarter T-1 to quarter T. The breadth of ownership in quarter T is the fraction of all mutual 
funds long the stock at the end of quarter T. ΔBREADTHt at month t is equal to the value of 
ΔBREADTHT in quarter T if month t belongs to quarter T. The probability of information-based 
trade (PIN) is obtained from the annual PIN data in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2005). The 
PIN value of stock in each month t takes the PIN value in that year. Stocks with a price less than 
$5 are excluded. Stocks with missing value of MV or PIN are excluded, and the missing value of 
COV or ΔBREADTH takes value of zero. 
Panel A: Mean Monthly Statistics by Year 
Year 
No.of Firms 
per Month 
MV 
per Month
COV 
per Month
AGE 
per Month
ΔBREADTH 
per Month 
PIN 
per Month 
1983 1,920 754 7 22 0.13% 0.222 
1984 1,832 777 8 22 0.03% 0.208 
1985 1,759 931 9 23 0.04% 0.216 
1986 1,706 1,178 9 23 0.04% 0.216 
1987 1,706 1,362 9 22 0.09% 0.217 
1988 1,630 1,293 8 22 0.01% 0.216 
1989 1,573 1,580 9 22 0.08% 0.213 
1990 1,424 1,692 9 23 0.06% 0.215 
1991 1,474 1,934 8 23 0.07% 0.214 
1992 1,609 1,946 7 22 0.08% 0.209 
1993 1,756 2,079 8 22 0.12% 0.199 
1994 1,844 2,085 8 22 0.10% 0.198 
1995 1,882 2,386 7 22 -0.01% 0.196 
1996 1,932 2,578 7 21 0.05% 0.192 
1997 2,038 2,723 7 21 0.03% 0.181 
1998 2,048 3,552 7 21 0.04% 0.171 
1999 1,880 4,059 8 21 0.07% 0.169 
2000 1,680 4,124 8 22 0.08% 0.171 
2001 1,549 4,719 9 23 0.03% 0.180 
Total 1,750 2,209 8 22 0.06% 0.199 
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Table 3.1—Continued 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
(Pearson Correlations Are Shown above the Diagonal with Spearman Below) 
 MV COV AGE ΔBREADTH PIN 
MV 1 0.318 0.240 0.114 -0.291 
COV 0.528 1 0.228 0.098 -0.383 
AGE 0.301 0.150 1 0.042 -0.240 
ΔBREADTH 0.042 0.043 0.008 1 -0.057 
PIN -0.693 -0.390 -0.250 -0.021 1 
Panel C: Means and Standard Deviations by NYSE Market Capitalization Quintiles 
 All 
Firms 
Quintile 1
Firms 
(Smallest)
Quintile 
2 
Firms 
Quintile  
3 
Firms 
Quintile 
4 
Firms 
Quintile 5 
Firms 
(Largest)
MV Mean 2,209 67 261 651 1,686 10,382 
 Std.Dev. 7,554 50 126 282 832 16,151 
 
COV Mean 8 1 5 8 12 19 
 Std.Dev. 10 3 5 7 10 14 
 
AGE Mean 22 16 17 20 26 35 
 Std.Dev. 18 12 14 17 18 21 
 
ΔBREADTH Mean 0.06% 0.01% 0.02% 0.04% 0.07% 0.19% 
 Std.Dev. 0.61% 0.12% 0.23% 0.33% 0.51% 1.32% 
 
PIN Mean 0.199 0.262 0.212 0.185 0.164 0.133 
 Std.Dev. 0.077 0.084 0.058 0.053 0.048 0.040 
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Table 3.2 Portfolio Returns Sorted by One Variable 
 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns sorted by one variable only. Firm size (MV) is 
the market capitalization (in millions of dollars) at the end of month t. Analyst coverage (COV) is 
the number of analysts providing annual FY1 earnings estimates lagged 12 months from the end of 
the month. Firm age (AGE) is the number of years since the firm was first covered by CRSP. 
ΔBREADTHT is the change in breadth of ownership from the end of quarter T-1 to quarter T. The 
breadth of ownership in quarter T is the fraction of all mutual funds long the stock at the end of 
quarter T. ΔBREADTHt at month t is equal to the value of ΔBREADTHT in quarter T if month t 
belongs to quarter T. The probability of information-based trade (PIN) is obtained from the annual 
PIN data in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2005). The PIN value of stock in each month t takes 
the PIN value in that year. At each month t, stocks are assigned into five classes of COVt, with the 
class breakpoints determined separately within each MVt quintile. The COVt classes are then 
recombined across MVt quintiles. Stocks are sorted into ΔBREADTHt quintiles by following the 
above steps as COVt. For the other three variables, each month stocks are simply sorted into five 
groups based on the value level of variable at that month. Stocks are held for one month and 
portfolio returns are equally weighted. Stocks with a price less than $5 are excluded. Stocks with 
missing value of MV or PIN are excluded, and the missing value of COV or ΔBREADTH takes 
value of zero. The sample period is 1983 - 2001. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Quintiles MV COV AGE ΔBREADTH PIN 
Q1 (Low) 0.0099 0.0103 0.0100 0.0081 0.0115 
 3.21 3.63 2.92 2.40 4.14 
Q2 0.0121 0.0108 0.0114 0.0091 0.0112 
 3.60 3.79 3.46 3.07 3.53 
Q3 0.0124 0.0138 0.0126 0.0111 0.0103 
 3.75 4.47 4.06 3.89 3.14 
Q4 0.0122 0.0124 0.0127 0.0128 0.0117 
 3.91 3.97 4.42 4.43 3.52 
Q5 (High) 0.0127 0.0122 0.0125 0.0186 0.0146 
 4.47 3.53 4.75 5.74 5.00 
      
Q5 - Q1 0.0028 0.0019* 0.0024 0.0105*** 0.0031* 
 1.29 1.74 1.51 8.59 1.73 
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Table 3.3 Portfolio Returns Sorted by Information Uncertainty and PIN 
 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns based on information uncertainty proxy and 
the probability of information-based trade proxy (PIN). Information uncertainty proxies include 
analyst coverage (COV), firm age (AGE) and firm size (MV) in Panel A, B, and C respectively. 
Stocks are first classified into five categories based on information uncertainty proxy at each 
month. The sorting method for COV is special. At each month t, stocks are assigned into five 
classes of COVt, with the class breakpoints determined separately within each MVt quintile. The 
COVt classes are then recombined across MVt quintiles. Within each uncertainty category, stocks 
are then sorted into five groups by the level of PIN t. For the resulting 25 subgroups, equally 
weighted portfolios are constructed and held for one month. Stocks with a price less than $5 are 
excluded. Stocks with missing value of MV or PIN are excluded, and the missing value of COV or 
ΔBREADTH takes value of zero. The sample period is 1983 - 2001. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Portfolios Formed by COV and PIN 
COV 
PIN 
C1 (Low) C2 C3 C4 C5 (High) 
P1 (Low) 0.0114 0.0085 0.0118 0.0121 0.0131 
 4.29 2.86 3.88 4.17 4.33 
P2 0.0103 0.0091 0.0123 0.0121 0.0125 
 3.6 2.86 3.8 3.67 3.40 
P3 0.0086 0.0098 0.0137 0.0115 0.0103 
 2.77 3.01 4.11 3.33 2.68 
P4 0.0092 0.0123 0.0140 0.0116 0.0114 
 2.87 3.99 4.29 3.31 2.98 
P5 (High) 0.0120 0.0144 0.0171 0.0149 0.0137 
 3.82 5.51 5.34 4.54 3.68 
      
P5 - P1 0.0006 0.0060*** 0.0053*** 0.0028 0.0006 
 0.29 3.16 2.79 1.42 0.23 
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Table 3.3—Continued 
 
Panel B: Portfolios Formed by AGE and PIN 
AGE 
PIN 
A1 (Low) A1 (Low) A1 (Low) A1 (Low) A1 (Low) 
P1 (Low) 0.0098 0.0105 0.0119 0.0117 0.0126 
 2.94 3.10 3.73 3.91 5.03 
P2 0.0077 0.0089 0.0110 0.0122 0.0114 
 2.09 2.42 3.18 3.86 4.22 
P3 0.0081 0.0109 0.0111 0.0116 0.0124 
 2.12 2.92 3.38 3.73 4.50 
P4 0.0099 0.0134 0.0142 0.0128 0.0125 
 2.66 3.83 4.23 4.15 4.21 
P5 (High) 0.0146 0.0136 0.0147 0.0151 0.0133 
 4.41 4.48 4.95 5.38 4.63 
      
P5 - P1 0.0049*** 0.0031 0.0028 0.0035* 0.0006 
 2.65 1.50 1.34 1.66 0.31 
Panel C: Portfolios Formed by MV and PIN 
MV 
PIN 
M1 (Low) M2 M3 M4 M5 (High) 
P1 (Low) 0.0052 0.0093 0.0115 0.0128 0.0126 
 1.46 2.59 3.54 4.22 4.61 
P2 0.0083 0.0095 0.0114 0.0111 0.0118 
 2.32 2.65 3.26 3.41 4.12 
P3 0.0091 0.0124 0.0121 0.0125 0.0118 
 2.65 3.45 3.43 3.67 3.97 
P4 0.0134 0.0131 0.0117 0.0101 0.0131 
 4.24 3.73 3.43 3.10 4.34 
P5 (High) 0.0137 0.0163 0.0154 0.0144 0.0141 
 5.22 5.07 4.55 4.69 4.68 
      
P5 - P1 0.0085*** 0.0070*** 0.0039** 0.0016 0.0016 
 3.93 3.81 2.46 1.05 1.12 
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Table 3.4 Portfolio Returns Sorted by Short-Sale Constraints and PIN 
 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns based on short-sale constraints proxy (the 
change of breadth of ownership ΔBREADTH) and the probability of information-based trade 
proxy (PIN). At each month t, stocks are assigned into five classes of ΔBREADTH t, with the class 
breakpoints determined separately within each MVt quintile. The ΔBREADTH t classes are then 
recombined across MVt quintiles. Within each ΔBREADTH t category, stocks are then sorted into 
five groups by the level of PINt. For the resulting 25 subgroups, equally weighted portfolios are 
constructed and held for one month. Stocks with a price less than $5 are excluded. Stocks with 
missing value of MV or PIN are excluded, and the missing value of COV or ΔBREADTH takes 
value of zero. The sample period is 1983 - 2001. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
ΔBREADTH 
PIN 
B1 (Low) B2 B3 B4 B5 (High) 
P1 (Low) 0.0083 0.0093 0.0105 0.0130 0.0163 
 2.70 3.27 3.76 4.75 5.38 
P2 0.0071 0.0093 0.0101 0.0129 0.0172 
 1.92 2.81 3.28 4.18 5.04 
P3 0.0047 0.0073 0.0096 0.0119 0.0183 
 1.26 2.22 3.06 3.78 5.18 
P4 0.0077 0.0094 0.0121 0.0113 0.0207 
 2.10 2.81 3.74 3.40 5.67 
P5 (High) 0.0126 0.0105 0.0133 0.0150 0.0204 
 3.65 3.56 4.69 4.87 6.04 
      
P5 - P1 0.0042* 0.0012 0.0028 0.0020 0.0041* 
 1.90 0.61 1.43 0.97 1.81 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5 Portfolio Returns Sorted by Information Uncertainty, Short-Sale Constraints, and PIN 
 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns using three-way sorting. Information uncertainty proxies include analyst coverage (COV), firm age (AGE) and 
firm size (MV) in Panel A, B, and C respectively. Stocks are first classified into three information uncertainty categories at each month. Within each uncertainty 
category, stocks are then sorted into three levels of the change in breadth of ownership (ΔBREADTHt). For each uncertainty and the change of breadth subgroup, 
stocks are further sorted into three divisions by the level of probability of information-based trade (PINt). The sorting method for COV is special. At each month t, 
stocks are assigned into three classes of COVt, with the class breakpoints determined separately within each MVt quintile, the COVt classes are then recombined 
across MVt quintiles. For the resulting 27 subgroups, equally weighted portfolios are constructed and held for one month. All three panels report the Fama-French 
three-factor and the four-factor risk-adjusted returns for all high-minus-low PIN hedging portfolios. Stocks with a price less than $5 are excluded. Stocks with 
missing value of MV or PIN are excluded, and the missing value of COV or ΔBREADTH takes value of zero. The sample period is 1983 - 2001. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Portfolios Formed by COV, ΔBREADTH and PIN
Low COV Medium COV High COV
ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTHPIN 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Low 0.0088 0.0112 0.0103 0.0103 0.0106 0.0136 0.0094 0.0116 0.0159 
 2.61 4.10 3.19  3.29 3.60 4.45  2.94 3.36 5.00 
Medium 0.0073 0.0091 0.0133  0.0113 0.0107 0.0148  0.0069 0.0092 0.0150 
 2.01 3.00 3.96  3.40 3.32 4.39  1.88 2.44 4.34 
High 0.0125 0.0105 0.0179  0.0120 0.0144 0.0173  0.0103 0.0152 0.0171 
 4.03 3.68 5.48  3.78 4.30 4.95  2.78 3.87 4.75 
            
H – L (Raw) 0.0038 -0.0007 0.0076***  0.0017 0.0038*** 0.0037**  0.0009 0.0035* 0.0012 
 1.57 -0.40 3.29  1.00 2.60 2.20  0.45 1.90 0.64 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0060** -0.0005 0.0084***  0.0017 0.0035** 0.0035**  -0.0009 0.0023 0.0007 
 2.56  -0.29  3.90   1.03  2.49  2.21   -0.48  1.37  0.41  
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0057** -0.0007 0.0069***  0.0012 0.0035** 0.0031*  -0.0005 0.0017 0.0009 
 2.36  -0.37  3.20   0.72  2.48  1.89   -0.25  0.98  0.47  
1
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Table 3.5—Continued 
 
Panel B: Portfolios Formed by AGE, ΔBREADTH and PIN
Low AGE Medium AGE High AGE
ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTHPIN 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Low 0.0061 0.0082 0.0146 0.0092 0.0095 0.0144 0.0107 0.0124 0.0137 
 1.74  2.43  4.11   2.74  3.06  4.40   3.91  4.87  4.87  
Medium 0.0044 0.0090 0.0139  0.0101 0.0101 0.0165  0.0103 0.0109 0.0128 
 1.13  2.45  3.51   2.84  3.16  4.94   3.34  3.80  4.31  
High 0.0098 0.0125 0.0181  0.0127 0.0126 0.0175  0.0140 0.0127 0.0155 
 2.69  3.84  4.78   3.79  4.17  5.28   4.45  4.22  5.07  
            
H – L (Raw) 0.0036** 0.0044** 0.0035*  0.0035* 0.0031* 0.0032  0.0032* 0.0003 0.0018 
 1.99  2.45  1.70   1.93  1.83  1.63   1.85  0.15  1.02  
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0038** 0.0042** 0.0032*  0.0038** 0.0038** 0.0047***  0.0025 -0.0005 0.0018 
 2.04  2.39  1.66   2.20  2.38  2.83   1.50  -0.28  1.23  
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0038** 0.0024 0.0008  0.0039** 0.0031* 0.0034**  0.0031* -0.0001 0.0014 
 2.03  1.39  0.44   2.23  1.88  2.05   1.79  -0.04  0.95  
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Table 3.5—Continued 
 
Panel C: Portfolios Formed by MV, ΔBREADTH and PIN
Low MV Medium MV High MV
ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTHPIN 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Low 0.0036 0.0068 0.0121 0.0089 0.0094 0.0151 0.0099 0.0123 0.0158 
 0.94  2.04  3.26   2.42  3.09  4.41   3.47  4.42  5.41  
Medium 0.0085 0.0086 0.0153  0.0063 0.0106 0.0180  0.0087 0.0128 0.0138 
 2.27  2.61  4.16   1.71  3.21  5.04   2.71  4.23  4.41  
High 0.0127 0.0120 0.0182  0.0107 0.0136 0.0186  0.0100 0.0121 0.0175 
 3.85  4.13  5.61   3.00  4.30  5.23   3.10  3.88  5.26  
            
H – L (Raw) 0.0091*** 0.0053*** 0.0061***  0.0018 0.0042*** 0.0035**  0.00003 -0.0001 0.0018 
 4.04  2.94  3.06   1.10  2.97  2.00   0.02  -0.10  1.26  
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0104*** 0.0057*** 0.0068***  0.0027 0.0044*** 0.0042**  -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0010 
 4.67  3.31  3.37   1.60  3.14  2.50   -0.35  -0.45  0.86  
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0089*** 0.0048*** 0.0053***  0.0016 0.0029** 0.0024  -0.0009 -0.0011 0.0001 
 3.97  2.71  2.60   0.95  2.10  1.46   -0.62  -0.84  0.08  
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Table 3.6 Subperiod Analysis 
 
This table reports the average monthly returns of high-minus-low PIN hedging portfolios in two subperiods 1983 - 1992 and 1993 - 2002. Information uncertainty 
proxies include analyst coverage (COV), firm age (AGE) and firm size (MV) in Panel A, B, and C respectively. The 9 hedging portfolios in each panel are 
constructed following the procedures in Table 3.5. All three panels report the Fama-French three-factor and the four-factor risk-adjusted returns for all 
high-minus-low PIN hedging portfolios. Stocks with a price less than $5 are excluded. Stocks with missing value of MV or PIN are excluded, and the missing value 
of COV or ΔBREADTH takes value of zero. The sample period is 1983 - 2001. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Portfolios Formed by COV, ΔBREADTH and PIN
Low COV Medium COV High COV
ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTHPIN 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
1983 - 1992
H – L (Raw) 0.0042 -0.0009 0.0053 0.0044* 0.0057*** 0.0013 0.0001 0.0041* 0.0021 
 1.12 -0.45 1.62  1.96 2.84 0.59  0.02 1.77 0.96 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0064* -0.000004 0.0046  0.0057*** 0.0059*** 0.0030*  -0.0001 0.0044** 0.0028* 
 1.67 -0.00 1.42  2.95 3.01 1.71  -0.04 2.02 1.66 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0067* 0.000047 0.0048  0.0052*** 0.0049** 0.0028  -0.0007 0.0039* 0.0025 
 1.69 0.03 1.44  2.65 2.47 1.52  -0.32 1.76 1.45 
1993 - 2002
H – L (Raw) 0.0033 -0.0005 0.0102*** -0.0012 0.0018 0.0064** 0.0018 0.0030 0.0003 
 1.14 -0.15 3.08  -0.45 0.84 2.50  0.61 0.99 0.08 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0059** 0.0022 0.0114***  -0.0016 0.0007 0.0058**  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 2.28 0.75 4.22  -0.57 0.38 2.28  0.02 0.05 0.03 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0052* 0.0017 0.0087***  -0.0027 0.0014 0.0049*  0.0007 -0.0009 0.0005 
 1.94 0.57 3.41  -0.99 0.68 1.90  0.25 -0.32 0.15 
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Table 3.6—Continued 
 
Panel B: Portfolios Formed by AGE, ΔBREADTH and PIN
Low AGE Medium AGE High AGE
ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTHPIN 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
1983 - 1992
H – L (Raw) 0.0028*** 0.0075*** -0.0013*** 0.0037*** 0.0049*** 0.0030*** 0.0039*** -0.0002*** 0.0019*** 
 1.16 3.45 -0.53  1.50 2.34 1.51  1.56 -0.06 0.86 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0031 0.0075*** -0.0026  0.0045** 0.0067*** 0.0054***  0.0044** 0.0006 0.0034** 
 1.23 3.46 -1.11  2.12 3.55 3.26  2.02 0.28 1.98 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0029 0.0063*** -0.0035  0.0040* 0.0054*** 0.0054***  0.0038* 0.0007 0.0027 
 1.13 2.92 -1.48  1.82 2.91 3.16  1.70 0.32 1.53 
1993 - 2002
H – L (Raw) 0.0045 0.0010 0.0087*** 0.0034 0.0011 0.0034 0.0025 0.0008 0.0016 
 1.64 0.34 2.69  1.22 0.40 0.98  1.03 0.30 0.59 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0048* 0.0020 0.0106***  0.0037 0.0024 0.0044  0.0020 0.0003 0.0014 
 1.73 0.73 3.50  1.35 0.96 1.46  0.79 0.11 0.61 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0051* -0.0005 0.0071**  0.0039 0.0017 0.0021  0.0029 0.0005 0.0011 
 1.76 -0.20 2.55  1.41 0.66 0.71  1.15 0.21 0.47 
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Table 3.6—Continued 
 
Panel C: Portfolios Formed by MV, ΔBREADTH and PIN
Low MV Medium MV High MV
ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTHPIN 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
1983 - 1992
H – L (Raw) 0.0108*** 0.0086*** 0.0096*** 0.0030*** 0.0041*** 0.0026*** 0.0033*** -0.0026*** 0.0002*** 
 3.38 4.43 3.69  1.36 2.24 1.30  1.87 -1.41 0.12 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0117*** 0.0084*** 0.0092***  0.0032 0.0049*** 0.0022  0.0042** -0.0017 -0.0001 
 3.55 4.12 3.43  1.37 2.81 1.06  2.47 -1.04 -0.04 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0112*** 0.0075*** 0.0089***  0.0027 0.0035** 0.0015  0.0037** -0.0017 -0.0004 
 3.30 3.66 3.23  1.14 2.10 0.72  2.11 -1.00 -0.24 
1993 - 2002
H – L (Raw) 0.0072** 0.0017 0.0024 0.0005 0.0042* 0.0044 -0.0036 0.0025 0.0035 
 2.28 0.56 0.78  0.20 1.97 1.52  -1.46 1.28 1.58 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0102*** 0.0042 0.0046  0.0023 0.0049** 0.0054**  -0.0056** 0.0015 0.0025 
 3.42 1.52 1.53  0.94 2.26 2.10  -2.38 0.77 1.42 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0078*** 0.0030 0.0020  0.0005 0.0030 0.0030  -0.0063*** 0.0004 0.0012 
 2.67 1.06 0.68  0.20 1.44 1.20  -2.62 0.21 0.66 
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Chapter 4 
 
Informed Trading, Short-Sale Constraints, and Trading Volume 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The prior literature often documents that short-sale constraints cause overpricing. 
However, whether short-sale constraints will always lead to overpricing is far from 
certain. For example, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) show that the presence of short 
sales constraints reduces the informational efficiency of prices but does not bias them 
upward in a rational expectations model. Chapter 3 demonstrates that when short-sale 
constraints are binding tightly and informed trading is absent, prices will decrease 
because uninformed investors confront a new information uncertainty risk and hence 
they are reluctant to hold the stock. While this new information uncertainty risk is the 
central theme of Yuan (2006), Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006), and Marin and Olivier 
(2008), the three theoretical papers are actually focusing on two different kinds of 
new information uncertainty risk effect.  
 
In particular, the combination of binding short-sale constraints and the absence of 
informed trading would affect stock prices in two distinct ways under two special 
conditions. Firstly, Yuan (2006) argues that short-sale constraints combined with 
information asymmetry dampen the upward price movement and thus make bubbles 
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difficult to form. In the model of Yuan (2006), there is a noisy demand or supply 
shock so that prices do not fully reveal private information, similar to the noisy 
rational expectations equilibrium (REE) model that used by Hellwig (1980) and 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). She considers the situation in which high stock prices 
are driven by a high level of noise demand, and informed investors are kept out of the 
market due to short-sale constraints. In this scenario, informed investors' private 
information is not embedded in the market clearing price, resulting a noisy price. 
Uninformed investors face a new information uncertainty risk as they cannot 
distinguish noise demand from informed buying. Thus, upward price movement will 
be dampened since uninformed investors demand an information-disadvantage 
premium to hold the stock. Hence, the first kind of new information uncertainty risk 
reduces the level of overvaluation.  
 
Secondly, Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006) and Marin and Olivier (2008) suggest that 
short-sale constraints combined with information asymmetry would cause crash of 
asset prices. Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006) extend Grossman-Stiglitz (1980)’s 
framework with differently informed investors. They consider fully rational 
expectations equilibrium model with binding short-sale constraints. Investors in that 
model trade for sharing risk or speculating on private information. Following 
Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991), Marin and Olivier (2008) also extend the Grossman 
and Stiglitz (1980) model by substituting noise trading with rational trading driven by 
stochastic hedging needs. In addition, they introduce a simple constraint on asset 
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holdings. Therefore, both Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006) and Marin and Olivier (2008) 
introduce noise trading through informed investors’ hedging need on their 
non-tradable asset so that prices do not fully reveal private information. They consider 
the scenario in which stock prices are likely to be low when short-sale constraints are 
binding. When the binding short-sale constraints keep informed investors from trading 
on private information, prices become less informative. In this case, without a high 
noise demand in the market, uninformed investors can only infer that informed 
investors are in possession of bad news since otherwise informed buying activities can 
be observed. Uninformed investors become aware of a new information uncertainty 
risk as they could not find out how negative the information really is. Thus, the 
second kind of new information uncertainty risk exacerbates downward price 
movement as uninformed investors demand an information-disadvantage premium to 
hold the stock. 
 
While the above three papers concentrate on the role of short-sale constraints in an 
asymmetric information setting, the purpose of this chapter is the relation between 
informed trading and future stock returns under two special conditions. To examine 
the two kinds of new information uncertainty risk effect, this chapter proposes that 
different levels of trading activities in the market combined with binding short-sale 
constraints and low informed trading can be used to capture the two kinds of market 
scenarios. This is because Lee and Swaminathan (2000) suggest that volume provides 
information about the extent to which investor sentiment favours a stock at a point in 
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time. While uninformed investors perceive a new information uncertainty risk when 
short-sale constraints are binding and informed trading is absent, different levels of 
trading activities shape their feelings about the new uncertainty risk. On the one hand, 
the scenario in Yuan (2006) is captured by the high level of trading activities. Since 
short-sale constraints can create overvaluation, high level of trading activities 
combined with overvaluation represent high noise demand and buying pressure in the 
market. Thus, uninformed investors could not distinguish noise demand from 
informed buying. The first kind of new information uncertainty effect can be 
presented by the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Stock should have higher future return if the level of informed trading 
is lower when (1) the level of trading activities is high; (2) short-sale constraints are 
binding.  
 
On the other hand, the scenario suggested by Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006) and Marin 
and Olivier (2008) can be captured by the low level of trading activities. The low 
levels of trading activities and informed trading would convince uninformed investors 
that the majority of investors hold downward beliefs and informed investors hold 
negative private information, since not only informed investors but also most of 
investors in the market stop buying stock. Therefore, uninformed investors become 
aware of the potential bad news but they do not know how bad the information really 
is. The following hypothesis describes the second kind of new information uncertainty 
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effect. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Stock will have lower future returns if the level of informed trading is 
lower and when (1) the level of trading activities is low; and (2) short-sale constraints 
are binding. 
 
The empirical results in this chapter confirm these two hypotheses using monthly data 
on NYSE- and AMEX-listed stocks from 1983 to 2001. Specifically, trading volume 
(VOL) is used to measure the trading activity of stocks. The existence of informed 
trading is measured by the probability of information-based trade (PIN). The stocks 
with binding short-sale constraints are defined as stocks with reductive change in 
breadth of ownership (ΔBREADTH). Moreover, stocks with negative and low 
ΔBREADTH (tightly binding short-sale constraints) are attributed to be overvalued. 
The analysis based on the performance of different portfolios constructed by these 
variables provides supporting evidence to the two hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 is 
supported by the evidence that high-minus-low PIN strategy produces significant 
negative return among stocks with high-VOL and negative low-ΔBREADTH. In other 
words, when trading activity is great, short-sale constrained stocks with low level of 
informed trading are subject to less overpricing comparing to short-sale constrained 
stocks with high level of informed trading. On the other hand, when the level of VOL 
is low and ΔBREADTH is low and negative, high-minus-low PIN hedging portfolio 
earns significant positive return. Hence, Hypothesis 2 is verified as short-sale 
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constrained stocks with lower informed trading underperform when trading activity is 
low.  
 
The information risk theory also suggests that higher informed trading stocks earn 
higher subsequent returns as information is a risk factor (see, e.g., Easley, Hvidkjaer, 
and O’Hara 2002). Hence, it seems that the prediction of Hypothesis 2 can be 
explained by the information risk theory as well. However, within low-VOL group, 
high-PIN stocks outperform low-PIN stocks only when short-sale constraints are 
binding tightly. The information risk theory cannot interpret the importance of 
short-sale constraints. In contrast, the new uncertainty risk theory can explain it well 
because uninformed investors only perceive the new information uncertainty risk 
when short-sale constraints are binding, which are assumed to keep informed 
investors from trading on private information. Furthermore, the empirical evidence of 
Hypothesis 1 shows that high-PIN stocks should underperform than low-PIN stocks 
when short-sale constraints are binding and trading volume is intense, which is 
contrary to the information risk theory 
 
This chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, Chapter 4 is the first 
study that empirically examines and supports the two theories proposed by Yuan 
(2006) as well as Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006) and Marin and Olivier (2008). 
Chapter 4 not only confirms the new information uncertainty risk once again but also 
verifies that there can be two different kinds of new information uncertainty risk 
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effect. Second, previous literature mainly focuses on the close relationship between 
short-sale constraints and overvaluation. Chapter 4 shows that short-sale constraints 
can actually dampen the degree of overvaluation under certain conditions. Finally, 
while previous literature normally uses trading volume to measure heterogeneous 
beliefs, Chapter 4 suggests that trading volume can also influence the uncertainty risk 
as perceived by uninformed investors. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews related 
literature. Section 4.3 presents the data and sample. Section 4.4 discusses empirical 
results from the portfolio analysis. Section 4.5 concludes this chapter. 
 
4.2. Related Literature 
 
Because Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 have reviewed related literature about short-sale 
constraints and asymmetric information (informed trading), this chapter focuses on 
the details of three key papers including Yuan (2006), Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006), 
and Marin and Olivier (2008). 
 
Yuan (2006) argues that short-sale constraints when combined with information 
asymmetry dampen the upward price movement and thus make bubbles difficult to 
form. Her theory considers the situation that when a high level of noise demand 
increases the price, informed investors may be constrained out of the market due to 
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short-sale restrictions. In this scenario, informed investors' private information is not 
embedded in the market clearing price, resulting a noisy price. Uninformed investors 
are less willing to purchase the asset since they cannot distinguish noise demand from 
information-based buying. Their demand becomes more elastic as the price increases, 
inducing a dampening effect. Hence, large upward price movements become less 
likely. 
 
Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006) study how short-sale constraints affect asset price and 
market efficiency. They consider a fully rational expectations equilibrium model, in 
which investors start to trade to share risk or to speculate on private information in the 
presence of short-sale constraints. Short-sale constraints limit both types of trades, and 
thus reduce the allocational and informational efficiency of the market. Limiting short 
sales driven by risk-sharing simply shifts the demand for the asset upwards and 
consequently its price. However, limiting short sales driven by private information 
increases the uncertainty about the asset as perceived by less informed investors, 
which reduces their demand for the asset. When this information effect dominates, 
short-sale constraints actually cause asset prices to decrease and price volatility to 
increase. Moreover, they show that short-sale constraints can give rise to discrete 
price drops accompanied by a sharp rise in volatility when prices fail to be 
informative and the uncertainty perceived by uninformed investors surges. 
 
Marin and Olivier (2008) document that at the individual stock level, sales of insiders 
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peak many months before a large drop in the stock price, while purchases of insiders 
peak only the month before a large jump. They provide a theoretical explanation for 
this phenomenon based on asset pricing under trading constraints and asymmetric 
information. The key feature of their theory is that uninformed investors may react 
more strongly to the absence of insider sales than to their presence. They attribute this 
as the “dog that did not bark” effect. They also empirically test their hypothesis and 
find it is still robust after examining competing stories such as patterns of insider 
trading driven by earnings announcement dates, or insiders timing their trades to 
evade prosecution. 
 
The three key papers share one common insight that short-sale constrained informed 
trading creates an additional information uncertainty as perceived by uninformed 
investors, which has been analysed in Chapter 3. However, the three papers have 
many differences either.  
 
Firstly, although all of them build noisy rational expectation equilibrium models to 
analyse the new information uncertainty risk, their models have different features. In 
the model of Yuan (2006), there is a noisy demand or supply shock so that prices do 
not fully reveal private information, similar to the noisy rational expectations 
equilibrium (REE) model that used by Hellwig (1980) and Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980). Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006) extend Grossman-Stiglitz (1980)’s framework 
with differently informed investors. They consider fully rational expectations 
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equilibrium model with binding short-sale constraints. Investors in that model trade 
for sharing risk or speculating on private information. Following Bhattacharya and 
Spiegel (1991), Marin and Olivier (2008) also extend the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
model by substituting noise trading with rational trading driven by stochastic hedging 
needs. In addition, they introduce a simple constraint on asset holdings. Therefore, 
both Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006) and Marin and Olivier (2008) introduce noise 
trading through informed investors’ hedging need on their non-tradable asset so that 
prices do not fully reveal private information. 
 
Secondly, since they introduce noisy into models differently, their models capture 
different market conditions. The model of Yuan (2006) captures the phenomenon that 
informed investors are short-sale constrained when the high stock price is caused by a 
high level of noise demand, a scenario similar to the “dot-com bubble”. Thus, she 
suggests that short-sale constraints are likely to bind when prices are high. By contrast, 
in the models of Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006) and Marin and Olivier (2008), 
short-sale constraints are likely to bind when asset prices are low. Without the high 
noise demand in the market, uninformed investors can only infer that informed 
investors are in possession of bad news since otherwise informed buying activities can 
be observed. 
 
Thirdly, according to these different market scenarios, their models have different 
predictions. In the model of Yuan (2006), uninformed investors cannot infer private 
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information from the noisy prices because binding short-sale constraints keep 
informed investors from trading on private information. According to the high buying 
pressure generated by high noise demand and the overvaluation effect of short-sale 
constraints, uninformed investors face a new information uncertainty risk as they 
cannot distinguish noise demand from informed buying. Thus, upward price 
movement will be dampened since uninformed investors demand an 
information-disadvantage premium to hold the stock. Hence, the first kind of new 
information uncertainty risk reduces the level of overvaluation. By contrast, in the 
models of Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006) and Marin and Olivier (2008), since there is 
no high noise demand in the market, uninformed investors can only infer that 
informed investors are in possession of bad news since otherwise informed buying 
activities can be observed. Uninformed investors become aware of a new information 
uncertainty risk as they could not find out how negative the information really is. 
Thus, the second kind of new information uncertainty risk exacerbates downward 
price movement as uninformed investors demand an information-disadvantage 
premium to hold the stock. 
 
Fourthly, while the focus of Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006) is short-sale constraints, 
Marin and Olivier (2008) consider the general trading constraints including short-sale 
constraints. Moreover, the study of Marin and Olivier (2008) is motivated by the 
evidence of insider trading and crashes in asset prices. They also empirically confirm 
their hypothesis by using insider trading data in the US market. The other two papers 
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are pure theoretical. 
 
Finally, Yuan (2006) also explores how general trading constraints affect asset prices 
in the presence of asymmetric information. She suggests that prices play an important 
role in shaping uninformed investor expectation in an asymmetric information 
environment. Accordingly, uninformed investors are uncertain whether trading 
constraints restrict informed investors from transmitting information to prices, and 
thus they demand an information-disadvantage premium in holding stocks. This effect 
creates a large price decline. Apart from the effect of information asymmetry 
combined with short-sale constraints, she also sheds light on the role of borrowing 
constraints as she argues that information asymmetry combined with borrowing 
constraints intensifies the downward price movement. In addition, the source of 
uncertainty in Yuan (2006) is different from that in Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006) and 
Marin and Olivier (2008). In the latter two studies, at a given price, informed 
investors' demand can be inferred and so is their constraint status. By contrast, in 
Yuan (2006), informed investors' constraint status cannot be inferred with certainty 
since the high price could be caused either by a high realization of private signals or 
by a high level of noise trading. This introduces an additional source of perceived 
uncertainty to uninformed investors and causes equilibrium price more skewed and 
more volatile. 
 
Although this chapter employs trading volume to capture certain market scenarios, 
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trading volume is often attributed to differences of opinion among investors in 
literature. Many studies including Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) and Boehme, 
Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) use turnover to measure dispersion of opinions.  
Hong and Stein (2007) suggest that trading volume appears to be an indicator of 
sentiment. They call one particular class of heterogeneous-agent models as 
“disagreement” models. These models underline the importance of differences in the 
beliefs of investors, which can be due to (1) gradual information flow; (2) limited 
attention; (3) heterogeneous priors. The most compelling attractive feature of these 
models is that they directly address the joint behaviour of stock prices and trading 
volume. Cao and Ou-Yang (2009) argue that it is differences of opinion regarding 
public information that determines the dynamics of trading volume in stocks and 
options. Their model suggests that four kinds of disagreements lead to trading in stock 
markets: (1) disagreements about the mean of the current public information; (2) 
disagreements about the precision of the current public information; (3) disagreements 
about the mean of the next-period public information; and (4) disagreements about the 
precision of past public information. Only two kinds of disagreements lead to trading 
in option markets: disagreements about the precisions of the current- and next-period 
public information. Their results show that stock trading starts at the public event date 
and decays slowly, whereas options trading are clustered before and during the public 
event date. Furthermore, they develop a multiple-stock model and indicate that trading 
volume of a stock depends not only on disagreements about this stock’s payoff, but 
also on disagreements about the payoffs of other correlated stocks. Even if there are 
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no disagreements or no signals about a stock’s payoff, there may still be trading in 
that stock due to disagreements about the payoffs of other related stocks. 
 
4.3. Data and Sample 
 
This chapter uses probability of information-based trade (PIN) as the informed trading 
proxy and the change in breadth of ownership (ΔBREADTH) as the short-sale 
constraints proxy, which is consistent with Chapter 3. The monthly PIN data is 
obtained from the 1983 – 2001 annual PIN data in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara 
(2005). The PIN value of stock in each month t takes the PIN value in that year. 
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2005) argue that the market microstructure of NYSE 
and AMEX are most closely consistent to that of their PIN model, therefore this 
chapter also focuses on the NYSE- and AMEX-listed stocks during the period of 1983 
- 2001. Since short-sale constraints also serve as proxy for overvaluation, stocks with 
negative and low ΔBREADTH in this chapter are regarded as overpriced. The datasets 
of Mutual Funds Holdings (CDA/Spectrum s12) in the Thomson Reuters databases 
are used to compute the change in breadth of ownership. Similar to Chapter 3, the 
value of ΔBREADTHt at month t is equal to the value of ΔBREADTHT in quarter T if 
month t belongs to quarter T. 
 
The extent of trading activity is measured by trading volume (VOL). Volume is the 
total number of shares traded in the market. While raw trading volume is unscaled and 
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hence is likely to be highly correlated with firm size, most recent studies have used 
turnover as a measure of the trading volume in a stock. Generally, turnover is defined 
as the total number of shares traded divided by the total number of shares outstanding. 
However, raw volume has several advantages than turnover in the context of this 
chapter. Obviously, volume describes the extent of trading activity more directly. The 
level of volume is merely the total number of shares traded, but the level of turnover 
also depends on the total number of shares outstanding. Thus, it can be the case that 
one stock A has higher volume than stock B but A has lower turnover than B because 
A has much larger shares outstanding than B. Since this chapter concentrates on the 
reaction of uninformed investors to different level of trading activity in the market, 
volume is a more suitable measure than turnover. Moreover, turnover has missing 
value if the total number of shares outstanding is zero despite the level of volume. 
Thus, volume would introduce larger sample size than turnover. The CRSP monthly 
tape in WRDS provides the data for trading volume as well as firm size (MV) and 
monthly returns. 
 
At last, the sample in this chapter has two requirements. Firstly, following Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2001), stocks with a price less than $5 are excluded to minimize the 
problem of bid-ask bounces and extreme illiquidity of small stocks. Secondly, this 
chapter requires all grouping variables are jointly available at each month t. These 
grouping variables include firm size (MVt), volume (VOLt), short-sale constraints 
(ΔBREADTHt) and the probability of informed trading (PINt). Therefore, stocks with 
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missing value of firm size will be excluded. Since both VOLt and PINt are primary 
variables, stocks are excluded if they do not have valid information on any of the 
variable at month t. Following Aslan, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2007), 
ΔBREADTHt takes value of zero if it has missing value at month t. 
 
This chapter adjusts high-minus-low PIN hedging portfolio returns for common risk 
factors. In particular, the returns of high-minus-low PIN hedging portfolios are 
adjusted by the three factors: 
Ri = αi + βi (RM - RF) + siSMB + hiHML + ei., 
and four factors: 
Ri = αi + βi (RM - RF) + siSMB + hiHML + miUMD +ei.. 
All the four factors are downloaded from Kenneth French’s website.  
 
Table 4.1 provides the summary statistics of the sample in this chapter. Panel A 
contains mean monthly statistics for the firm-month observations by year. These 
observations are those that will be used to form portfolios in later sections. The 
sample contains on average 1,745 firms per month from 1983 to 2001. The unusual 
decrease in the number of firms from 1999 is because the sample size is determined 
by the availability of probability of information-based trade (PIN). Easley, Hvidkjaer, 
and O’Hara (2005) indicate that the extremely high daily trading volume in late 1990s 
could cause failures for estimating PIN. Furthermore, they present that this occurs 
almost exclusively for the largest stocks rather than for smaller stocks. The monthly 
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mean of PIN in the sample is 0.199, and its general trend is decreasing from 1983 
(0.222) to 2001 (0.180). Panel A also confirms that trading volume becomes relative 
large since the late 1990s. While the average monthly volume in whole sample is 
37,994, it continues to increasing from 1994 (10,579) to 2001 (117,578). Firm size 
(MV) is also strict increasing from 1983 to 2001, and the monthly mean of the change 
in breadth of ownership (ΔBREADTH) changes from year to year without a 
consistent pattern.  
 
Panel B demonstrates the correlation matrix. The Pearson and Spearman correlations 
for these four variables are quite similar. Larger firms tend to have larger trading 
volume because of the strong positive relations between MV and VOL in both 
Pearson and Spearman matrix. Smaller firms are likely to have higher probability of 
information-based trade since MV is highly negatively correlated with PIN (Pearson = 
-0.291 and Spearman = -0.694). The negative correlation between volume and PIN is 
strong as well (Pearson = -0.348 and Spearman = -0.684). However, none of the 
Pearson and Spearman correlations between ΔBREADTH and any of other three 
variables is strong. Thus, short-sale constraints apply to all kinds of firms. 
 
Finally, Panel C provides a close look at the relationship between firm size and other 
three variables by assigning firms into size quintiles, which are determined by NYSE 
market capitalization breakpoints (obtained from Kenneth French’s website). The 
mean value of ΔBREADTH is closely related to firm size, ranging from 0.01% for 
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stocks in the bottom-size quintile, to 0.19% for stocks in the top-size quintile. The 
standard deviations of ΔBREADTH show a similar pattern with respect to firm size. 
According to this pattern that there is much more variation in ΔBREADTH across 
large stocks comparing with small stocks, Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) indicate that 
small firms will not have enough meaningful variation in ΔBREADTH. However, 
VOL and PIN do not suffer this problem since their bottom- and top-ranking groups 
will not be dominated by large firms as ΔBREADTH’s. Although the mean and 
standard deviation values of VOL are also closely related to firm size, these values in 
the bottom-size quintile are still large enough to guarantee meaningful variation in 
VOL across smallest firms. Similarly, the mean and standard deviation values in the 
top-size quintile ensure significant variation in PIN across largest firms. 
 
4.4. Empirical Results 
 
To empirically investigate the two hypotheses, stocks are assigned to portfolios based 
on certain characteristics. This standard approach in asset pricing, pioneered by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), reduces the variability in returns.  
 
4.4.1. Portfolio Returns Sorted by One Variable 
 
The first step is to review the individual impact of trading volume (VOL), short-sale 
constraints (ΔBREADTH) and the probability of informed trading (PIN) on stock 
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returns. These independent effects of variables give a baseline against which to 
compare their jointly effects in later tests. In Table 4.2, stocks are classified into five 
groups based on the level of each variable at each month.  
 
The sorting method is special for the change in breadth of ownership (ΔBREADTH). 
At each month t, stocks are assigned into five classes of ΔBREADTHt at that month, 
with the class breakpoints determined separately within each size (MVt) quintile in the 
same month. The ΔBREADTHt classes are then recombined across the five MVt 
quintiles, and hence five ΔBREADTHt groups obtained. This procedure ensures that 
within each ΔBREADTHt quintile, stocks do not have roughly the same size. The 
procedure is necessary because, as it is shown in Panel C of Table 4.1, there is much 
more variation in ΔBREADTH across large stocks. If it was an unconditional ranking 
on ΔBREADTH independent of MV, then the lowest ΔBREADTH and the highest 
ΔBREADTH groups would be dominated by large stocks. For the other two variables 
(VOL and PIN) that do not have this problem, stocks are simply sorted into five 
groups at each month t based on the value level of variable at that month. Equally 
weighted portfolios are formed within each subgroup, and portfolios are held for one 
month. 
 
Table 4.2 presents the average monthly portfolio returns. First of all, although high 
volume stocks perform better than low volume stocks, hedging portfolio that longs 
high-VOL and shorts low-VOL stocks does not generate significant return (0.21% 
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with t = 1.08). Thus, volume in this chapter does not capture the overpricing effect as 
the evidence in literature. Second, hedging portfolio that longs high-ΔBREADTH and 
shorts low-ΔBREADTH stocks earns significant positive return (1.07% with t = 8.53). 
Hence, the short-sale constrained stocks do perform worse than otherwise stocks. At 
last, the positive relationship between PIN and subsequent returns in information risk 
theory is confirmed since the return of high-minus-low PIN hedging portfolio is 
0.31% at 10% significance level. 
 
4.4.2. The Interaction between Trading Volume and Short Sale Constraints 
 
Table 4.3 examines the price impact of the interaction between trading volume and 
short sale constraints. Panel A of Table 4.3 shows the independent sorting portfolio 
results. Stocks are sorted into five groups based on VOLt at each month t. Meanwhile, 
stocks are also assigned into five classes of ΔBREADTHt, with the class breakpoints 
determined separately within each firm size (MVt) quintile. The ΔBREADTHt classes 
are then recombined across five MVt quintiles. The combination of the independent 
rankings on ΔBREADTH and VOL gives 25 groups at each month t. Table 4.3 also 
provides dependent sorting portfolio results of ΔBREADTH under VOL in Panel B 
and VOL under ΔBREADTH in Panel C, respectively. In Panel B, stocks are 
classified into five VOLt groups, and within each VOL group stocks are further 
divided into five ΔBREADTHt subgroups. In contrast, stocks in Panel C are sorted 
into five classes of ΔBREADTHt, with the class breakpoints determined separately 
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within each firm size (MVt) quintile. The ΔBREADTHt classes are then recombined 
across five MVt quintiles. For each the obtained five groups of ΔBREADTHt, stocks 
are then sorted into five volume subgroups based on the level of VOLt. All the 
resulting 25 portfolios in three panels are equal-weighted and held for one month. 
Table 4.3 provides the average monthly portfolio returns. 
 
The independent and dependent sorting evidence are the basically same. On the one 
hand, the change in breadth of ownership effect is confirmed in all three panels. 
Moreover, hedging portfolios that long high-ΔBREADTH stocks and short 
low-ΔBREADTH stocks earn largest significant positive returns within high-VOL 
groups. Therefore, the overvaluation effect of short-sale constraints is stronger if the 
level of trading volume is higher. On the other hand, all three panels show that stocks 
with higher trading volume only have higher future returns when short-sale 
constraints are not binding. While the returns of high-minus-low VOL hedging 
portfolios within the high-ΔBREADTH groups are significant positive, the 
performance of high-minus-low VOL hedging portfolios within the low-ΔBREADTH 
groups are negative but not statistically significant different from zero. Overall, Table 
4.3 presents that short-sale constrained stocks tend underperform more if they have 
higher trading volume. This is consistent with the literature that overvaluation is often 
accompanied by intense trading activities (Hong and Stein 2007). Thus, the 
implication is that high-minus-low ΔBREADTH strategy generates higher subsequent 
return if trading volume is greater. 
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4.4.3. The Interaction between Trading Volume and PIN 
 
Table 4.4 examines the interaction between trading volume and informed trading. In 
particular, stocks are assigned into 25 portfolios based on dependent sorting by VOL 
and PIN. At each month t, stocks are sorted into five VOLt classes first. Within each 
VOLt class, stocks are then sorted into five subgroups by the level of PINt. For the 
resulting 25 subgroups, equally weighted portfolios are constructed and held for one 
month. Table 4.4 provides the average monthly portfolio returns. 
 
Table 4.4 shows that low informed trading stocks have lower subsequent returns when 
volume is small but tend to earn higher subsequent returns when volume is large. 
However, the performance of high informed trading stocks does not change 
significantly with the level of volume. Therefore, high-minus-low PIN hedging 
portfolio within low-VOL group generates significant positive return (0.34% t = 2.36), 
but the return of the same hedging portfolio within high-VOL group is not statistically 
significant different from zero (-0.25% t = -1.12).  
 
On the other hand, low-VOL stocks also have lower subsequent returns when 
informed trading is low but have higher subsequent returns when informed trading is 
high. The performance of high-VOL stocks does not change significantly with the 
level of informed trading. Thus, high-minus-low VOL hedging portfolio within 
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low-PIN quintile generates significant positive return (0.42% t=1.92), but the return of 
the same hedging portfolio within high-PIN quintile is not statistically significant 
different from zero (-0.18% t = -0.65). 
 
According to the performance of above hedging portfolios, the significant positive 
returns are mainly contributed by shorting stocks with low level of informed trading 
and low level of volume. The relative poor performance of stocks with low-PIN and 
low-VOL can be due to that both informed and uninformed investors are not 
interested in holding these stocks. Note that high-VOL and high-PIN stocks do not 
have great performance as well, which might be due to the fact that high volume 
stocks are associated with the arrival rate of both informed and uninformed investors. 
Panel B of Table 4.1 has presented that volume is negatively related to PIN, which is 
consistent with the notion that stocks with greater trading activity tend to have more 
uninformed order flow. Therefore, in order to differentiate between VOL and PIN, the 
best way is to examine the level of informed order flow and the level of uninformed 
order flow. 
 
4.4.4. The Interaction between Short-Sale Constraints and PIN 
 
Table 4.5 reviews the interaction between short-sale constraints (ΔBREADTH) and 
informed trading (PIN). At each month t, stocks are assigned into five classes of the 
change in breadth of ownership ΔBREADTHt, with the class breakpoints determined 
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separately within each MVt quintile. The ΔBREADTHt classes are then recombined 
across MVt quintiles. Within each ΔBREADTH t category obtained, stocks are then 
sorted into five quintiles by PINt. For the resulting 25 subgroups, equally weighted 
portfolios are constructed and held for one month. Table 4.5 provides the average 
monthly portfolio returns. 
 
The results of Table 4.5 are basically the same as that of Table 3.4 in Chapter 3. 
High-minus-low PIN hedging portfolio produces significant positive return if stocks 
are subject to lowest or highest level of ΔBREADTH. Therefore, stocks with higher 
level of informed trading could earn higher returns when short-sale constraints are 
binding tightly or not binding at all. While the new information uncertainty risk effect 
documented in Chapter 3 can explain the case with binding short-sale constraints, the 
information risk theory can explain either case that short-sale constraints are binding 
tightly or not binding at all. On the other hand, high-minus-low ΔBREADTH hedging 
portfolios always earn significant positive returns regardless of the level of informed 
trading, although their performance within low-PIN group is not different from the 
result within high-PIN group. Therefore, informed trading alone cannot change the 
fact that short-sale constrained stocks always underperform stocks without binding 
short-sale constraints. Nevertheless, short-sale constrained stocks with low-PIN have 
the lowest subsequent returns, which is consistent with the new information 
uncertainty risk effect documented in Chapter 3. When short-sale constraints are not 
binding, stocks with high level of informed trading have the largest subsequent returns, 
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which is consistent with the information risk theory. 
 
4.4.5. Portfolio Returns under Three-Way Sorting 
 
The investigation of the two hypotheses requires a three-way sort by trading activity, 
short-sale constraints, and informed trading proxies. Three kinds of three-way sorting 
methods are used to obtain robust results. In Panel A of Table 4.6, stocks are assigned 
into three trading volume (VOLt) categories at month t. Within each volume category, 
stocks are then sorted into three groups based on the level of the change in breadth of 
ownership (ΔBREADTHt). Finally, for each volume and the change in breadth 
subgroup, stocks are further sorted into three divisions by the level of probability of 
information-based trade (PINt). Thus, Panel A focuses on stocks with different level of 
trading volume.  
 
By contrast, Panel B of Table 4.6 concentrates on short-sale constrained stocks. At 
each month t, stocks are sorted into three ΔBREADTHt classes, with the class 
breakpoints determined separately within each size (MVt) quintile in the same month. 
The ΔBREADTHt classes are then recombined across the five MVt quintiles, and 
hence three the change in breadth groups obtained. This procedure ensures that within 
each ΔBREADTHt group, stocks do not have roughly the same size. Stocks in each 
ΔBREADTHt group are then assigned into three VOLt divisions, and each 
ΔBREADTHt and VOLt group is further sorted into three PINt subgroups.  
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In order to show that the results in Panel A and Panel B are not depending on specific 
sorting methods, Panel C of Table 4.6 uses independent sorting to examine stocks 
with different levels trading volumes and short-sale constraints. At the beginning, 
stocks are assigned into three VOLt groups and three ΔBREADTHt groups separately 
at each month t. The combination of the independent rankings on VOLt and 
ΔBREADTHt gives 9 groups at each month t. For stocks within each VOLt and 
ΔBREADTHt group, they are further assigned into three PINt subgroups.  
 
All the above three-way sorts classify stocks into 27 portfolios, portfolios are equally 
weighted and their performances are tracked over one-month head. Apart from raw 
portfolio returns, Table 4.7 also reports the Fama-French three-factor and the 
four-factor risk-adjusted returns for all hedging portfolios that long high-PIN stocks 
and short low-PIN stocks. 
 
Firstly, Table 4.6 confirms the first kind of new information uncertainty risk effect 
presented by Hypothesis 1 because when trading volume is high, stocks with binding 
short-sale constraints will have higher future returns if informed trading is lower. All 
three panels of Table 4.6 show that all high-minus-low PIN hedging portfolios within 
high-VOL and low-ΔBREADTH subgroup have significant negative risk-adjusted 
returns. Furthermore, the return differential between high-PIN stocks and low-PIN 
stocks within high-VOL and low-ΔBREADTH subgroup in Panel B is the largest 
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comparing to other two panels. This can be due to the fact that Panel B concentrates 
on the overvaluation effect of short-sale constrained stocks. It is also important to note 
that, when trading volume is high but short-sale constraints are not binding, the 
positive risk-adjusted return differential between high-PIN stocks and low-PIN stocks 
becomes statistically insignificant. Therefore, the binding short-sale constraints are 
crucial for the less overpricing effect. This is consistent to the first kind of new 
information uncertainty risk effect, which suggests that the absence of informed 
trading only creates a new information uncertainty risk as perceived by uninformed 
investors when short-sale constraints are binding tightly. Overall, the above findings 
suggest that when stocks have intense trading activity, short-sale constrained stocks 
have less overvaluation if the level of informed trading is lower.  
 
Secondly, Table 4.6 verifies Hypothesis 2 because when trading volume is low and 
short-sale constraints are binding, low-PIN stocks underperform high-PIN stocks. All 
three panels of Table 4.6 show that hedging portfolios based on high-minus-low PIN 
strategy yield significant positive returns within low-VOL and low-ΔBREADTH 
subgroups. Specially, this hedging portfolio has the largest positive return in Panel A. 
This is because Panel A concentrates on stocks with different level of trading volume. 
Therefore, the second kind of new information uncertainty risk effect is confirmed. 
 
Finally, Table 4.6 can also provide evidence to distinguish Hypothesis 2 from the 
information risk theory, which can also explain the evidence of Hypothesis 2. The 
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information risk theory, presented by Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002), argues 
that high-PIN stocks have high information risk and hence leads to high subsequent 
returns. Table 4.4 has presented high-PIN stocks with higher future returns than 
low-PIN stocks within low-VOL group. Table 4.5 also shows that high-PIN stocks 
outperform low-PIN stocks within low-ΔBREADTH group or high-ΔBREADTH 
group. According to the information risk theory and these findings, short-sale 
constraints should not make any difference to the performance of high-minus-low PIN 
hedging portfolio within low-VOL subgroup. However, the results in Table 4.6 
underline the importance of short-sale constraints. Pane A and C provide the evidence 
of statistically insignificant raw and risk-adjusted return of this hedging portfolio 
when short-sale constraints are not binding. However, all three panels show that this 
hedging portfolio earns significant positive return within low-VOL when short-sale 
constraints are binding.  
 
Although the information risk theory cannot explain the role of the binding short-sale 
constraints, the second kind of new information uncertainty risk effect presented by 
Hypothesis 2 can interpret it well. When short-sale constraints are binding and the 
level informed trading is low, uninformed investors find the prices less informative 
because binding short-sale constraints keep informed investors from trading on 
private information. Since the levels of volume and informed trading are both low, 
uninformed investors would believe that the private information is negative because 
otherwise positive news would lead to buying activities in the market. In this case, 
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uninformed investors face a new information uncertainty risk because they are not 
sure how bad the information is. As a result, they are reluctant to hold stocks and 
hence stock prices are forced to decrease to attract marginal buyers. This explains the 
results found in low-VOL and low-ΔBREADTH subgroup. On the other hand, when 
short-sale constraints are not binding, informed investors can trade on their private 
information without limitation. Thus, uninformed investors do not believe the absence 
of informed trading implies the unrevealed private information. As a result, 
uninformed investors will not face the new information uncertainty risk. 
 
4.4.6. Subperiod Analysis 
 
Table 4.7 provides the subperiod analysis to see if the results that support the two 
hypotheses are time-specific. The subperiods include 1983 to 1992 and 1993 to 2002. 
The sorting methods of portfolios in Panel A, B, and C of Table 4.7 correspond to 
Panel A, B, and C of Table 4.6, respectively. The results here only include the raw 
returns, the Fama-French three-factor and the four-factor risk-adjusted returns for all 
hedging portfolios that long high-PIN stocks and short low-PIN stocks.  
 
According to the results in Table 4.7, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed by evidence in 
subperiod of 1993 to 2002 while Hypothesis 2 is supported by evidence in subperiod 
of 1983 to 1992. When stocks have high trading volume and short-sale constraints are 
binding, hedging portfolios only generate strong significant negative risk-adjusted 
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returns in latter subperiod as none of their returns in earlier subperiod is significantly 
different from zero. By contrast, when stocks have low trading volume and short-sale 
constraints are binding, hedging portfolios generally earn significant positive raw and 
risk-adjusted returns in earlier subperiod, and most of their positive raw and 
risk-adjusted returns are no longer statistically significant in latter subperiod.  
 
Although these findings might imply that two hypotheses are time-specific, they are 
more likely to be explained by the feature of the trading volume time series. Panel A 
in Table 4.1 has shown that the monthly trading volume keeps increasing from 1983 
to 2001. In addition, the increasing speed grows more rapidly in period of 1993 to 
2001 than in period of 1983 to 1992. Actually, the average monthly volume in period 
of 1983 to 1992 is 19,932 while the average monthly volume in period of 1993 to 
2001 is 58,116. Since Hypothesis 1 captures the scenario of intense trading activity 
and Hypothesis 2 represents the situation with low trading activity, it is natural that 
Hypothesis 1 works better in subperiod of 1993 to 2002 and Hypothesis 2 is more 
effective in subperiod of 1983 to 1992. 
 
4.4.7. Comments on Robustness 
 
Although Section 4.4.6 provides one robustness check of subperiod analysis, it is too 
early to say that the empirical findings in this chapter are robust. Because of data 
limitation, there are no alternative proxies for informed trading and short-sale 
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constraints. Despite the fact that the results may not hold in general, this chapter has 
used three kinds of three-way sorting methods to examine the robustness of the two 
different new information uncertainty risk effects.  
 
Panel A of Table 4.6 adopts the three-way nonindependent sort by volume and then by 
short-sale constraints and finally by informed trading. In this way, stocks within 
low-VOL low-ΔBREADTH and low-PIN subgroup are subject to low or absent 
buying activities, and hence they match the market scenario suggested by Bai, Chang, 
and Wang (2006) and Marin and Olivier (2008). Therefore, Panel A of Table 4.6 is 
designed to examine the crash of prices effect in Hypothesis 2. 
 
Panel B of Table 4.6 employs another three-way nonindependent sort by short-sale 
constraints and then by volume and finally by informed trading, which can accurately 
examine the overvaluation effect of short-sale constrained stocks. Stocks within 
low-ΔBREADTH low-VOL and low-PIN subgroup are subject to high buying 
pressure and noise demand, which is the market scenario in Yuan (2006). Therefore, 
Panel B of Table 4.6 can be used to examine the reduction of overvaluation effect in 
Hypothesis 1. 
 
In order to demonstrate the findings are not determined by specific sorting methods, 
Panel C of Table 4.6 assigns stocks into three volume and three short-sale constraints 
groups independently. For stocks within each volume and short-sale constraints group, 
 162
they are then classified into three informed trading subgroups. 
 
The empirical findings in Table 4.6 show that the two different new information 
uncertainty risk effects can be verified by each of the three sorting methods. 
Furthermore, like the case in Chapter 3, the prediction of Hypothesis 2 can be 
explained by the information risk theory. Nevertheless, the information risk theory is 
controversial in Table 4.6 as it cannot explain why low-VOL and low-PIN stocks no 
longer underperform low-VOL and high-PIN stocks when short-sale constraints are 
not binding. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter examines two kinds of new information uncertainty risk effects proposed 
by Yuan (2006), and Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006) and Marin and Olivier (2008). 
They all study asset pricing theories under short-sale constraints in an asymmetric 
information setting, but their models capture two kinds of market scenarios. Firstly, 
short-sale constraints are likely to bind when prices are high in Yuan (2006), which 
captures the overvaluation effect. In this case, the sharp drop of price informativeness 
that due to the binding short-sale constraints and absent informed trading could 
produce a new information uncertainty risk to uninformed investors. The first kind of 
new uncertainty risk dampens the upward price movement because uninformed 
investors cannot distinguish high noise demand from information-based buying and 
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hence they are reluctant to hold the stock. Secondly, Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006) 
and Marin and Olivier (2008) suggest that short-sale constraints are likely to bind 
when asset prices are low. In this case, a new information uncertainty risk also arises 
when short-sale constraints are binding and informed trading is absent. The second 
kind of new information uncertainty risk will cause decline in the price or even crash 
since uninformed investors believe there is negative private information and they are 
not sure how negative it is. 
 
This chapter use two extreme levels of trading volume to estimate the two market 
condition of the above two predictions. On the one hand, high trading volume 
combined with binding short-sale constraints could cause overpricing with high noise 
demand. This captures the scenario of the first kind of new information uncertainty 
risk effect. On the other hand, the low levels of trading volume and informed trading 
could convince uninformed investors that most investors have downward beliefs and 
informed investors hold negative information. This captures the scenario of the 
second kind of new information uncertainty risk effect.  
 
Using monthly data on NYSE- and AMEX-listed stocks from 1983 to 2001, this 
chapter provides supporting evidence to these two kinds of effect. For the first kind of 
new information uncertainty risk effect, stocks with lower level of informed trading 
have higher future returns when short-sale constraints are binding and trading volume 
is high. For the second kind of new information uncertainty risk effect, stocks with 
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lower level of informed trading have lower future returns when short-sale constraints 
are binding and trading volume is low. Moreover, this second new uncertainty risk 
effect does not arise when short-sale constraints are not binding. Therefore, the 
information risk theory that predicts stocks with higher informed trading will perform 
better cannot fully explain these findings. 
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics 
 
This table provides the summary statistics for NYSE and AMEX stocks during the period from 
January 1983 through December 2001. Panel A reports the mean monthly statistics for all stocks. 
Panel B shows the correlation matrix, in which the Pearson's correlations are shown above the 
diagonal with Spearman's correlation below. Panel C demonstrates the mean and standard 
deviation values by NYSE Market Capitalization quintiles. No. of firms per month is the monthly 
average number of firms in the sample. Firm size (MV) is the market capitalization (in millions of 
dollars) at the end of month t. Trading volume (VOL) is the total number of shares traded at each 
month t. ΔBREADTHT is the change in breadth of ownership from the end of quarter T-1 to 
quarter T. The breadth of ownership in quarter T is the fraction of all mutual funds long the stock 
at the end of quarter T. ΔBREADTHt at month t is equal to the value of ΔBREADTHT in quarter T 
if month t belongs to quarter T. The probability of information-based trade (PIN) is obtained from 
the annual PIN data in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2005). The PIN value of stock in each 
month t takes the PIN value in that year. Stocks with a price less than $5 are excluded. Stocks with 
missing value of MV, VOL or PIN are excluded, and the missing value of ΔBREADTH takes 
value of zero. 
 
Panel A: Mean Monthly Statistics by Year 
Year No.of Firms 
per Month 
MV 
per Month 
VOL  
per Month 
ΔBREADTH 
per Month 
PIN 
per Month 
1983 1,918 754 10,579 0.13% 0.222 
1984 1,830 776 11,758 0.03% 0.208 
1985 1,757 931 14,743 0.04% 0.216 
1986 1,703 1,180 19,144 0.04% 0.216 
1987 1,700 1,365 24,689 0.09% 0.217 
1988 1,627 1,295 21,338 0.01% 0.216 
1989 1,570 1,581 22,518 0.08% 0.213 
1990 1,421 1,694 22,877 0.06% 0.215 
1991 1,471 1,937 25,461 0.07% 0.214 
1992 1,604 1,951 26,210 0.08% 0.209 
1993 1,750 2,083 30,894 0.12% 0.199 
1994 1,839 2,089 32,548 0.10% 0.198 
1995 1,877 2,391 37,648 -0.01% 0.195 
1996 1,924 2,586 38,424 0.05% 0.192 
1997 2,032 2,730 43,765 0.03% 0.181 
1998 2,040 3,561 58,077 0.04% 0.171 
1999 1,875 4,063 70,624 0.07% 0.169 
2000 1,676 4,130 93,484 0.08% 0.171 
2001 1,546 4,720 117,578 0.03% 0.180 
Total 1,745 2,213 37,994 0.06% 0.199 
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Table 4.1—Continued 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
(Pearson Correlations Are Shown above the Diagonal with Spearman Below) 
  MV  VOL  ΔBREADTH  PIN 
MV  1  0.679  0.114  -0.291 
VOL  0.837  1  0.082  -0.348 
ΔBREADTH  0.042  0.031  1  -0.057 
PIN  -0.694  -0.684  -0.021  1 
Panel C: Means and Standard Deviations by NYSE Market Capitalization Quintiles 
 All 
Firms 
Quintile 1
Firms 
(Smallest)
Quintile 
2 
Firms 
Quintile  
3 
Firms 
Quintile 
4 
Firms 
Quintile 5 
Firms 
(Largest)
MV Mean 2,213 67 261 651 1,686 10,383 
 Std.Dev. 7,561 50 126 282 832 16,155 
 
VOL Mean 37,994 3,040 10,486 22,336 48,456 135,138 
 Std.Dev. 93,138 6,571 17,099 33,562 71,230 179,889 
 
ΔBREADTH Mean 0.06% 0.01% 0.02% 0.04% 0.06% 0.19% 
 Std.Dev. 0.61% 0.12% 0.23% 0.33% 0.51% 1.31% 
 
PIN Mean 0.199 0.262 0.211 0.185 0.164 0.133 
 Std.Dev. 0.077 0.084 0.058 0.053 0.048 0.040 
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Table 4.2 Portfolio Returns Sorted by One Variable 
 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns sorted by one variable only. Firm size (MV) is 
the market capitalization (in millions of dollars) at the end of month t. Trading volume (VOL) is 
the total number of shares traded at each month t. ΔBREADTHT is the change in breadth of 
ownership from the end of quarter T-1 to quarter T. The breadth of ownership in quarter T is the 
fraction of all mutual funds long the stock at the end of quarter T. ΔBREADTHt at month t is equal 
to the value of ΔBREADTHT in quarter T if month t belongs to quarter T. The probability of 
information-based trade (PIN) is obtained from the annual PIN data in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and 
O’Hara (2005). The PIN value of stock in each month t takes the PIN value in that year. At each 
month t, stocks are assigned into five classes of ΔBREADTHt, with the class breakpoints 
determined separately within each MVt quintile. The ΔBREADTHt classes are then recombined 
across MVt quintiles. For the other two variables VOL and PIN, each month t stocks are simply 
sorted into five groups based on the value level of variable at that month. Stocks are held for one 
month and portfolio returns are equally weighted. Stocks with a price less than $5 are excluded. 
Stocks with missing value of MV, VOL or PIN are excluded, and the missing value of 
ΔBREADTH takes value of zero. The sample period is 1983 - 2001. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Quintiles VOL ΔBREADTH PIN 
Q1 (Low) 0.0102 0.0079 0.0115 
 3.92 2.36 4.15 
Q2 0.0124 0.0093 0.0112 
 4.01 3.12 3.53 
Q3 0.0121 0.0111 0.0103 
 3.62 3.89 3.15 
Q4 0.0123 0.0129 0.0117 
 3.70 4.41 3.52 
Q5 (High) 0.0123 0.0186 0.0146 
 3.89 5.75 5.01 
    
Q5 - Q1 0.0021 0.0107*** 0.0031* 
 1.08 8.53 1.73 
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Table 4.3 Portfolio Returns Sorted by Trading Volume  
and Short-Sale Constraints 
 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns by sorting the change in breadth of ownership 
(ΔBREADTH) and trading volume (VOL). Panel A uses independent sorting. Stocks are sorted 
into five groups based on VOLt at each month t. Stocks are then assigned into five classes of 
ΔBREADTHt, with the class breakpoints determined separately within each firm size (MVt) 
quintile. The ΔBREADTHt classes are then recombined across five MVt quintiles. The 
combination of the independent rankings on ΔBREADTH and VOL gives 25 groups at each month 
t. Panel B and C adopt dependent sorting of ΔBREADTH under VOL and VOL under 
ΔBREADTH, respectively. In Panel B, stocks are classified into five VOLt groups, and each VOLt 
group is further divided into five ΔBREADTHt subgroups. In contrast, stocks in Panel C are sorted 
into five classes of ΔBREADTHt, with the class breakpoints determined separately within each 
firm size (MVt) quintile. The ΔBREADTHt classes are then recombined across five MVt quintiles. 
For each of the five ΔBREADTHt groups obtained, stocks are then sorted into five VOLt 
subgroups. All these portfolios are equal-weighted and held for one month. Stocks with a price 
less than $5 are excluded. Stocks with missing value of MV, VOL or PIN are excluded, and the 
missing value of ΔBREADTH takes value of zero. The sample period is 1983 - 2001. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Portfolios by VOL and ΔBREADTH Independently 
VOL ΔBREADTH 
V1 (Low) V2 V3 V4 V5 (High)  V5 - V1 
B1 (Low) 0.0074 0.0096 0.0079 0.0066 0.0069 -0.0005 
 2.48 2.80 2.10 1.71 1.96 -0.22 
B2 0.0082 0.0095 0.0081 0.0099 0.0093 0.0008 
 2.69 3.11 2.39 2.82 2.89 0.28 
B3 0.0101 0.0116 0.0105 0.0108 0.0108 0.0007 
 3.77 3.7 3.30 3.49 3.38 0.31 
B4 0.0097 0.0131 0.0134 0.0134 0.0156 0.0064* 
 2.67 4.16 4.06 4.08 4.77 1.93 
B5 (High) 0.0140 0.0188 0.0204 0.0199 0.0191 0.0051**
 4.99 5.37 5.47 5.52 5.79 2.16 
       
B5 - B1 0.0066*** 0.0093*** 0.0125*** 0.0133*** 0.0123***  
 3.79 5.31 6.61 6.66 6.98 
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Table 4.3—Continued 
 
Panel B: Portfolios by ΔBREADTH under VOL 
VOL ΔBREADTH 
V1 (Low) V2 V3 V4 V5 (High)  V5 - V1 
B1 (Low) 0.0074 0.0105 0.0089 0.0077 0.0073 -0.0001 
 2.55 3.25 2.45 2.21 2.13 -0.04 
B2 0.0092 0.0072 0.0080 0.0106 0.0096 0.0009 
 3.21 2.04 2.10 2.82 2.83 0.29 
B3 0.0096 0.0120 0.0118 0.0128 0.0111 0.0012 
 3.27 3.39 3.29 3.73 3.15 0.49 
B4 0.0081 0.0146 0.0150 0.0138 0.0151 0.0071**
 2.70 4.28 4.53 3.92 4.67 2.13 
B5 (High) 0.0130 0.0178 0.0182 0.0175 0.0194 0.0063***
 4.74 5.33 5.14 5.19 5.76 2.63 
       
B5 - B1 0.0056*** 0.0072*** 0.0093*** 0.0098*** 0.0121***  
 3.49 4.10 4.80 5.48 5.87 
 
 
Panel C: Portfolios by VOL under ΔBREADTH 
ΔBREADTH 
VOL 
B1 (Low) B2 B3 B4 B5 (High)  B5 - B1 
V1 (Low) 0.0083 0.0088 0.0103 0.0099 0.0146 0.0063***
 2.73 3.16 3.97 3.75 4.97 4.18 
V2 0.0095 0.0096 0.0123 0.0135 0.0200 0.0105***
 2.65 3.19 3.98 4.36 5.53 5.62 
V3 0.0069 0.0091 0.0116 0.0124 0.0192 0.0122***
 1.80 2.66 3.59 3.73 5.19 6.11 
V4 0.0080 0.0098 0.0103 0.0135 0.0201 0.0121***
 2.13 2.87 3.38 4.06 5.66 6.40 
V5 (High) 0.0069 0.0092 0.0110 0.0150 0.0190 0.0121***
 2.01 2.88 3.51 4.81 5.80 6.82 
       
V5 - V1 -0.0014 0.0005 0.0007 0.0051** 0.0044*  
 -0.62 0.21 0.32 2.25 1.91 
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Table 4.4 Portfolio Returns Sorted by Trading Volume and PIN 
 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns based on trading activity proxy (trading 
volume, VOL) and the probability of information-based trade proxy (PIN). At each month t, stocks 
are assigned into five categories of VOLt first. Within each VOLt category, stocks are then sorted 
into five quintiles by the level of PINt. For the resulting 25 subgroups, equally weighted portfolios 
are constructed and held for one month. Stocks with a price less than $5 are excluded. Stocks with 
missing value of MV, VOL or PIN are excluded, and the missing value of ΔBREADTH takes 
value of zero. The sample period is 1983 - 2001. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
VOL 
PIN 
V1 (Low) V2 V3 V4 V5 (High)  V5 - V1 
P1 (Low) 0.0092 0.0077 0.0098 0.0119 0.0133 0.0042* 
 3.59 2.91 3.46 4.00 4.71 1.92 
P2 0.0084 0.0105 0.0092 0.0124 0.0126 0.0042* 
 2.92 3.31 2.71 3.71 4.21 1.90 
P3 0.0095 0.0119 0.0122 0.0118 0.0118 0.0024 
 3.29 3.55 3.41 3.45 3.69 1.09 
P4 0.0113 0.0137 0.0110 0.0113 0.0127 0.0014 
 4.05 4.03 3.12 3.14 3.54 0.57 
P5 (High) 0.0126 0.0184 0.0181 0.0143 0.0108 -0.0018 
 5.05 5.25 4.61 3.68 2.86 -0.65 
       
P5 - P1 0.0034** 0.0106*** 0.0082*** 0.0024 -0.0025  
 2.36 5.91 3.96 1.15 -1.12 
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Table 4.5 Portfolio Returns Sorted by Short-Sale Constraints and PIN 
 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns based on short-sale constraints proxy (the 
change of breadth of ownership ΔBREADTH) and the probability of information-based trade 
proxy (PIN). At each month t, stocks are assigned into five classes of ΔBREADTH t, with the class 
breakpoints determined separately within each MVt quintile. The ΔBREADTH t classes are then 
recombined across MVt quintiles. Within each ΔBREADTH t group obtained, stocks are then 
sorted into five subgroups by the level of PINt. For the resulting 25 subgroups, equally weighted 
portfolios are constructed and held for one month. Stocks with a price less than $5 are excluded. 
Stocks with missing value of MV, VOL or PIN are excluded, and the missing value of 
ΔBREADTH takes value of zero. The sample period is 1983 - 2001. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
ΔBREADTH 
PIN 
B1 (Low) B2 B3 B4 B5 (High)  B5 - B1 
P1 (Low) 0.0084 0.0094 0.0106 0.0131 0.0164 0.0081***
 2.70 3.34 3.79 4.77 5.45 5.13 
P2 0.0071 0.0091 0.0102 0.0128 0.0172 0.0100***
 1.93 2.76 3.32 4.1 5.02 5.71 
P3 0.0045 0.0075 0.0095 0.0117 0.0182 0.0137***
 1.21 2.27 3.01 3.71 5.18 8.06 
P4 0.0075 0.0097 0.0121 0.0121 0.0209 0.0134***
 2.05 2.89 3.77 3.62 5.68 7.39 
P5 (High) 0.0123 0.0108 0.0132 0.0147 0.0203 0.0080***
 3.57 3.65 4.64 4.77 6.05 4.24 
       
P5 - P1 0.0039* 0.0014 0.0026 0.0016 0.0038*  
 1.76 0.69 1.36 0.81 1.72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6 Portfolio Returns under Three-Way Sorting 
 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns using three-way sorting on trading volume (VOL), the change in breadth of ownership (ΔBREADTHt), and 
probability of information-based trade (PINt) at each month t. In Panel A, stocks are assigned into three trading volume (VOLt) categories at month t. Within each 
volume category, stocks are sorted into three the change of breadth of ownership groups based on the level of ΔBREADTHt. Then for each volume and the change of 
breadth subgroup, stocks are further sorted into three divisions by the level of probability of information-based trade (PINt). Panel B classifies stocks into three 
ΔBREADTHt classes, with the class breakpoints determined separately within each size (MVt) quintile. The ΔBREADTHt classes are then recombined across the five 
MVt quintiles, and hence three the change of breadth groups obtained. Stocks in each ΔBREADTHt group are then assigned into three VOLt divisions, and each 
ΔBREADTHt and VOLt group is further sorted into three PINt subgroups. In Panel C, stocks are assigned into three VOLt groups and three ΔBREADTHt groups 
separately at each month t. The combination of the independent rankings on VOLt and ΔBREADTHt gives 9 groups at each month t. Then for stocks within each 
VOLt and ΔBREADTHt group, they are further assigned into three PINt subgroups. All three-way sorts classify stocks into 27 portfolios, which are equally weighted 
and are held for one-month head. Apart from raw portfolio returns, Table 4.7 also reports the Fama-French three-factor and the four-factor risk-adjusted returns for all 
hedging portfolios that long high-PIN stocks and short low-PIN stocks. Stocks with a price less than $5 are excluded. Stocks with missing value of MV, VOL or PIN 
are excluded, and the missing value of ΔBREADTH takes value of zero. The sample period is 1983 - 2001. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.6—Continued 
 
Panel A: Portfolios Formed by PIN within ΔBREADTH under VOL
Low VOL Medium VOL High VOL
ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTHPIN 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Low 0.0076 0.0093 0.0124 0.0086 0.0097 0.0127 0.0104 0.0123 0.0159 
 2.57  3.30  4.25   2.64  3.36  4.12   3.46  4.22  5.25  
Medium 0.0087 0.0097 0.0145  0.0079 0.0087 0.0161  0.0086 0.0124 0.0142 
 2.82  3.22  4.57   2.19  2.57  4.54   2.44  3.65  4.13  
High 0.0120 0.0120 0.0150  0.0118 0.0163 0.0202  0.0073 0.0112 0.0187 
 3.90  4.26  5.10   3.07  4.31  5.08   1.93  2.95  4.93  
            
H – L (Raw) 0.0043** 0.0027* 0.0026  0.0033* 0.0066*** 0.0075***  -0.0031 -0.0011 0.0028 
 2.49  1.79  1.64   1.77  3.67  3.64   -1.60  -0.58  1.52  
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0043** 0.0028* 0.0031*  0.0032* 0.0050*** 0.0072***  -0.0044*** -0.0029* 0.0015 
 2.40  1.85  1.93   1.88  3.35  4.50   -2.61  -1.80  1.11  
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0041** 0.0023 0.0021  0.0035** 0.0045*** 0.0054***  -0.0036** -0.0029* 0.0011 
 2.23  1.46  1.28   2.05  2.98  3.48   -2.13  -1.75  0.76  
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Table 4.6—Continued 
 
Panel B: Portfolios Formed by PIN within VOL under ΔBREADTH
Low ΔBREADTH MediumΔBREADTH High ΔBREADTH
VOL VOL VOLPIN 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Low 0.0065 0.0082 0.0095 0.0084 0.0089 0.0118 0.0125 0.0149 0.0169 
 2.15  2.39  3.18   3.09  3.15  4.09   4.26  4.61  5.75  
Medium 0.0099 0.0083 0.0083  0.0103 0.0094 0.0110  0.0148 0.0152 0.0160 
 3.01  2.27  2.35   3.46  2.93  3.45   4.48  4.25  4.78  
High 0.0103 0.0105 0.0062  0.0126 0.0146 0.0098  0.0156 0.0226 0.0197 
 3.42  2.69  1.59   4.78  4.06  2.84   5.22  5.68  5.11  
            
H – L (Raw) 0.0038** 0.0023 -0.0033  0.0042*** 0.0057*** -0.0020  0.0030** 0.0077*** 0.0028 
 2.52  1.26  -1.59   2.90  3.21  -1.12   1.97  3.91  1.36  
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0041*** 0.0027 -0.0050***  0.0049*** 0.0048*** -0.0025*  0.0030* 0.0070*** 0.0014 
 2.65  1.63  -2.79   3.32  3.45  -1.67   1.91  4.71  1.04  
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0036** 0.0036** -0.0043**  0.0044*** 0.0039*** -0.0027*  0.0028* 0.0060*** 0.0011 
 2.29  2.14  -2.35   2.91  2.83  -1.74   1.74  4.01  0.77  
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Table 4.6—Continued 
 
Panel C: Portfolios Formed by PIN under VOL and ΔBREADTH
Low VOL Medium VOL High VOL
ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTHPIN 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Low 0.0069 0.0086 0.0131 0.0072 0.0097 0.0135 0.0091 0.0119 0.0165 
 2.31  3.10  4.46   2.19  3.39  4.32   3.03  4.09  5.56  
Medium 0.0084 0.0105 0.0151  0.0077 0.0094 0.0163  0.0083 0.0120 0.0167 
 2.67  3.49  4.74   2.09  2.92  4.54   2.30  3.76  4.94  
High 0.0105 0.0125 0.0149  0.0112 0.0137 0.0212  0.0069 0.0093 0.0203 
 3.44  4.67  5.09   2.95  3.79  5.23   1.75  2.65  5.25  
            
H – L (Raw) 0.0036** 0.0040*** 0.0018  0.0041** 0.0039** 0.0077***  -0.0022 -0.0026 0.0038* 
 2.10  2.77  1.07   2.36  2.28  3.82   -1.12  -1.33  1.88  
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0038** 0.0048*** 0.0023  0.0039** 0.0031** 0.0068***  -0.0039** -0.0030* 0.0021 
 2.17  3.25  1.36   2.43  2.33  4.16   -2.36  -1.80  1.62  
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0036** 0.0045*** 0.0022  0.0045*** 0.0025* 0.0056***  -0.0032* -0.0030* 0.0021 
 1.98  2.98  1.27   2.79  1.88  3.42   -1.88  -1.77  1.57  
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Table 4.7 Subperiod Analysis 
 
This table reports the average monthly returns of hedging portfolios based on PIN strategy in two subperiods 1983 to 1992 and 1993 to 2002. VOL is trading volume. 
ΔBREADTH is the change in breadth of ownership. PIN is probability of information-based trade. The sorting methods of portfolios in Panel A, B, and C correspond 
to Panel A, B, and C of Table 4.6, respectively. The results here only include the raw returns, and the Fama-French three-factor and the four-factor risk-adjusted 
returns for all hedging portfolios that long high-PIN stocks and short low-PIN stocks. Stocks with a price less than $5 are excluded. Stocks with missing value of MV, 
VOL or PIN are excluded, and the missing value of ΔBREADTH takes value of zero. The sample period is 1983 - 2001. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Portfolios Formed by PIN within ΔBREADTH under VOL
Low VOL Medium VOL High VOL
ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTHPIN 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
1983 - 1992
H – L (Raw) 0.0057** 0.0044*** 0.0031 0.0031 0.0046* 0.0049** -0.0014 -0.0033 0.0029 
 2.09 2.65 1.57  1.27 1.88 2.15  -0.63 -1.36 1.27 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0053* 0.0040** 0.0040*  0.0030 0.0039** 0.0047**  -0.0007 -0.0030 0.0024 
 1.86 2.35 1.97  1.29 2.08 2.29  -0.37 -1.56 1.28 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0051* 0.0030* 0.0030  0.0037 0.0033* 0.0043**  -0.0011 -0.0031 0.0020 
 1.75 1.79 1.49  1.55 1.72 2.06  -0.57 -1.55 1.06 
1993 - 2002
H – L (Raw) 0.0028 0.0007 0.0020 0.0035 0.0087*** 0.0103*** -0.0049 0.0012 0.0026 
 1.36 0.30 0.80  1.22 3.32 2.94  -1.54 0.41 0.90 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0036 0.0030 0.0028  0.0035 0.0072*** 0.0095***  -0.0079*** -0.0020 0.0007 
 1.65 1.26 1.08  1.42 3.15 3.78  -2.91 -0.80 0.36 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0032 0.0024 0.0014  0.0036 0.0069*** 0.0068***  -0.0068** -0.0021 0.0001 
 1.45 0.99 0.52  1.40 2.91 2.90  -2.44 -0.80 0.03 
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Table 4.7—Continued 
 
Panel B: Portfolios Formed by PIN within VOL under ΔBREADTH
Low ΔBREADTH MediumΔBREADTH High ΔBREADTH
VOL VOL VOLPIN 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
1983 - 1992
H – L (Raw) 0.0052*** 0.0021 -0.0012 0.0058*** 0.0055** -0.0028 0.0036** 0.0038* 0.0016 
 2.41 0.97 -0.44  3.74 2.36 -1.30  2.00 1.73 0.68 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0049** 0.0027 -0.0004  0.0057*** 0.0053*** -0.0018  0.0037** 0.0039** 0.0009 
 2.21 1.29 -0.16  3.50 2.88 -1.13  2.02 2.00 0.47 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0049** 0.0031 -0.0006  0.0052*** 0.0049** -0.0018  0.0030 0.0036* 0.0007 
 2.14 1.47 -0.25  3.13 2.56 -1.07  1.60 1.79 0.39 
1993 - 2002
H – L (Raw) 0.0022 0.0026 -0.0056* 0.0024 0.0059** -0.0012 0.0024 0.0119*** 0.0041 
 1.08 0.84 -1.74  0.96 2.17 -0.40  0.93 3.61 1.19 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0039* 0.0027 -0.0097***  0.0045* 0.0048** -0.0024  0.0039 0.0101*** 0.0016 
 1.86 1.01 -3.76  1.81 2.29 -0.94  1.51 4.39 0.81 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0030 0.0038 -0.0088***  0.0041 0.0035* -0.0029  0.0038 0.0086*** 0.0013 
 1.40 1.41 -3.33  1.61 1.70 -1.09  1.45 3.75 0.62 
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Table 4.7—Continued 
 
Panel C: Portfolios Formed by PIN under VOL and ΔBREADTH
Low VOL Medium VOL High VOL
ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTH ΔBREADTHPIN 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
1983 - 1992
H – L (Raw) 0.0045* 0.0054*** 0.0028 0.0044** 0.0041* 0.0050** 0.0002 -0.0041* 0.0033 
 1.76 3.71 1.41  2.07 1.85 2.07  0.10 -1.69 1.42 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0043 0.0056*** 0.0035*  0.0044** 0.0037** 0.0046**  0.0009 -0.0030 0.0026 
 1.63 3.71 1.73  2.18 2.20 2.19  0.46 -1.48 1.41 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0048* 0.0050*** 0.0028  0.0047** 0.0037** 0.0041*  0.0002 -0.0028 0.0023 
 1.79 3.27 1.37  2.26 2.18 1.90  0.09 -1.37 1.22 
1993 - 2002
H – L (Raw) 0.0026 0.0023 0.0006 0.0037 0.0037 0.0107*** -0.0049 -0.0010 0.0043 
 1.16 0.93 0.22  1.34 1.39 3.25  -1.51 -0.32 1.29 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0039* 0.0048* 0.0021  0.0035 0.0032 0.0092***  -0.0088*** -0.0023 0.0013 
 1.70 1.91 0.76  1.39 1.56 3.59  -3.38 -0.86 0.66 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0030 0.0047* 0.0022  0.0044* 0.0022 0.0075***  -0.0074*** -0.0025 0.0015 
 1.27 1.79 0.77  1.70 1.05 2.95  -2.83 -0.91 0.75 
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Chapter 5 
  
Informed Trading, Information Uncertainty, and Momentum 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Previous literature has recognized the momentum phenomenon as one of the biggest 
challenges to asset pricing. Although traditional asset pricing models fail to explain 
the high abnormal returns generated by momentum strategies (see, e.g., Grundy and 
Martin 2001, Griffin, Ji, and Martin 2003), some have suggested that momentum 
arises more naturally within behavioural asset pricing models (see, e.g., Barberis, 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1998, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 1998). In 
particular, one popular category stresses that momentum is a symptom of 
underreaction: prices adjust too slowly to news (see, e.g., Chan, Jegadeesh, and 
Lakonishok 1996, Hong and Stein 1999). Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) empirically 
find that momentum reflects the gradual diffusion of firm-specific information. They 
also quote one recent paper’s empirical finding as saying that momentum at least in 
part reflects the adjustment of stock prices to the sort of information that is not made 
publicly available to all investors simultaneously. 
 
The market microstructure literature suggests another way to investigate momentum. 
O’Hara (2003) argues that anomalies such as momentum highlight the need to 
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incorporate market microstructure approaches into asset pricing.  In particular, market 
microstructure focuses on price discovery – asset prices evolve in markets. Informed 
investors who have superior private information will move prices toward the full 
information levels. Uninformed investors make inferences about this information 
from prices and follow informed trading. However, continuously attaining the full 
information levels is not credible. Thus, trading activities of informed and uninformed 
investors are crucial for better understanding the adjustment of prices to the full 
information values. Recently, Hvidkjaer (2006) provides a trade-based analysis of 
momentum. He finds the evidence of both initial underreaction and delayed reaction 
among small traders, who are typically uninformed investors. By contrast, initial 
selling pressure for losers and buying pressure for winners exist among large trades, 
which are typically informed trading. Thus, large traders show not evidence of 
underreaction and they engage in (early-stage) momentum trading. 
 
According to the above literature, this chapter investigates the impact of informed 
trading to the momentum effect. The main proposition is that if momentum is a result 
of underreaction and if informed trading identifies stocks with underreaction, the 
presence of informed trading predicts future momentum effect. Since informed 
investors have private information and hence understand the true value of stock, their 
trading implies that price has not adjusted to the full information level. In other words, 
the presence of informed trading suggests there is an underreaction. Because informed 
trading moves price to the full information level, uninformed investors can gradually 
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learn informed investors’ private information from the price movements. As a result, 
uninformed investors will follow the earlier informed trading eventually and prices 
continue to adjusting until reaching the full information level. Therefore, the 
momentum effect (price continuation) arises following informed trading. Accordingly, 
the main hypothesis is the following. 
 
Main Hypothesis: The momentum effect arises when informed trading is present. 
Higher level of informed trading leads to stronger momentum effect. 
 
However, the robustness of informed trading’s predictability on momentum requires 
taking the information uncertainty effect into account. This is because information 
uncertainty is closely related to both momentum and informed trading. Information 
uncertainty means the ambiguity with respect to the implications of new information 
for a firm’s value (Zhang 2006). Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) show that momentum 
strategies perform better among stocks with low analyst coverage (high information 
uncertainty). They attribute information uncertainty to a measure of information 
diffusion speed. In addition, previous studies have documented that information 
uncertainty alone can forecast momentum. Zhang (2006) attributes information 
uncertainty like analyst coverage to a measure of behavioural biases, which are 
responsible for underreaction according to behavioural finance. He shows that greater 
information uncertainty produces higher returns following good news and lower 
returns following bad news. As a result, greater information uncertainty should lead to 
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stronger momentum. It is thus important to see whether information uncertainty 
affects the predictive power of informed trading on momentum. Moreover, it is also 
interesting to check Zhang’s findings by controlling for informed trading as Wang 
(1993) indicates that the presence of informed trading improves information 
efficiency and thereby reducing information uncertainty. Therefore, this chapter 
further examines the following questions. 
 
Question 1: Does the predictability of informed trading on momentum remain robust 
after controlling for information uncertainty?  
 
Question 2: Does the predictability of information uncertainty on momentum remain 
robust after controlling for informed trading?  
 
Question 3: How can information uncertainty forecast momentum? In other words, 
considering the information diffusion theory proposed by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) 
and the behavioural biases theory proposed by Zhang (2006), which theory is more 
robust? 
 
Using monthly data on NYSE- and AMEX-listed stocks from 1983 to 2001, this 
chapter examines the main hypothesis and the three further questions. Specifically, 
price momentum is measured with past 11-month stock returns as Zhang (2006). Past 
winners refer to good news and past losers refer to bad news. The probability of 
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information-based trade (PIN), proposed by Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1997), is used 
to measure informed trading. Analyst coverage (COV), firm age (AGE), and firm size 
(MV) are used as the proxies for the information uncertainty of stocks. The empirical 
investigations provide several major findings. 
 
First, momentum strategy has significant positive returns when the level of PIN is 
equal or above average. Stocks with higher level of PIN have stronger momentum, 
while momentum disappears when the level of PIN is below average (Main 
Hypothesis). Second, after controlling for information uncertainty, momentum is 
again observed in most high-PIN portfolios (Question 1). Third, the predictive power 
on momentum by information uncertainty is determined by informed trading. High 
level of information uncertainty will not lead to momentum if the level of PIN is low 
(Question 2). Fourth, the empirical results support Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)’s 
theory but reject Zhang (2006)’s (Question 3). After controlling for information 
uncertainty, high information uncertainty tends to contribute the momentum effect 
introduced by informed trading. Stocks with high level of PIN exhibit stronger 
momentum if information uncertainty is greater. Stocks with medium level of PIN 
only exhibit momentum if information uncertainty is high. These findings are 
consistent with the information diffusion theory. This is because when the level of 
informed trading is large enough, informed trading can move prices toward the full 
information levels. Since the fundamental news spread slowly when information 
uncertainty is high, uninformed investors also learn the fundamental news from the 
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price movements gradually. Hence, uninformed investors follow informed trading 
gradually and momentum (the slow price adjustment) emerges. After controlling for 
informed trading, high level of information uncertainty does not lead to momentum 
unless the level of informed trading is relatively high. Moreover, past winners with 
higher uncertainty could earn lower future returns when the level of PIN is low. All 
these results are opposite to Zhang (2006)’s findings. 
 
Therefore, the above findings show that informed trading holds better predictive 
power to momentum than information uncertainty. While information uncertainty 
does not work in the way suggested by Zhang (2006) after controlling informed 
trading, it can nonetheless still influence the degree of predictability of informed 
trading. The connection between information uncertainty and informed trading is not 
surprising according to Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)’s theory about information 
diffusion. Moreover, Aslan, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2007) also report that PIN 
is negatively related to information uncertainty.  
 
Hameed, Hong, and Warachka (2008), one most relevant work to this chapter, also 
document that firm-specific informed trading is an important determinant of 
momentum. In addition, they show that the relation between informed trading and 
momentum cannot explained by liquidity and uncertainty proxies such as analyst 
forecast dispersion, analyst coverage, idiosyncratic return volatility, and size. 
However, the central theme of their paper is different from this chapter. Their analysis 
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is motivated by Wang (1994), who suggests that informed investors trade either 
because of private information or investment needs that lead to uninformed trades. 
Thus, they argue that if turnover is motivated by private information, uninformed 
investors gradually become informed and influence prices in a manner that causes 
return continuation. Conversely, turnover without private information leads to 
subsequent reversals. They find that high turnover stocks with high PIN exhibiting 
return continuation; high turnover stocks with low PIN exhibit return reversals. 
Therefore, their focus is the combination effect of turnover and informed trading.  
 
The central theme of this chapter, however, only depends on the important role of 
informed trading played in price discovery. That is, if momentum is due to the process 
that price continuously and gradually adjusts to the full information level after an 
initial underreaction to information, informed investors identifies stocks with 
underreaction and their trading activities deliver private information to uninformed 
investors, who will follow informed trading gradually. Since this proposition depends 
on the speed of information diffusion that measured by information uncertainty, this 
chapter also examines the interaction among informed trading, information 
uncertainty, and momentum. 
 
This chapter makes several potential contributions. First, it finds that informed trading 
plays an important role in explaining the well-documented momentum phenomenon. 
It stresses that price discovery, emphasized by market microstructure, is crucial for 
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better understanding of the momentum effect. Second, it presents that information 
uncertainty can also contribute to the momentum effect, though it is not the 
determinant factor as informed trading. Finally, it suggests that the reported 
relationship between information uncertainty and momentum requires careful 
interpretations. The findings in this chapter imply that the predictive power of 
information uncertainty on momentum is not due to the linkage between uncertainty 
and behavioural biases, but because of the relation between uncertainty and 
information diffusion. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews related literature. 
Section 5.3 constructs the sample and describes the data characteristics. Section 5.4 
reports empirical results from the portfolio analysis and provides dissection. Section 
5.5 concludes. 
 
5.2. Related Literature 
 
Momentum refers to the tendency of stock prices to continue moving in the same 
direction for several months after an initial impulse. At first, Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) show that stocks with high recent performance continue to earn higher returns 
over the next three to twelve months than stocks with low recent performance. The 
momentum effect has also been documented in international markets (Rouwenhorst 
1998), industry portfolios (Moskowitz and Grinblatt 1999), and size and 
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book-to-market portfolios (Lewellen 2002). Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) find that 
momentum remains strong in the post-1993 sample. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) 
indicate that momentum is more prevalent in stocks with high trading volume. Hong, 
Lim, and Stein (2000) report that small firms with low analyst coverage display great 
momentum. Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2007) find that momentum 
profits are large and significant among firms with low-grade credit ratings but are 
nonexistent among firms with high-grade credit ratings. Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) 
and Zhang (2006) report that momentum effect are greater among firms with higher 
information uncertainty that can be measured by size, age, return volatility, cash flow 
volatility, and analyst coverage, dispersion in analyst forecasts. 
 
Many studies report that high abnormal returns generated by momentum strategies 
cannot be explained by measures of risk. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document that 
momentum cannot be explained by market risk. Fama and French (1996) show that 
Fama-French three-factor model cannot explain momentum. Grundy and Martin 
(2001) and Avramov and Chordia (2006) find that controlling for time-varying 
exposures to common risk factors does not affect momentum profits.  
 
Since many empirical studies in literature have failed to document direct evidence of 
risk that might drive momentum, behavioural theories based on some kind of bounded 
rationality of investors such as overconfidence or underreaction to information have 
been developed to explain the momentum effect (see, e.g., Barberis, Shleifer, and 
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Vishny 1998, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 1998, and Hong and Stein 
1999).  
 
Nevertheless, many papers still try to explore risk explanations of momentum. Conrad 
and Kaul (1998) argue that cross-sectional variations in the mean returns of individual 
securities can potentially drive momentum. Ahn, Conrad, and Dittmar (2003) suggest 
that their nonparametric risk adjustment can account for about half of momentum 
profits. Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2005) show that the consumption risk 
embodied in cash flows can explain the momentum effect. Chen and Zhang (2008) 
find that winner-minus-loser portfolios have positive exposures on a low-minus-high 
investment factor, which can be motivated from neoclassical reasoning. Although 
Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003) show that the model of Chen, Roll, Ross (1986) does 
not provide any evidence that macroeconomic risk variables can explain momentum, 
Liu and Zhang (2008) report that macroeconomic risk can actually drive momentum. 
Liu and Zhang (2008) show that recent winners have temporarily higher loadings than 
recent losers on the growth rate of industrial production (MP), which is a common 
risk factor motivated by Chen, Roll, and Ross (1996). The loading spread derives 
mostly from the positive loadings of winners. Because this macroeconomic risk factor 
explains more than half of momentum profits in many tests, they conclude that risk 
plays an important role in driving momentum profits. 
 
Several other papers consider whether liquidity risk factor can account for momentum 
 189
profits. At first, some papers examine whether strategies that constructed to exploit 
the momentum effect can be profitable after taking transaction costs into account. 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and Grundy and Martin (2001) find the 
implementation of momentum strategies involves high portfolio turnover. Thus, the 
strategies that attempt to exploit potentially profitable momentum are likely to involve 
relatively high transaction costs. Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2004) examine 
transaction costs for extreme past winner stocks and loser stocks, and find little 
evidence that trading costs for the standard momentum strategies are below 1.5% per 
trade. They therefore suggest that the profits are largely “illusive” for the standard 
momentum strategies. Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) also find that the typical 
momentum strategies are less likely to be profitable for large investment funds. Since 
the profitability of momentum strategies are strongly related to transaction costs, it is 
an open question that whether the returns of momentum strategies can be related to 
the time variation of liquidity. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) present that a liquidity 
risk factor accounts for half of the profits to a winner-loser momentum portfolio. Thus, 
the abnormal returns of momentum can be viewed as compensation for liquidity risk 
as they are sensitive to unexpected changes in systematic liquidity. Sadka (2006) also 
shows that unexpected systematic (market-wide) variations of the variable component 
rather than the fixed component of liquidity are shown to be priced within the context 
of momentum portfolio returns. 
 
It is important to note that informed trading (or information asymmetry) and liquidity 
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are related despite they are not the same. Liquidity basically refers to the matching of 
buyers and sellers. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) indicate that liquidity is a broad and 
elusive concept that generally denotes the ability to trade large quantities of asset 
quickly, at low cost, and without moving the price. More specifically, there are two 
kinds of liquidity in literature. Firstly, many papers focus on the firm-specific liquidity 
(the liquidity level), which is often contributed by information asymmetry. Most of 
these studies that investigate the relation between liquidity and asset prices focus on 
the level of liquidity as a characteristic of a stock. They argue that investors holding 
illiquid assets are compensated by higher future returns. For example, Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) argue that investors demand a premium for relatively low liquidity 
stocks (measured by using bid-ask spreads). Similarly, Brennan and Subrahmanyam 
(1996) find that stocks with higher price impacts earn higher future returns. Easley, 
Hvidjaker, and O’Hara (2002) find that the level of liquidity, measured as PIN, carries 
a positive premium in asset prices. Secondly, another strand of literature concentrates 
on the systematic component of liquidity (liquidity risk) rather than on the actual 
idiosyncratic level of liquidity (firm-specific). These studies document the fact that 
while firm-specific liquidity fluctuates over time, there is a systematic or market-wide 
component to these liquidity fluctuations (see, e.g., Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 
2000, Huberman and Halka 2001, Amihud 2002). Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) 
develop a measure of aggregate (market-wide) liquidity based on daily price reversals 
and show that assets whose returns highly covary with this aggregate liquidity 
measure earn higher expected returns than do assets whose returns exhibit low 
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covariation with aggregate liquidity. Hence, systematic liquidity risk is a priced risk 
factor. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) build a liquidity adjusted capital asset pricing 
model to provide a unified framework for understanding how liquidity risk may affect 
asset prices. In their model, the require return of stock depends on its expected 
liquidity and on the covariances of its own return and liquidity with the market return 
and liquidity. 
 
Herding behaviour is often associated with a group of investors trading in the same 
direction over a period of time. Since most herding models suggest that investors 
follow some common signal, it is possible that momentum is because of herding as 
past returns are likely to be a simple and important signal on which investors focus. 
On the one hand, many papers focus on institutional investors, who would engage in 
herding as a result of superior private information, security characteristics, fads, or 
agency problems. Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) find that 77% of the mutual 
funds were momentum investors, buying stocks that were past winners. However, 
most mutual funds did not systematically sell past losers. Similar to Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), they also document weak evidence that institutional 
herding impacts prices. Although Nofsinger and Sias (1999) report that institutional 
herding is positively correlated with lag returns and appears to be related to stock 
return momentum, they are unable to infer whether institutional herding contributes to 
momentum. Finally, Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho (2003) study the aggregate 
holdings of US institutional investors and confirm that institutions buy shares from 
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individuals in response to good cash-flow news. However, institutions are not simply 
following price momentum strategies as they sell shares to individuals when price 
goes up in the absence of positive cash-flow news. 
 
On the other hand, plenty of studies suggest that individual investors, who are 
regarded as noise or uninformed investors, often engage in herding because of 
irrational but systematic responses to fads or sentiment. Grinblatt and Moskowitz 
(2004) find that many individual taxable investors delay tax-loss selling until the end 
of the year. At the end of the year, they are particularly likely to sell poor performers 
and hold onto good performers. Thus, momentum tends to be strong in December and 
weak in January. Hvidkjaer (2006) provides a trade-based analysis of momentum. He 
finds initial underreaction followed by delayed reaction among small traders and no 
evidence of underreaction among large traders. While large-trade imbalances have 
little impact on subsequent returns, small-trade imbalances during formation period 
significantly affect momentum returns, suggesting that underreaction among small 
traders contribute to the momentum effect. 
 
5.3. Data and Sample 
 
In the line with Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, this chapter also uses probability of 
information-based trade (PIN) as the informed trading proxy. This chapter also adopts 
analyst coverage (COV), firm age (AGE), and firm size (MV) as the proxies for 
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information uncertainty as Chapter 3. Momentum is constructed by the past 11-month 
stocks returns following Zhang (2006).  
 
The monthly PIN data is obtained from the 1983 – 2001 annual PIN data in Easley, 
Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2005). The PIN value of stock in each month t takes the PIN 
value in that year. Since Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2005) argue that the market 
microstructure of NYSE and AMEX are most closely consistent to that of their PIN 
model, this chapter also focuses on NYSE- and AMEX-listed stocks during the period 
of 1983 to 2001.  
 
Following Zhang (2006), analyst coverage (COV) is calculated based on the raw 
detail forecast data unadjusted for stock splits in I/B/E/S. Specifically, COV is the 
number of analysts providing annual FY1 earnings estimates lagged 12 months from 
the end of the month.  
 
The CRSP monthly tape in WRDS provides data on firm age, firm size, and monthly 
returns. Firm size (MV) is the market capitalization (in millions of dollars). Firm age 
(AGE) can be measured as the number of years since the firm was first covered by 
CRSP. Moreover, stocks are required to have past 11-month returns RETt-11, t-1 for 
examining price momentum strategies. RETt-11, t-1 is accumulated returns from month t 
- 11 to t - 1. This 1-month lag between the momentum measure and portfolio 
formation month is consistent with Fama and French (1996) since skipping the 
 194
portfolio formation month reduces bias from bid-ask bounce. 
 
Finally, a stock has to satisfy the following criteria to be included in the sample. First, 
following Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), stocks with a share price below $5 at the 
portfolio formation date are eliminated to make sure that the results are not driven by 
small, illiquid stocks or by the bid–ask bounce. Second, this chapter requires all 
grouping variables are jointly available at each month t. These grouping variables 
include three information uncertainty proxies (MVt, AGEt, and COVt), past 11-month 
returns (RETt-11, t-1) and informed trading proxy (PINt). Therefore, stocks without 
valid values of firm size and past 11-month returns are excluded. Since PIN is the 
primary variable, stocks are excluded if they do not have data on PIN. After the above 
filtration, following Aslan, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2007), COVt takes value 
of zero if it is missing at month t.  
 
This chapter also adjusts hedging portfolio returns for common risk factors. The 
returns of hedging portfolios in following sections are adjusted by the three factors: 
Ri = αi + βi (RM - RF) + siSMB + hiHML + ei., 
and four-factor model: 
Ri = αi + βi (RM - RF) + siSMB + hiHML + miUMD +ei.. 
All the four factors are downloaded from Kenneth French’s website.  
 
Table 5.1 gives the summary statistics of the sample in this chapter. Panel A contains 
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mean monthly statistics for the firm-month observations by year. These observations 
will be used to form portfolios in following sections. The sample contains on average 
1,680 firms per month from 1983 to 2001. The unusual drop in the number of firms 
from 1999 is because the sample size is determined by the number of PIN estimations. 
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2005) indicate that the extremely high daily trading 
volume in later years could cause failures for estimating PIN. They present that this 
occurs almost exclusively for the largest stocks rather than for smaller stocks. As it is 
shown in Panel A, firm size keeps increasing from 1983 to 2001. The average number 
of analyst coverage is around 8, and the average firm age is about 23 in each year. 
However, the monthly mean of the past 11-month returns RETt-11, t-1 changes from 
year to year without a consistent pattern. The monthly mean of RETt-11, t-1 only turns 
to be negative in 1988 (-0.24%), which should be due to the 1987 Stock Market Crash. 
Since stocks generally have poor performance during market downturn time, it is not 
surprise that after the 1987 Stock Market Crash, the monthly mean of the past 
11-month returns in 1988 tends to be negative. The monthly mean of PIN in the 
sample is 0.198, and its approximate trend is decreasing from 1983 to 2001. 
 
Panel B shows the correlation matrix. The Pearson and Spearman correlations for 
these five variables are quite similar. Firm size is strong positively correlated with 
firm age and analyst coverage but strong negatively correlated with PIN. Thus, small 
firms tend to have short history, less information transparent, and high probability of 
informed trading. New firms also tend to have less analysts and high probability of 
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informed trading as AGE and COV are positively correlated and both of them are 
negatively correlated to PIN. At last, all the correlations between past 11-month 
returns and the other four variables are weak. The Pearson (Spearman) correlation 
between RETt-11, t-1 and MVt is 0.014 (0.097), which is consistent with that correlation 
in Zhang (2006). 
 
Panel C provides a close look at the relationship between firm size and other four 
variables by assigning stocks into NYSE capitalization breakpoints (obtained from 
Kenneth French’s website). The purpose is to emphasize that there is much more 
variation in the level of analyst coverage across large stocks comparing with small 
stocks. Without controlling for firm size, the independent sorting on COV will let 
bottom- and top-COV groups dominate by large firms. This pattern is firstly proposed 
by Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) for the variable breadth of ownership. The rest 
variables AGE, RETt-11, t-1 and PIN will not encounter this problem because their 
means and standard deviations guarantee enough variations in both small and large 
firms. 
 
5.4. Empirical Results 
 
In this section, stocks are assigned to portfolios based on certain characteristics in 
order to draw conclusions about the average returns for different test. This standard 
approach in asset pricing, pioneered by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), reduces the 
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variability in returns.  
 
5.4.1. Portfolio Sorted by One Variable 
 
Table 5.2 provides an initial look at the momentum effect and the individual impact of 
analyst coverage (COV), firm age (AGE), firm size (MV) and the probability of 
information-based trading (PIN) on stock returns. At each month t, stocks are assigned 
into five classes of analyst coverage (COVt) at that month, with the class breakpoints 
determined separately within each size (MVt) quintile in the same month. The COVt 
classes are then recombined across the five MVt quintiles, and hence five COVt 
categories obtained. This procedure ensures that within each COVt category, stocks do 
not have roughly the same size. This procedure is necessary because, as it is shown in 
Panel C of Table 5.1, there is much more variation in COV across large stocks. If it 
was an unconditional ranking on COV independent of MV, then the extreme (lowest 
or highest COV) categories would be dominated by large stocks. For the other four 
variables (MV, AGE, RETt-11, t-1, and PIN), stocks are simply sorted into five groups at 
each month t based on the value level of the variable at that month. For each of the 
resulting groups, equally weighted portfolios are formed and are held for one month. 
 
Table 5.2 reports the average monthly portfolio returns. At first, higher uncertainty 
(low-MV, low-COV, or low-AGE) stocks forecast lower returns. Except for firm size, 
hedging portfolios on other two uncertainty variables that long high-quintile stocks 
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and short low-quintile stocks generate significant positive returns. Second, the 
momentum effect is confirmed in this sample as past winners outperform past losers 
by 1.02% (t = 4.32). Third, the results of PIN confirm the information risk proposed 
by Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) because hedging portfolio that long 
high-PIN stocks and short low-PIN stocks earns a return of 0.31% at 10% significance 
level. 
 
5.4.2. Portfolio Sorted by Momentum and Information Uncertainty 
 
Table 5.3 reviews the interaction between momentum and information uncertainty 
documented by Zhang (2006). At each month t, stocks are first classified into five 
categories based on past returns from t - 11 to t - 1. For each momentum category, 
stocks are further sorted into five groups by the level of information uncertainty. For 
the resulting 25 subgroups, equally weighted portfolios are constructed and their 
one-month-ahead returns are reported in Table 5.3. Information uncertainty proxy 
refers to COV, AGE, and MV in Panel A, B, and C respectively. 
 
All three panels in Table 5.3 show that greater information uncertainty leads to 
relatively lower future returns for past losers. In each panel, hedging strategy that 
longs high-uncertainty and shorts low-uncertainty stocks yields significant negative 
return within group of past losers. However, the evidence that relatively higher future 
returns for past winners when information uncertainty is greater is weak here. Among 
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past winner stocks, high-minus-low hedging portfolio on uncertainty only obtains 
significant positive return in Panel C. 
 
Nevertheless, information uncertainty still has a significant impact on momentum. 
Table 5.3 shows that momentum is much stronger for high-uncertainty firms than 
low-uncertainty firms, although it does not measure the momentum effect within each 
uncertainty group. The return from a trading strategy with a long position in past 
winner and a short position in past losers increases strictly with increasing 
information uncertainty, which is consistent with Zhang (2006). 
 
5.4.3. Portfolio Sorted by Information Uncertainty and PIN 
 
Table 5.4 examines the interactions of PIN and information uncertainty variables. 
Stocks are simply classified into five categories based on information uncertainty 
proxy at each month, and the sorting method for analyst coverage is special. At each 
month t, stocks are assigned into five classes of COVt, with the class breakpoints 
determined separately within each MVt quintile. The COVt classes are then 
recombined across MVt quintiles. Within each uncertainty category, stocks are then 
sorted into five groups by the level of PINt. For the resulting 25 subgroups, equally 
weighted portfolios are constructed and their one-month-ahead returns are reported in 
Table 5.4. Information uncertainty proxy refers to COV, AGE, and MV in Panel A, B, 
and C respectively. 
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Firstly, higher informed trading only generates higher returns when information 
uncertainty is large enough. When information uncertainty is relative high, i.e., stocks 
have above middle level uncertainty, high-minus-low PIN hedging portfolio has 
strong statistically significant positive returns in all three panels. One exception is 
hedging portfolio on low-COV stocks in Panel A. Thus, informed investors always 
make profits from trading on private information under great uncertainty environment. 
In contrast, all three panels show that there is barely a difference between high-PIN 
and low-PIN stocks when information uncertainty is small. The return differentials 
between high-PIN and low-PIN firms in all three panels are not statistically 
significant different from zero. The can be due to the fact that there is hardly any 
private information that can exist long if firm’s information environment is more 
transparent, and hence trading on private information will not lead to huge profit.  
 
Secondly, information uncertainty only affects stock prices when the level of informed 
trading is low. All three panels show that high-uncertainty stocks perform worse than 
low-uncertainty stocks within low-PIN groups. When the level of PIN is above 
average, none of high-minus-low quintile hedging portfolios on uncertainty proxy can 
earn significant negative returns. This confirms the proposition that informed trading 
enhances the information efficiency of prices, and hence reducing information 
uncertainty. 
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5.4.4. Portfolio Sorted by PIN and Momentum 
 
In order to test the main hypothesis, Table 5.5 examines the momentum effect under 
different level of informed trading. At each month t, stocks are first assigned into five 
groups of PINt. Within each group of PINt, stocks are then sorted into five divisions 
based on past returns from t – 11 to t – 1. For the resulting 25 subgroups, equally 
weighted portfolios are constructed and held for one month. Apart from the raw 
returns, Table 5.5 also gives the Fama-French three-factor and the four-factor 
risk-adjusted returns for momentum hedging portfolios that long past winners and 
short past losers. 
 
Following high level of informed trading, momentum strategy earns abnormal 
positive return. The raw and risk-adjusted return differentials between past winners 
and past losers are significant positive for stocks with middle level and above middle 
level of PIN. In addition, the return differential increases strictly from middle-PIN 
group to high-PIN group. By contrast, stocks with less than the middle level of PIN 
do not have significant positive returns for momentum strategies. Furthermore, their 
momentum strategies even yield significant negative four-factor risk-adjusted returns. 
Overall, Table 5.5 confirms the main hypothesis because the momentum effect is only 
observed when the level of informed trading is large enough and the higher level of 
informed trading the stronger the momentum effect. 
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5.4.5. Portfolio under Three-Way Sorting 
 
To find answers for the three questions in Section 5.1, three kinds of three-way sorting 
methods are used for comparing the predictability of informed trading and 
information uncertainty on momentum. 
 
(1) Predictability of Informed Trading after Controlling for Information Uncertainty 
 
The first portfolio strategy in Table 5.6 is to examine whether information uncertainty 
can affect the predictive power of informed trading on the momentum effect. This 
strategy focuses on the momentum effect within each PIN group under three levels of 
uncertainty. Each month stocks are sorted into three groups based on the level of 
information uncertainty at that month. Each uncertainty group is then sorted into three 
PIN groups. Each uncertainty and PIN group is further sorted into three momentum 
divisions. Note that the sorting method for analyst coverage is special as before. At 
each month t, stocks are assigned into three classes of COVt, with the class 
breakpoints determined separately within each MVt quintile. The COVt classes are 
then recombined across MVt quintiles. Stocks are held for one-month-ahead and 
portfolio returns are equal-weighted. Information uncertainty proxy refers to COV, 
AGE, and MV in Panel A, B, and C respectively. Table 5.6 reports the raw and 
risk-adjusted returns for momentum hedging portfolios that long past winners and 
short past losers. 
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The evidence in Table 5.6 suggests that the predictability of informed trading on 
momentum is unchallenged. No matter what the level of information uncertainty is 
like (low, middle, or high), high level of informed trading generally leads to 
significant positive raw and risk-adjusted returns for momentum strategies. The only 
one exception is the result of high-MV group in Panel C. Nevertheless, there is a 
connection between informed uncertainty and informed trading. Panel B and Panel C 
show that among high-PIN groups, momentum is stronger if uncertainty is greater. 
Furthermore, momentum arises within medium-PIN groups when uncertainty is large. 
Finally, one interesting finding is that momentum strategy earns significant positive 
return within low-MV and low-PIN group, although other two panels do not exhibit 
similar findings within high-uncertainty and low-PIN groups. 
 
(2) Predictability of Information Uncertainty after Controlling for Informed Trading 
 
In order to examine whether greater information uncertainty can predict greater 
momentum when the level of informed trading is low, Table 5.7 further investigates 
the information uncertainty effect on momentum documented in Zhang (2006) by 
controlling for the level of informed trading.  
 
First of all, Table 5.7 shows the momentum effect within each uncertainty group 
under three levels of PIN. This strategy can examine if the predictive power of 
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uncertainty remains after controlling for the level of informed trading. Each month 
stocks are sorted into three groups based on the level of PIN at that month. Each PIN 
group is then sorted into three information uncertainty groups. Each PIN and 
uncertainty group is further sorted into three momentum divisions. Stocks are held for 
one-month-ahead and portfolio returns are equal-weighted. Information uncertainty 
proxy refers to COV, AGE, and MV in Panel A, B, and C respectively. Table 5.7 
reports the raw and risk-adjusted returns for momentum hedging portfolios. 
 
The results of Table 5.7 are striking. High information uncertainty does not lead to 
momentum unless PIN is relatively high. Within the low-PIN groups of all three 
panels, the raw and risk-adjusted returns of momentum hedging portfolios are not 
significant positive, and 8 of 9 momentum hedging portfolios even generate strong 
significant negative returns. Thus, no matter how large the uncertainty is like, the lack 
of informed trading means that momentum will not emerge. Moreover, all the raw and 
risk-adjusted returns of momentum hedging portfolios are strong significant positive 
within high-PIN groups regardless the level of uncertainty (low, medium, or high). 
Therefore, it is not information uncertainty but informed trading determines the 
momentum effect. Similar to Table 5.6, information uncertainty still has influence on 
predictability of informed trading. Panel B and Panel C show that among high-PIN 
groups, momentum is stronger if uncertainty is greater. Among medium-PIN groups, 
high-uncertainty stocks present the evidence of momentum as well. 
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To examine Zhang (2006)’s proposition more thoroughly, Table 5.8 examines the 
impact of information uncertainty on bad news (past losers) and good news (past 
winners). The strategy in Table 5.8 concentrates on the information uncertainty effect 
within each PIN group under different momentum groups. Each month t stocks are 
sorted into three momentum groups based on the level of past returns from t – 11 to t - 
1. Each momentum group is then sorted into three PIN groups. Each momentum and 
PIN group is further sorted into three uncertainty divisions. Stocks are held for 
one-month-ahead and portfolio returns are equal-weighted. Information uncertainty 
proxy refers to COV, AGE, and MV in Panel A, B, and C respectively. Table 5.8 
reports the raw and risk-adjusted returns for hedging portfolios that long 
low-uncertainty stocks and short high-uncertainty stocks. 
 
Zhang (2006) suggests that higher expected stock returns following good news but 
lower expected stock returns following bad news relative to the returns of stocks with 
less information uncertainty. Table 5.8 provides results for information uncertainty 
effect on bad news and good news. On the one hand, information uncertainty effect on 
bad news seems to be more effective when the level of informed trading is low. The 
low-PIN groups in Panel B and C support that greater information uncertainty 
produces lower returns following bad news. Only Panel B confirms this with evidence 
of high-PIN group. On the other hand, results from past winners reject the predicted 
information uncertainty effect on good news. All three panels present that neither the 
results in high-PIN groups nor the results in low-PIN groups support the prediction 
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that greater uncertainty leads to higher returns following good news. In addition, 
Panel A and Panel C actually show that lower information uncertainty leads to higher 
returns following good news within low-PIN groups, which is completely opposite to 
Zhang (2006)’s findings.  
 
(3) General Remarks 
 
According to the findings in Table 5.6, Table 5.7 and Table 5.8, the comparison 
between the predictive power of informed trading and information uncertainty on 
momentum becomes clear. 
 
First, considering Question 1, the above results show that high level of informed 
trading can predict the momentum effect regardless the level of information 
uncertainty. Moreover, the momentum effect generally does not exist if the level 
informed trading is low. Thus, the impact of informed trading on momentum is 
determinant.  
 
Second, considering Question 2, the empirical findings demonstrate that the 
information uncertainty effect documented by Zhang (2006) is out of order after 
controlling informed trading. High information uncertainty does not lead to 
momentum unless the level of informed trading is low. Therefore, the predictive 
power on momentum by information uncertainty is determined by informed trading.  
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Third, considering Question 3, the above analysis provides supporting evidence to 
Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)’s information diffusion theory but presents contrary 
evidence to Zhang (2006)’s behavioural biases theory. In particular, after controlling 
for information uncertainty, high information uncertainty tends to contribute the 
momentum effect introduced by informed trading. When the level informed trading is 
high, momentum is stronger if uncertainty is larger. When the level of informed 
trading is moderate, momentum only arises with high information uncertainty. These 
findings are consistent with the information diffusion theory. This is because high 
information uncertainty implies that the fundamental news spread slowly. Thus, when 
the level of informed trading is large enough, informed trading can move prices 
toward the full information levels. The price movements will help uninformed 
investors to learn the fundamental news and hence follow informed trading gradually. 
Consequently, a slow price adjustment, i.e., price continuation, emerges. On the other 
hand, there are opposite results to Zhang (2006)’s findings. After controlling for 
informed trading, high level of information uncertainty does not lead to momentum 
unless the level of informed trading is relatively high. Moreover, past winners with 
higher uncertainty could earn lower future returns when the level of PIN is low. 
 
5.4.6. Subperiod Analysis 
 
Table 5.9 provides the subperiod analysis. This robustness check examines whether 
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previous results are time-specific. The subperiods include 1983 to 1992 and 1993 to 
2002. Firstly, Panel A reexamines the momentum effect within different level of 
informed trading (Table 5.5). Secondly, Panel B1, B2, and B3 review the 
predictability of informed trading on momentum under different level of information 
uncertainty (Table 5.6). Thirdly, Panel C1, C2, and C3 review the predictability of 
information uncertainty on momentum under different level of informed trading 
(Table 5.7). Finally, Panel D1, D2, and D3 investigate the information uncertainty 
effect on past losers and winners again (Table 5.8). All the portfolio construction 
methods are the same as previous related tables. All panels only report the 
one-month-ahead raw and the Fama-French three-factor and the four-factor 
risk-adjusted returns for the relevant hedging portfolios. Overall, Table 5.9 provides 
consistent results to previous related tables. 
 
5.4.7. Comments on Robustness 
 
This chapter has established several robustness checks, although it cannot fully rule 
out the informed trading’s predictability on momentum here is not because of specific 
sample, specific proxies, or other explanation.  
 
The first and important robustness check is to examine the influence of information 
uncertainty on the relationship between informed trading and momentum. This is 
because not only momentum but also informed trading is closely related to 
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information uncertainty. Table 5.6 uses the three-way nonindependent sort by 
information uncertainty and then by informed trading and finally by momentum. The 
results indicate that high level of informed trading generally leads to momentum 
effect regardless the level of information uncertainty. Thus, the predictability of 
informed trading on momentum is unchallenged. 
 
This chapter also investigates how information uncertainty contributes to momentum 
effect. Table 5.7 employs the three-way nonindependent sort by informed trading and 
then by information uncertainty and finally by momentum. It demonstrates that high 
level of information uncertainty does not lead to momentum unless the level of 
informed trading is relatively high. When the level of informed trading is high, 
momentum is stronger if uncertainty is greater. When the level of informed trading is 
moderate, momentum emerges if uncertainty is large. Therefore, it is not information 
uncertainty but informed trading determines the momentum effect. In addition, these 
findings suggest that the impact of information uncertainty on momentum should be 
due to Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)’s information diffusion theory but not Zhang 
(2006)’s behavioural biases theory. 
 
To further examine Zhang (2006)’s behavioural biases theory, Table 5.8 adopts the 
three-way nonindependent sort by momentum and then by informed trading and 
finally by information uncertainty. The evidence that past winners with higher 
information uncertainty could earn lower future returns when the level of informed 
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trading is low is contrast to the behavioural biases theory. 
 
Although there is no alternative choice of informed trading proxy, this chapter uses 
two alternative measures of information uncertainty including firm age and firm size. 
The robustness tests with the alternative proxies have similar results as the primary 
proxy analyst coverage. 
 
At last, subperiod analysis in Section 5.4.6, the final robustness check, presents that 
the identified relationship between informed trading and momentum is valid in each 
subperiod of 1983 – 1992 and 1993 – 2002. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter analyses the role of informed trading in the momentum effect from two 
perspectives. First, it proposes that if momentum is a result of underreaction and if 
informed trading identifies stocks with underreaction, the presence of informed 
trading forecasts future momentum effect. The empirical findings show that high 
probability of informed trading forecasts momentum effect and momentum will not 
arise if the level of informed trading is relatively low. Furthermore, the momentum 
effect is greater if the level of informed trading is higher. 
 
Second, this chapter further questions whether information uncertainty can change the 
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predicative power of informed trading because information uncertainty means the 
speed of information diffusion which affects the adjustment of price to the 
fundamental news. Moreover, Zhang (2006) shows that great information uncertainty 
alone can lead to momentum. The empirical results in this chapter indicate that the 
identified relationship between informed trading and momentum is robust after 
controlling for uncertainty proxy such as analyst coverage, firm age, and size. High 
probability of informed trading leads to momentum regardless the level of uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, information uncertainty still has influence on informed trading as high 
uncertainty tends to contribute the predictability of informed trading, which is 
consistent with Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)’s information diffusion theory about 
information uncertainty.  
 
This chapter also sheds light on the information uncertainty effect on momentum. It 
reexamines Zhang (2006)’s findings by controlling for informed trading. The 
empirical findings, however, provide many contrary evidence to Zhang (2006)’s 
findings. High level of information uncertainty does not produce momentum unless 
the level of informed trading is relatively high. Furthermore, past winners with higher 
uncertainty could earn lower future returns when the level of informed trading is low. 
These findings suggest the reported relationship between information uncertainty and 
momentum requires careful interpretations.  
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Table 5.1 Summary Statistics 
 
This table provides the summary statistics for NYSE and AMEX stocks during the period 1983 - 
2001. Panel A reports the mean monthly statistics for all stocks. Panel B shows the correlation 
matrix, in which the Pearson's correlations are shown above the diagonal with Spearman's 
correlation below. Panel C demonstrates the mean and standard deviation values by NYSE Market 
Capitalization quintiles. No. of firms per month is the monthly average number of firms in the 
sample. Firm size (MV) is the market capitalization (in millions of dollars) at the end of month t. 
Firm age (AGE) is the number of years since the firm was first covered by CRSP. Analyst 
coverage (COV) is the number of analysts providing annual FY1 earnings estimates lagged 12 
months from the end of the month. RETt-11, t-1 is accumulated returns from month t – 11 to t – 1. 
The probability of information-based trade (PIN) is obtained from the annual PIN data in Easley, 
Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2005). The value of PIN in each month t takes the PIN value in that year. 
Stocks with a price less than $5 are excluded. Stocks with missing value of MV, RETt-11, t-1 or PIN 
are excluded, and the missing value of COV takes value of zero. 
 
Panel A: Mean Monthly Statistics by Year 
Year 
No.of Firms 
per Month 
MVt 
per Month
COVt 
per Month
AGEt 
per Month
RETt-11, t-1 
per Month 
PINt 
per Month 
1983 1,889 760 7 22 64.27% 0.221 
1984 1,781 768 9 23 3.68% 0.208 
1985 1,718 946 9 23 20.73% 0.214 
1986 1,657 1,203 9 23 30.25% 0.216 
1987 1,616 1,418 9 23 16.05% 0.215 
1988 1,584 1,320 8 23 -0.24% 0.215 
1989 1,531 1,608 9 23 22.53% 0.212 
1990 1,380 1,730 10 24 0.39% 0.215 
1991 1,430 1,974 8 24 22.16% 0.214 
1992 1,529 2,018 8 24 22.17% 0.208 
1993 1,669 2,153 8 23 25.94% 0.198 
1994 1,749 2,163 8 23 11.41% 0.196 
1995 1,805 2,464 8 23 15.33% 0.194 
1996 1,817 2,680 7 23 25.36% 0.190 
1997 1,914 2,844 7 22 26.61% 0.179 
1998 1,922 3,728 8 22 16.71% 0.169 
1999 1,812 4,117 8 22 2.84% 0.169 
2000 1,614 4,205 9 23 10.07% 0.169 
2001 1,505 4,787 9 23 22.72% 0.179 
Total 1,680 2,265 8 23 19.36% 0.198 
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Table 5.1—Continued 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
(Pearson Correlations Are Shown above the Diagonal with Spearman Below) 
 MVt COVt AGEt RETt-11, t-1 PINt 
MVt 1 0.316 0.240 0.014 -0.292 
COVt 0.529 1 0.210 -0.042 -0.383 
AGEt 0.307 0.125 1 -0.042 -0.238 
RETt-11, t-1 0.097 -0.019 0.004 1 0.066 
PINt -0.698 -0.388 -0.246 0.036 1 
Panel C: Means and Standard Deviations by NYSE Market Capitalization Quintiles 
 All 
Firms 
Quintile 1
Firms 
(Smallest)
Quintile 
2 
Firms 
Quintile  
3 
Firms 
Quintile 
4 
Firms 
Quintile 5 
Firms 
(Largest)
MVt Mean 2,265 67 260 650 1,684 10,411 
 Std.Dev. 7,683 50 126 282 833 16,220 
 
COVt Mean 8 2 5 8 12 19 
 Std.Dev. 10 3 5 7 10 14 
 
AGEt Mean 23 17 18 21 27 35 
 Std.Dev. 17 12 14 17 18 21 
 
RETt-11, t-1 Mean 19.36% 18.00% 18.69% 19.82% 19.65% 21.55% 
 Std.Dev. 50.68% 62.29% 55.53% 47.41% 41.03% 33.52% 
 
PINt Mean 0.198 0.262 0.211 0.184 0.163 0.133 
 Std.Dev. 0.077 0.084 0.058 0.052 0.047 0.040 
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Table 5.2 Portfolio Returns Sorted by One Variable 
 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns sorted by one variable only. Firm size (MV) is 
the market capitalization at the end of month t. Firm age (AGE) is the number of years since the 
firm was first covered by CRSP. Analyst coverage (COV) is the number of analysts providing 
annual FY1 earnings estimates lagged 12 months from the end of the month. RETt-11, t-1 is 
accumulated returns from month t – 11 to t – 1. The probability of information-based trade (PIN) 
is obtained from the annual PIN data in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2005). The value of PIN 
in each month t takes the PIN value in that year. At each month t, stocks are assigned into five 
classes of COVt, with the class breakpoints determined separately within each MVt quintile. The 
COVt classes are then recombined across MVt quintiles. For the rest four variables, each month 
stocks are simply sorted into five groups based on the value level of variable at that month. Stocks 
are held for one month and portfolio returns are equally weighted. Stocks with a price less than $5 
are excluded. Stocks with missing value of MV, RETt-11, t-1 or PIN are excluded, and the missing 
value of COV takes value of zero. The sample period is 1983 - 2001. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Quintiles MV COV AGE RETt-11, t-1 PIN 
Q1 (Low) 0.0103 0.0101 0.0097 0.0064 0.0117 
 3.35 3.64 2.90 1.74 4.20 
Q2 0.0122 0.0111 0.0120 0.0113 0.0113 
 3.64 3.95 3.65 3.88 3.59 
Q3 0.0122 0.0135 0.0126 0.0122 0.0101 
 3.72 4.39 4.11 4.43 3.11 
Q4 0.0123 0.0126 0.0128 0.0132 0.0117 
 3.99 4.03 4.48 4.67 3.57 
Q5 (High) 0.0126 0.0123 0.0125 0.0165 0.0147 
 4.45 3.56 4.75 4.84 5.11 
      
Q5 - Q1 0.0024 0.0022* 0.0027* 0.0102*** 0.0031* 
 1.10 1.90 1.78 4.32 1.73 
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Table 5.3 Portfolio Returns Sorted by Momentum and Information Uncertainty 
 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns based on momentum and information 
uncertainty proxy. Information uncertainty proxies include analyst coverage (COV), firm age 
(AGE) and firm size (MV) in Panel A, B, and C respectively. At each month t, stocks are first 
classified into five categories based on past returns from t - 11 to t – 1 (RETt-11, t-1). For each 
momentum category, stocks are further sorted into five groups by information uncertainty level. 
For the resulting 25 subgroups, equally weighted portfolios are constructed and held for one 
month. Stocks with a price less than $5 are excluded. Stocks with missing value of MV, RETt-11, t-1 
or PIN are excluded, and the missing value of COV takes value of zero. The sample period is 1983 
- 2001. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Portfolios Formed by Momentum and COV 
Momentum 
COV M1 
(Losers) 
M2 M3 M4 
M5 
(Winners) 
M5 - M1
C1 (Low) 0.0065 0.0089 0.0107 0.0108 0.0156 0.0120 
 1.89 3.25 4.06 3.69 4.10 4.17 
C2 0.0044 0.0119 0.0115 0.0132 0.0174 0.0134 
 1.12 4.19 3.62 4.22 4.20 4.04 
C3 0.0054 0.0125 0.0133 0.0134 0.0181 0.0128 
 1.37 3.83 4.40 4.24 4.83 4.92 
C4 0.0083 0.0122 0.0127 0.0139 0.0155 0.0072 
 2.03 3.63 3.94 4.40 4.30 2.75 
C5 (High) 0.0089 0.0125 0.0121 0.0136 0.0168 0.0078 
 2.08 3.95 3.97 4.51 4.74 2.36 
       
C1 – C5 -0.0049** -0.0034** -0.0015 -0.0027* -0.0019  
 -2.02 -2.04 -0.92 -1.66 -0.88  
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Table 5.3—Continued 
 
Panel B: Portfolios Formed by Momentum and AGE 
Momentum 
AGE M1 
(Losers) 
M2 M3 M4 
M5 
(Winners) 
M5 - M1
A1 (Low) 0.0013 0.0089 0.0112 0.0137 0.0164 0.0151 
 0.31 2.77 3.53 4.26 4.23 5.37 
A2 0.0041 0.0106 0.0127 0.0131 0.0181 0.0140 
 1.02 3.38 4.19 4.26 4.79 5.13 
A3 0.0074 0.0120 0.0124 0.0133 0.0178 0.0104 
 1.91 3.86 4.37 4.43 4.84 3.63 
A4 0.0100 0.0116 0.0124 0.0133 0.0161 0.0061 
 2.76 4.13 4.67 4.82 4.84 2.36 
A5 (High) 0.0097 0.0134 0.0124 0.0129 0.0137 0.0040 
 2.80 4.67 4.70 4.85 4.32 1.46 
       
A1 – A5 -0.0084*** -0.0045** -0.0012 0.0008 0.0027  
 -3.98 -2.51 -0.72 0.44 1.39  
Panel C: Portfolios Formed by Momentum and MV 
Momentum 
MV M1 
(Losers) 
M2 M3 M4 
M5 
(Winners) 
M5 - M1
V1 (Low) 0.0045 0.0092 0.0124 0.0140 0.0193 0.0148 
 1.28 3.15 4.21 4.59 5.36 6.27 
V2 0.0035 0.0116 0.0129 0.0122 0.0183 0.0148 
 0.89 3.57 4.07 3.89 4.82 5.70 
V3 0.0060 0.0116 0.0129 0.0136 0.0160 0.0099 
 1.47 3.55 4.51 4.41 4.22 3.60 
V4 0.0075 0.0123 0.0120 0.0131 0.0147 0.0071 
 1.85 3.8 4.01 4.39 4.13 2.39 
V5 (High) 0.0102 0.0117 0.0111 0.0131 0.0144 0.0042 
 2.65 3.92 3.83 4.54 4.31 1.27 
       
V1 – V5 -0.0057** -0.0026 0.0013 0.0009 0.0049*  
 -2.04 -1.03 0.55 0.36 1.95  
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Table 5.4 Portfolio Returns Sorted by Information Uncertainty and PIN 
 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns based on information uncertainty proxy and 
the probability of information-based trade proxy (PIN). Information uncertainty proxies include 
analyst coverage (COV), firm age (AGE) and firm size (MV) in Panel A, B, and C respectively. 
Stocks are first classified into five categories based on information uncertainty proxy at each 
month. The sorting method for COV is special. At each month t, stocks are assigned into five 
classes of COVt, with the class breakpoints determined separately within each MVt quintile. The 
COVt classes are then recombined across MVt quintiles. Within each uncertainty category, stocks 
are then sorted into five groups by the level of PIN t. For the resulting 25 subgroups, equally 
weighted portfolios are constructed and held for one month. Stocks with a price less than $5 are 
excluded. Stocks with missing value of MV, RETt-11, t-1 or PIN are excluded, and the missing value 
of COV takes value of zero. The sample period is 1983 - 2001. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Portfolios Formed by and COV and PIN 
COV 
PIN 
C1 (Low) C2 C3 C4 C5 (High) C5 - C1 
P1 (Low) 0.0112 0.0080 0.0118 0.0123 0.0136 0.0024 
 4.26 2.76 3.83 4.24 4.51 1.75 
P2 0.0103 0.0094 0.0122 0.0119 0.0119 0.0015 
 3.58 3.01 3.80 3.64 3.21 0.92 
P3 0.0084 0.0106 0.0138 0.0110 0.0108 0.0024 
 2.74 3.32 4.14 3.23 2.76 1.48 
P4 0.0094 0.0124 0.0135 0.0125 0.0116 0.0023 
 2.95 4.06 4.1 3.61 3.04 1.23 
P5 (High) 0.0115 0.0151 0.0164 0.0151 0.0137 0.0023 
 3.83 5.77 5.14 4.56 3.70 1.32 
       
P5 - P1 0.0002 0.0071*** 0.0047** 0.0028 0.0001  
 0.12 3.77 2.41 1.34 0.05  
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Table 5.4—Continued 
 
Panel B: Portfolios Formed by AGE and PIN 
AGE 
PIN 
A1 (Low) A2 A3 A4 A5 (High) A5 - A1 
P1 (Low) 0.0092 0.0110 0.0118 0.0119 0.0125 0.0033 
 2.8 3.26 3.73 4.01 4.96 1.74 
P2 0.0080 0.0093 0.0108 0.0124 0.0114 0.0034 
 2.17 2.56 3.14 3.95 4.23 1.57 
P3 0.0072 0.0116 0.0118 0.0114 0.0124 0.0051 
 1.96 3.14 3.63 3.70 4.47 2.46 
P4 0.0100 0.0137 0.0140 0.0127 0.0124 0.0024 
 2.73 3.89 4.18 4.14 4.16 1.16 
P5 (High) 0.0143 0.0146 0.0147 0.0154 0.0136 -0.0007 
 4.44 4.82 5.00 5.47 4.71 -0.44 
       
P5 - P1 0.0051*** 0.0036* 0.0029 0.0036* 0.0011  
 2.63 1.77 1.37 1.66 0.53  
Panel C: Portfolios Formed by and MV and PIN 
MV 
PIN 
V1 (Low) V2 V3 V4 V5 (High) V5 - V1 
P1 (Low) 0.0063 0.0099 0.0118 0.0127 0.0126 0.0063 
 1.78 2.80 3.66 4.27 4.60 2.27 
P2 0.0080 0.0091 0.0107 0.0110 0.0120 0.0039 
 2.26 2.53 3.10 3.39 4.15 1.44 
P3 0.0092 0.0119 0.0119 0.0129 0.0118 0.0026 
 2.70 3.36 3.35 3.82 3.99 1.05 
P4 0.0142 0.0132 0.0120 0.0106 0.0130 -0.0012 
 4.55 3.78 3.57 3.28 4.34 -0.53 
P5 (High) 0.0137 0.0167 0.0146 0.0144 0.0139 0.0002 
 5.26 5.25 4.38 4.71 4.61 0.09 
       
P5 - P1 0.0074*** 0.0068*** 0.0028* 0.0017 0.0013  
 3.39 3.85 1.72 1.08 0.98  
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Table 5.5 Portfolio Returns Sorted by PIN and Momentum 
 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns based on the probability of information-based 
trade proxy (PIN) and momentum. At each month t, stocks are first assigned into five groups 
based on the level of PINt. Within each group of PINt, stocks are then sorted into five divisions 
based on past returns from t – 11 to t – 1(RETt-11, t-1). For the resulting 25 subgroups, equally 
weighted portfolios are constructed and held for one month. The Fama-French three-factor and the 
four-factor risk-adjusted returns are reported for momentum strategies. Stocks with a price less 
than $5 are excluded. Stocks with missing value of MV, RETt-11, t-1 or PIN are excluded, and the 
missing value of COV takes value of zero. The sample period is 1983 - 2001. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
PIN 
Momentum 
P1 (Low) P2 P3 P4 P5 (High) 
M1 (Losers) 0.0105 0.0086 0.0029 0.0032 0.0065 
 2.96 2.10 0.70 0.79 1.94 
M2 0.0113 0.0118 0.0096 0.0115 0.0114 
 3.98 3.56 2.98 3.50 3.96 
M3 0.0104 0.0120 0.0113 0.0127 0.0161 
 3.88 4.08 3.67 4.06 5.80 
M4 0.0120 0.0111 0.0128 0.0142 0.0170 
 4.40 3.60 4.04 4.53 6.03 
M5 (Winners) 0.0141 0.0130 0.0141 0.0171 0.0228 
 4.40 3.78 3.72 4.44 6.27 
      
0.0035 0.0044 0.0112*** 0.0140*** 0.0163*** M5 – M1 
(Raw) 1.27 1.50 3.99 5.23 6.23 
0.0042 0.0051* 0.0122*** 0.0154*** 0.0175*** M5 – M1 
(3-Factor) 1.44 1.67 4.20 5.70 6.79 
-0.0045*** -0.0036** 0.0046** 0.0090*** 0.0122*** M5 – M1  
(4-Factor) -3.03 -1.97 2.38 4.48 5.76 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.6 Portfolio Returns Sorted by Information Uncertainty, PIN and Momentum 
 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns using three-way sorting by information uncertainty proxy, probability of information-based trade (PIN), and 
momentum. Information uncertainty proxies include analyst coverage (COV), firm age (AGE) and firm size (MV) in Panel A, B, and C respectively. Each month t 
stocks are sorted into three groups based on the level of information uncertainty at that month. Each uncertainty group is then sorted into three groups by the level of 
PINt. Each uncertainty and PINt group is further sorted into three momentum divisions based on past returns from t – 11 to t – 1 (RETt-11, t-1). Note that the sorting 
method for analyst coverage is special. At each month t, stocks are assigned into three classes of COVt, with the class breakpoints determined separately within each 
MVt quintile. The COVt classes are then recombined across MVt quintiles. For the resulting 27 subgroups, equally weighted portfolios are constructed and held for 
one month. All three panels report the Fama-French three-factor and the four-factor risk-adjusted returns for all momentum strategies. Stocks with a price less than $5 
are excluded. Stocks with missing value of MV, RETt-11, t-1 or PIN are excluded, and the missing value of COV takes value of zero. The sample period is 1983 - 2001. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Portfolios Formed by COV, PIN, and Momentum
Low COV Medium COV High COV
PIN PIN PINMomentum 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Low (Losers) 0.0097 0.0036 0.0075 0.0105 0.0103 0.0082 0.0123 0.0065 0.0057 
 3.07 1.05 2.54  3.13 2.94 2.46  3.30 1.51 1.44 
Medium 0.0101 0.0112 0.0126  0.0110 0.0123 0.0162  0.0114 0.0117 0.0144 
 3.91 4.06 4.73  3.84 3.98 5.58  3.82 3.36 4.35 
High (Winners) 0.0108 0.0124 0.0177  0.0122 0.0150 0.0202  0.0142 0.0150 0.0202 
 3.69 3.67 5.52  3.83 4.24 5.69  4.42 4.24 5.39 
            
H – L (Raw) 0.0011 0.0088*** 0.0102***  0.0017 0.0047** 0.0120***  0.0020 0.0085*** 0.0145*** 
 0.46 3.71 4.86  0.86 2.18 5.60  0.76 3.44 6.33 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0012 0.0098*** 0.0109***  0.0024 0.0048** 0.0126***  0.0030 0.0094*** 0.0154*** 
 0.49 4.07 5.21  1.15 2.17 5.78  1.13 3.73 6.50 
H – L (4-Factor) -0.0057*** 0.0039** 0.0069***  -0.0030** -0.0007 0.0081***  -0.0048*** 0.0034* 0.0107*** 
 -4.08 2.24 3.86  -2.24 -0.44 4.52  -3.20 1.80 5.38 
2
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Table 5.6—Continued 
 
Panel B: Portfolios Formed by AGE, PIN, and Momentum
Low AGE Medium AGE High AGE
PIN PIN PINMomentum 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Low (Losers) 0.0065 0.0003 0.0060 0.0098 0.0096 0.0086 0.0124 0.0118 0.0099 
 1.67 0.06 1.68  2.59 2.61 2.74  4.22 3.50 3.04 
Medium 0.0093 0.0116 0.0152  0.0110 0.0120 0.0141  0.0105 0.0128 0.0142 
 2.90 3.41 5.04  3.53 3.90 4.94  4.07 4.71 5.23 
High (Winners) 0.0123 0.0153 0.0199  0.0141 0.0146 0.0188  0.0129 0.0117 0.0169 
 3.35 3.97 5.49  4.35 4.24 5.59  4.44 3.93 5.49 
            
H – L (Raw) 0.0057** 0.0151*** 0.0139***  0.0043* 0.0050** 0.0102***  0.0005 -0.0001 0.0070*** 
 2.30 5.74 5.90  1.66 2.35 4.88  0.21 -0.04 3.25 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0057** 0.0161*** 0.0149***  0.0052* 0.0059*** 0.0106***  0.0006 0.0013 0.0082*** 
 2.20 5.95 6.20  1.90 2.74 5.05  0.27 0.55 3.73 
H – L (4-Factor) -0.0012 0.0095*** 0.0103***  -0.0029** 0.00064 0.0061***  -0.0051*** -0.0046*** 0.0040** 
 -0.70 4.85 5.03  -2.07 0.41 3.61  -3.35 -2.86 2.12 
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Table 5.6—Continued 
 
Panel C: Portfolios Formed by MV, PIN, and Momentum
Low MV Medium MV High MV
PIN PIN PINMomentum 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Low (Losers) 0.0022 0.0050 0.0074 0.0102 0.0084 0.0084 0.0117 0.0120 0.0105 
 0.54 1.32 2.41  2.60 2.16 2.44  3.72 3.48 3.02 
Medium 0.0082 0.0126 0.0143  0.0121 0.0111 0.0154  0.0113 0.0122 0.0133 
 2.62 3.97 5.17  4.06 3.48 5.16  4.05 4.13 4.42 
High (Winners) 0.0132 0.0171 0.0196  0.0116 0.0141 0.0177  0.0137 0.0130 0.0154 
 3.72 4.63 6.29  3.43 3.90 4.84  4.63 4.02 4.58 
            
H – L (Raw) 0.0110*** 0.0122*** 0.0122***  0.0015 0.0058** 0.0093***  0.0020 0.0009 0.0049* 
 4.65 5.47 6.23  0.57 2.53 4.26  0.89 0.39 1.87 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0116*** 0.0138*** 0.0129***  0.0014 0.0065*** 0.0096***  0.0028 0.0019 0.0071*** 
 4.73 6.09 6.47  0.51 2.72 4.35  1.21 0.77 2.68 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0067*** 0.0095*** 0.0103***  -0.0053*** 0.0006 0.0046***  -0.0038*** -0.0051*** -0.0004 
 3.28 4.89 5.43  -2.73 0.38 2.70  -2.77 -3.68 -0.23 
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Table 5.7 Portfolio Returns Sorted by PIN, Information Uncertainty and Momentum 
 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns using three-way sorting by probability of information-based trade (PIN), information uncertainty, and momentum. 
Information uncertainty proxies include analyst coverage (COV), firm age (AGE) and firm size (MV) in Panel A, B, and C respectively. Each month t stocks are 
sorted into three groups based on the level of PINt. Each PINt group is then sorted into three information uncertainty groups. Each PINt and 
uncertainty group is further sorted into three momentum divisions based on past returns from t – 11 to t – 1 (RETt-11, t-1). For the resulting 27 subgroups, 
equally weighted portfolios are constructed and held for one month. All three panels report the Fama-French three-factor and the four-factor risk-adjusted returns for 
all momentum strategies. Stocks with a price less than $5 are excluded. Stocks with missing value of MV, RETt-11, t-1 or PIN are excluded, and the missing value of 
COV takes value of zero. The sample period is 1983 - 2001. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Portfolios Formed by PIN, COV, and Momentum
Low PIN Medium PIN High PIN
COV COV COVMomentum 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Low (Losers) 0.0101 0.0101 0.0124 0.0022 0.0075 0.0082 0.0075 0.0064 0.0081 
 3.20 2.65 3.51  0.60 1.99 2.07  2.42 1.84 2.13 
Medium 0.0101 0.0114 0.0122  0.0098 0.0128 0.0131  0.0126 0.0143 0.0162 
 3.99 3.79 4.08  3.46 4.01 3.97  4.80 4.85 5.00 
High (Winners) 0.0108 0.0118 0.0149  0.0123 0.0140 0.0146  0.0164 0.0190 0.0228 
 3.63 3.61 4.68  3.57 3.85 4.19  5.07 5.44 5.98 
            
H – L (Raw) 0.0007 0.0017 0.0025  0.0101*** 0.0065*** 0.0064**  0.0089*** 0.0126*** 0.0147*** 
 0.31 0.73 0.99  3.99 2.84 2.47  4.46 5.48 5.58 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0005 0.0029 0.0035  0.0105*** 0.0070*** 0.0077***  0.0099*** 0.0135*** 0.0157*** 
 0.21 1.21 1.32  3.99 2.96 2.91  4.97 5.67 5.84 
H – L (4-Factor) -0.0058*** -0.0037** -0.0043***  0.0041** 0.0015 0.0010  0.0062*** 0.0099*** 0.0101*** 
 -3.83 -2.43 -3.00  2.14 0.85 0.53  3.60 4.54 4.59 
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Table 5.7—Continued 
 
Panel B: Portfolios Formed by PIN, AGE, and Momentum
Low PIN Medium PIN High PIN
AGE AGE AGEMomentum 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Low (Losers) 0.0084 0.0116 0.0135 0.0012 0.0087 0.0097 0.0044 0.0082 0.0100 
 2.18 3.35 4.54  0.29 2.23 2.88  1.19 2.51 3.16 
Medium 0.0100 0.0111 0.0111  0.0101 0.0112 0.0129  0.0144 0.0145 0.0147 
 3.24 3.79 4.24  2.97 3.52 4.47  4.65 4.93 5.53 
High (Winners) 0.0137 0.0127 0.0123  0.0133 0.0140 0.0132  0.0192 0.0198 0.0175 
 3.90 4.08 4.37  3.42 4.06 4.18  5.10 5.57 5.79 
            
H – L (Raw) 0.0053** 0.0011 -0.0012  0.0121*** 0.0054** 0.0035  0.0148*** 0.0117*** 0.0075*** 
 2.05 0.48 -0.55  4.55 2.21 1.58  6.18 5.00 3.88 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0054** 0.0020 -0.0007  0.0123*** 0.0065*** 0.0044*  0.0162*** 0.0118*** 0.0088*** 
 2.02 0.85 -0.31  4.46 2.63 1.93  6.69 4.95 4.52 
H – L (4-Factor) -0.0023 -0.0049*** -0.0062***  0.0057*** 0.0004 -0.0013  0.0108*** 0.0068*** 0.0056*** 
 -1.56 -3.57 -3.84  2.80 0.21 -0.78  5.69 3.50 3.20 
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Table 5.7—Continued 
 
Panel C: Portfolios Formed by PIN, MV, and Momentum
Low PIN Medium PIN High PIN
MV MV MVMomentum 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Low (Losers) 0.0096 0.0117 0.0119 0.0029 0.0070 0.0100 0.0056 0.0084 0.0093 
 2.50 3.27 3.92  0.72 1.81 2.85  1.66 2.32 2.73 
Medium 0.0111 0.0115 0.0114  0.0091 0.0125 0.0120  0.0124 0.0144 0.0163 
 3.82 3.95 3.99  2.80 3.94 3.96  4.40 4.72 5.52 
High (Winners) 0.0100 0.0130 0.0138  0.0143 0.0137 0.0132  0.0169 0.0195 0.0204 
 3.04 4.11 4.55  3.82 3.80 3.89  5.17 5.48 5.52 
            
H – L (Raw) 0.0003 0.0014 0.0019  0.0114*** 0.0067*** 0.0032  0.0113*** 0.0111*** 0.0111*** 
 0.14 0.57 0.87  5.00 2.99 1.27  5.60 5.07 4.62 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0003 0.0021 0.0028 
 0.0112*** 0.0076*** 0.0047*  0.0125*** 0.0122*** 0.0121*** 
 0.12 0.83 1.22  4.75 3.26 1.83  6.01 5.44 4.97 
H – L (4-Factor) -0.0062*** -0.0050*** -0.0038***  0.0068*** 0.0019 -0.0024  0.0100*** 0.0077*** 0.0065*** 
 -3.50 -3.19 -2.98  3.33 1.12 -1.53  4.99 4.12 3.50 
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Table 5.8 Portfolio Returns Sorted by Momentum, PIN and Information Uncertainty 
 
This table reports average monthly portfolio returns using three-way sorting by momentum, probability of information-based trade (PIN), and information uncertainty. 
Information uncertainty proxies include analyst coverage (COV), firm age (AGE) and firm size (MV) in Panel A, B, and C respectively. Each month t stocks are 
sorted into three momentum groups based on the level of past returns from t – 11 to t – 1 (RETt-11, t-1). Each momentum group is then sorted into 
three PINt groups. Each momentum and PINt group is further sorted into three uncertainty divisions. For the resulting 27 subgroups, equally weighted 
portfolios are constructed and held for one month. All three panels report the Fama-French three-factor and the four-factor risk-adjusted returns for low-minus-high 
group hedging portfolios on uncertainty. Stocks with a price less than $5 are excluded. Stocks with missing value of MV, RETt-11, t-1 or PIN are excluded, and the 
missing value of COV takes value of zero. The sample period is 1983 - 2001. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Portfolios Formed by Momentum, PIN, and COV
Low Momentum (Losers) Medium Momentum High Momentum (Winners) 
PIN PIN PINCOV 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Low 0.0088 0.0021 0.0077 0.0105 0.0096 0.0124 0.0103 0.0129 0.0167 
 2.78 0.57 2.52  3.96 3.48 4.60  3.36 3.77 5.21 
Medium 0.0112 0.0079 0.0060  0.0110 0.0126 0.0153  0.0120 0.0137 0.0192 
 2.96 2.07 1.76  3.72 3.96 5.27  3.60 3.80 5.43 
High 0.0115 0.0082 0.0083  0.0116 0.0124 0.0161  0.0152 0.0153 0.0224 
 3.12 2.05 2.17  3.84 3.86 4.96  4.83 4.42 6.04 
            
H – L (Raw) 0.0027* 0.0061*** 0.0005  0.0011 0.0028** 0.0038**  0.0050*** 0.0024 0.0057*** 
 1.68 3.41 0.25  0.80 2.08 2.34  3.74 1.51 2.87 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0009 0.0047*** -0.0020  0.0005 0.0016 0.0018  0.0054*** 0.0021 0.0037* 
 0.58 2.72 -1.13  0.44 1.28 1.19  4.37 1.27 1.90 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0018 0.0050*** -0.0006  0.0012 0.0022* 0.0019  0.0052*** 0.0022 0.0027 
 1.18 2.81 -0.35  0.96 1.74 1.20  4.07 1.32 1.33 
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Table 5.8—Continued 
 
Panel B: Portfolios Formed by Momentum, PIN, and AGE
Low Momentum (Losers) Medium Momentum High Momentum (Winners) 
PIN PIN PINAGE 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Low 0.0076 0.0007 0.0052 0.0105 0.0098 0.0150 0.0125 0.0144 0.0196 
 2.01 0.17 1.42  3.45 2.94 4.85  3.54 3.86 5.43 
Medium 0.0114 0.0077 0.0083  0.0107 0.0122 0.0140  0.0129 0.0138 0.0202 
 3.16 2.00 2.52  3.72 3.99 4.75  4.12 3.93 5.80 
High 0.0127 0.0095 0.0103  0.0119 0.0130 0.0143  0.0121 0.0136 0.0177 
 4.00 2.76 3.29  4.43 4.68 5.34  4.24 4.19 5.76 
            
H – L (Raw) 0.0051*** 0.0087*** 0.0051***  0.0014 0.0033** -0.0006  -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0019 
 2.85 4.59 2.99  0.98 2.18 -0.48  -0.24 -0.50 -1.08 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0056*** 0.0090*** 0.0063***  0.0019 0.0036*** 0.0004  0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0008 
 3.57 4.99 3.76  1.51 2.70 0.31  0.19 -0.43 -0.46 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0048*** 0.0077*** 0.0055***  0.0010 0.0024* 0.0003  0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0001 
 2.84 4.23 3.22  0.79 1.80 0.25  0.27 -0.79 -0.03 
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Table 5.8—Continued 
 
Panel C: Portfolios Formed by Momentum, PIN, and MV
Low Momentum (Losers) Medium Momentum High Momentum (Winners) 
PIN PIN PINMV 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Low 0.0087 0.0032 0.0061 0.0106 0.0101 0.0138 0.0113 0.0151 0.0181 
 2.34 0.81 1.99  3.70 3.14 4.72  3.32 4.05 5.49 
Medium 0.0117 0.0059 0.0087  0.0113 0.0126 0.0146  0.0133 0.0131 0.0195 
 3.20 1.53 2.42  3.88 4.13 4.76  4.19 3.70 5.38 
High 0.0112 0.0089 0.0088  0.0113 0.0120 0.0150  0.0130 0.0136 0.0203 
 3.38 2.38 2.51  3.88 3.97 5.15  4.30 4.13 5.95 
            
H – L (Raw) 0.0025 0.0057** 0.0026  0.0007 0.0018 0.0012  0.0018 -0.0015 0.0022 
 1.17 2.53 1.33  0.46 0.99 0.60  0.98 -0.75 1.03 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0030* 0.0053*** 0.0008  0.0009 0.0017 0.0010  0.0036** 0.00003 0.0012 
 1.74 2.62 0.40  0.74 1.22 0.50  2.46 0.02 0.56 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0031* 0.0061*** 0.0020  0.0005 0.0009 0.0005  0.0026* -0.0021 -0.0004 
 1.70 2.99 1.00  0.39 0.62 0.23  1.79 -1.23 -0.19 
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Table 5.9 Subperiod Analysis 
 
This table provides subperiod analysis for Table 5.5 – Table 5.8. Two subperiods are 1983 - 1992 and 1993 - 2002. Panel A refers to Table 5.5 - Portfolio Returns 
Sorted by PIN and Momentum. Panel B1, B2, and B3 refer to Table 5.6 - Portfolio Returns Sorted by Information Uncertainty, PIN and Momentum. Panel C1, C2, 
and C3 refer to Table 5.7 - Portfolio Returns Sorted by PIN, Information Uncertainty and Momentum. Panel D1, D2, and D3 refer to Table 5.8 - Portfolio Returns 
Sorted by Momentum, PIN and Information Uncertainty. All hedging portfolios are constructed as previous related tables. All panels report one-month-ahead raw 
returns and the Fama-French three-factor and the four-factor risk-adjusted returns for the relevant hedging portfolios. Stocks with a price less than $5 are excluded. 
Stocks with missing value of MV, RETt-11, t-1 or PIN are excluded, and the missing value of COV takes value of zero. The sample period is 1983 - 2001. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Portfolios Formed by PIN and Momentum 
PIN 
Momentum 
P1 (Low) P2 P3 P4 P5 (High)
1983 - 1992 
0.0025 0.0059 0.0127*** 0.0116*** 0.0117***M5 – M1 
(Raw) 0.75 1.65 3.64 3.50 3.52 
0.0019 0.0052 0.0132*** 0.0130*** 0.0138***M5 – M1 
(3-Factor) 0.55 1.41 3.71 3.93 4.10 
-0.0051*** -0.0023 0.0066*** 0.0072*** 0.0087***M5 – M1  
(4-Factor) -2.85 -1.20 2.90 3.17 3.27 
1993 - 2002 
0.0046 0.0029 0.0096** 0.0165*** 0.0214***M5 – M1 
(Raw) 1.02 0.59 2.13 3.88 5.26 
0.0068 0.0054 0.0118** 0.0186*** 0.0208***M5 – M1 
(3-Factor) 1.44 1.07 2.51 4.19 5.30 
-0.0036 -0.0050* 0.0028 0.0110*** 0.0148***M5 – M1  
(4-Factor) -1.56 -1.70 0.90 3.30 4.62 
2
2
9
Table 5.9—Continued 
 
Panel B1: Portfolios Formed by COV, PIN, and Momentum
Low COV Medium COV High COV
PIN PIN PINMomentum 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
1983 - 1992
H – L (Raw) 0.0007 0.0102*** 0.0103*** 0.0029 0.0067** 0.0089*** 0.0012 0.0062** 0.0112*** 
 0.23 3.19 3.55  1.12 2.51 3.22  0.39 2.21 3.98 
H – L (3-Factor) -0.0007 0.0111*** 0.0110***  0.0025 0.0061** 0.0100***  0.0015 0.0062** 0.0125*** 
 -0.22 3.39 3.64  0.94 2.23 3.53  0.49 2.18 4.35 
H – L (4-Factor) -0.0071*** 0.0051** 0.0067***  -0.0024 0.0018 0.0058**  -0.0047** 0.0014 0.0085*** 
 -4.24 2.40 2.70  -1.38 0.87 2.55  -2.56 0.69 3.56 
1993 - 2002
H – L (Raw) 0.0015 0.0072** 0.0101*** 0.0004 0.0026 0.0154*** 0.0028 0.0110*** 0.0181*** 
 0.42 2.06 3.31  0.14 0.74 4.67  0.66 2.64 4.94 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0035 0.0077** 0.0100***  0.0020 0.0035 0.0156***  0.0045 0.0133*** 0.0192*** 
 0.97 2.11 3.43  0.64 0.98 4.59  1.02 3.13 4.94 
H – L (4-Factor) -0.0042** 0.0010 0.0058**  -0.0042** -0.0036 0.0103***  -0.0050** 0.0060* 0.0135*** 
 -2.14 0.41 2.35  -2.05 -1.55 3.76  -2.08 1.89 4.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
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Table 5.9—Continued 
 
Panel B2: Portfolios Formed by AGE, PIN, and Momentum
Low AGE Medium AGE High AGE
PIN PIN PINMomentum 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
1983 - 1992
H – L (Raw) 0.0066** 0.0170*** 0.0113*** 0.0048* 0.0038 0.0067*** -0.0005 0.0015 0.0051* 
 2.12 5.01 3.42  1.67 1.61 2.62  -0.18 0.49 1.79 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0049 0.0176*** 0.0136***  0.0046 0.0044* 0.0071***  -0.0014 0.0018 0.0050* 
 1.55 5.26 3.99  1.53 1.80 2.73  -0.48 0.57 1.69 
H – L (4-Factor) -0.0008 0.0120*** 0.0086***  -0.0014 0.0004 0.0034  -0.0072*** -0.0040* 0.0006 
 -0.37 4.96 3.13  -0.83 0.21 1.57  -4.19 -1.93 0.25 
1993 - 2002
H – L (Raw) 0.0048 0.0129*** 0.0166*** 0.0038 0.0062* 0.0140*** 0.0015 -0.0018 0.0090*** 
 1.21 3.19 5.00  0.85 1.73 4.2  0.48 -0.58 2.79 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0066 0.0150*** 0.0165***  0.0051 0.0078** 0.0141***  0.0034 0.0007 0.0107*** 
 1.57 3.53 4.78  1.08 2.09 4.19  1.01 0.20 3.25 
H – L (4-Factor) -0.0017 0.0073** 0.0113***  -0.0052** 0.0009 0.0086***  -0.0028 -0.0056** 0.0063** 
 -0.65 2.42 3.96  -2.20 0.36 3.27  -1.18 -2.58 2.19 
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Table 5.9—Continued 
 
Panel B3: Portfolios Formed by MV, PIN, and Momentum
Low MV Medium MV High MV
PIN PIN PINMomentum 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
1983 - 1992
H – L (Raw) 0.0107*** 0.0106*** 0.0114*** 0.0039 0.0066** 0.0060** -0.0002 0.0008 0.0043 
 3.71 3.54 3.88  1.13 2.45 2.17  -0.09 0.24 1.52 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0104*** 0.0122*** 0.0138***  0.0026 0.0071** 0.0051*  -0.0003 0.0011 0.0058** 
 3.49 3.95 4.58  0.71 2.52 1.83  -0.10 0.32 2.00 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0058** 0.0085*** 0.0100***  -0.0042* 0.0020 -0.0002  -0.0059*** -0.0056*** 0.0003 
 2.49 3.11 3.82  -1.86 1.08 -0.10  -4.13 -3.37 0.19 
1993 - 2002
H – L (Raw) 0.0113*** 0.0139*** 0.0130*** -0.0012 0.0049 0.0129*** 0.0045 0.0011 0.0057 
 2.95 4.18 5.14  -0.32 1.29 3.79  1.22 0.31 1.23 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0128*** 0.0155*** 0.0119***  0.0001 0.0062 0.0142***  0.0066* 0.0027 0.0085* 
 3.25 4.54 4.66  0.02 1.57 4.08  1.73 0.73 1.82 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0076** 0.0103*** 0.0095***  -0.0070** -0.0007 0.0091***  -0.0012 -0.0052** -0.0013 
 2.20 3.69 3.89  -2.43 -0.25 3.13  -0.51 -2.56 -0.50 
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Table 5.9—Continued 
 
Panel C1: Portfolios Formed by PIN, COV, and Momentum
Low PIN Medium PIN High PIN
COV COV COVMomentum 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
1983 - 1992
H – L (Raw) 0.0017 0.0013 0.0014 0.0127*** 0.0097*** 0.0048* 0.0088*** 0.0111*** 0.0091*** 
 0.54 0.42 0.47  3.54 3.59 1.71  3.29 3.07 3.30 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0002 0.0009 0.0020  0.0127*** 0.0095*** 0.0052*  0.0100*** 0.0117*** 0.0099*** 
 0.05 0.27 0.70  3.50 3.40 1.82  3.67 3.09 3.48 
H – L (4-Factor) -0.0061*** -0.0053*** -0.0036**  0.0061** 0.0052** 0.00003  0.0063*** 0.0076** 0.0055** 
 -3.62 -2.77 -2.09  2.57 2.38 0.02  2.75 2.24 2.49 
1993 - 2002
H – L (Raw) -0.0004 0.0022 0.0038 0.0073** 0.0029 0.0081* 0.0090*** 0.0142*** 0.0208*** 
 -0.11 0.61 0.88  2.03 0.79 1.81  3.01 5.11 4.57 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0012 0.0046 0.0049  0.0085** 0.0043 0.0111**  0.0092*** 0.0151*** 0.0216*** 
 0.34 1.23 1.07  2.26 1.10 2.41  3.12 5.25 4.57 
H – L (4-Factor) -0.0056** -0.0029 -0.0050**  0.0017 -0.0027 0.0026  0.0052** 0.0116*** 0.0145*** 
 -2.48 -1.31 -2.12  0.64 -0.94 0.81  2.02 4.47 3.72 
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Table 5.9—Continued 
 
Panel C2: Portfolios Formed by PIN, AGE, and Momentum
Low PIN Medium PIN High PIN
AGE AGE AGEMomentum 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
1983 - 1992
H – L (Raw) 0.0045 0.0015 -0.0026 0.0144*** 0.0068*** 0.0030 0.0128*** 0.0079*** 0.0053** 
 1.56 0.49 -0.90  4.13 2.80 0.99  3.94 2.71 2.01 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0035 0.0013 -0.0031  0.0138*** 0.0075*** 0.0033  0.0146*** 0.0089*** 0.0053* 
 1.19 0.42 -1.02  3.88 2.97 1.07  4.41 3.00 1.92 
H – L (4-Factor) -0.0022 -0.0052*** -0.0090***  0.0076*** 0.0029* -0.0020  0.0095*** 0.0044* 0.0020 
 -1.30 -3.02 -5.22  3.06 1.75 -0.95  3.68 1.89 0.83 
1993 - 2002
H – L (Raw) 0.0061 0.0007 0.0004 0.0095** 0.0038 0.0041 0.0169*** 0.0157*** 0.0098*** 
 1.40 0.19 0.13  2.35 0.87 1.24  4.79 4.30 3.50 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0072 0.0026 0.0024  0.0114*** 0.0064 0.0052  0.0174*** 0.0150*** 0.0119*** 
 1.55 0.71 0.73  2.73 1.42 1.51  4.84 3.93 4.31 
H – L (4-Factor) -0.0026 -0.0053*** -0.0032  0.0042 -0.0018 -0.0011  0.0114*** 0.0090*** 0.0085*** 
 -1.03 -2.77 -1.26  1.34 -0.57 -0.48  4.14 2.94 3.42 
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Table 5.9—Continued 
 
Panel C3: Portfolios Formed by PIN, MV, and Momentum
Low PIN Medium PIN High PIN
MV MV MVMomentum 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
1983 - 1992
H – L (Raw) 0.0020 0.0009 -0.0014 0.0124*** 0.0080*** 0.0029 0.0105*** 0.0104*** 0.0070** 
 0.63 0.28 -0.54  4.24 2.84 0.94  3.53 3.53 2.57 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0010 0.0006 -0.0010  0.0115*** 0.0087*** 0.0037  0.0128*** 0.0111*** 0.0071** 
 0.30 0.17 -0.38  3.81 2.96 1.16  4.22 3.61 2.50 
H – L (4-Factor) -0.0053** -0.0063*** -0.0060***  0.0070*** 0.0035* -0.0023  0.0092*** 0.0068*** 0.0021 
 -2.49 -3.54 -4.05  2.90 1.75 -1.17  3.41 2.67 1.07 
1993 - 2002
H – L (Raw) -0.0015 0.0019 0.0055 0.0102*** 0.0053 0.0036 0.0122*** 0.0118*** 0.0156*** 
 -0.39 0.51 1.47  2.89 1.50 0.86  4.48 3.62 3.88 
H – L (3-Factor) -0.0004 0.0039 0.0066*  0.0112*** 0.0074** 0.0058  0.0124*** 0.0130*** 0.0169*** 
 -0.11 1.01 1.71  3.03 2.00 1.37  4.33 3.88 4.17 
H – L (4-Factor) -0.0077*** -0.0038 -0.0016  0.0065** 0.0007 -0.0029  0.0102*** 0.0080*** 0.0103*** 
 -2.82 -1.64 -0.77  1.98 0.28 -1.20  3.62 2.88 3.24 
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Table 5.9—Continued 
 
Panel D1: Portfolios Formed by Momentum, PIN, and COV
Low Momentum (Losers) Medium Momentum High Momentum (Winners) 
PIN PIN PINCOV 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
1983 - 1992
H – L (Raw) 0.0035 0.0084*** 0.0017 0.0001 0.0012 0.0056*** 0.0037** 0.0009 0.0019 
 1.58 3.47 0.69  0.05 0.63 2.61  1.99 0.40 0.95 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0005 0.0065*** 0.0008  -0.0011 0.0003 0.0047**  0.0040** -0.0001 0.0009 
 0.23 2.75 0.31  -0.68 0.17 2.27  2.35 -0.04 0.45 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0010 0.0062** 0.0015  -0.0007 0.0003 0.0054**  0.0053*** 0.0011 0.0011 
 0.48 2.57 0.63  -0.40 0.16 2.57  3.20 0.47 0.55 
1993 - 2002
H – L (Raw) 0.0019 0.0036 -0.0009 0.0022 0.0046b 0.0017 0.0064*** 0.0042* 0.0096*** 
 0.79 1.35 -0.31  1.08 2.32 0.72  3.34 1.72 2.80 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0025 0.0022 -0.0052**  0.0032* 0.0035* -0.0013  0.0074*** 0.0045* 0.0069** 
 1.11 0.85 -1.99  1.93 1.84 -0.55  4.13 1.93 1.99 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0041* 0.0030 -0.0031  0.0041** 0.0048** -0.0016  0.0063*** 0.0039 0.0049 
 1.80 1.13 -1.23  2.49 2.53 -0.69  3.52 1.61 1.41 
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Table 5.9—Continued 
 
Panel D2: Portfolios Formed by Momentum, PIN, and AGE
Low Momentum (Losers) Medium Momentum High Momentum (Winners) 
PIN PIN PINAGE 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
1983 - 1992
H – L (Raw) 0.0073*** 0.0098*** 0.0061** 0.0022 0.0019 -0.0017 0.0015 -0.0026 -0.0016 
 3.13 4.17 2.54  1.35 0.91 -0.95  0.79 -1.06 -0.68 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0064*** 0.0088*** 0.0075***  0.0013 0.0007 -0.0008  0.0006 -0.0038* -0.0022 
 3.39 3.85 3.20  0.94 0.40 -0.45  0.40 -1.70 -0.92 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0071*** 0.0079*** 0.0069***  0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0011  0.0004 -0.0040* -0.0019 
 3.69 3.44 2.89  0.76 -0.23 -0.58  0.24 -1.77 -0.78 
1993 - 2002
H – L (Raw) 0.0026 0.0076** 0.0039 0.0005 0.0047** 0.0005 -0.0024 0.0011 -0.0022 
 0.97 2.49 1.64  0.20 2.21 0.26  -0.88 0.47 -0.85 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0035 0.0091*** 0.0045*  0.0021 0.0059*** 0.0015  -0.0006 0.0011 0.0003 
 1.40 3.17 1.85  1.07 3.11 0.73  -0.25 0.46 0.10 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0012 0.0075** 0.0034  0.0012 0.0047** 0.0016  0.0001 0.0004 0.0015 
 0.51 2.60 1.35  0.58 2.48 0.78  0.06 0.15 0.55 
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Table 5.9—Continued 
 
Panel D3: Portfolios Formed by Momentum, PIN, and MV
Low Momentum (Losers) Medium Momentum High Momentum (Winners) 
PIN PIN PINMV 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
1983 - 1992
H – L (Raw) 0.0065** 0.0092*** 0.0017 0.0015 0.0015 0.0017 0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0009 
 2.36 2.96 0.64  0.70 0.62 0.63  0.80 -0.65 -0.36 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0048** 0.0073*** 0.0018  -0.0005 0.0005 0.0018  0.0019 -0.0015 -0.0022 
 2.12 2.68 0.66  -0.34 0.26 0.76  1.13 -0.73 -0.86 
H – L (4-Factor) 0.0058** 0.0090*** 0.0026  -0.0002 0.0001 0.0021  0.0022 -0.0017 -0.0024 
 2.52 3.33 0.95  -0.15 0.08 0.90  1.31 -0.81 -0.89 
1993 - 2002
H – L (Raw) -0.0019 0.0019 0.0037 -0.0001 0.0023 0.0007 0.0017 -0.0013 0.0056 
 -0.58 0.58 1.22  -0.03 0.78 0.24  0.59 -0.43 1.60 
H – L (3-Factor) 0.0002 0.0018 -0.0006  0.0016 0.0024 -0.0013  0.0045* 0.0009 0.0036 
 0.09 0.63 -0.19  0.84 1.07 -0.42  1.90 0.32 1.03 
H – L (4-Factor) -0.0002 0.0026 0.0013  0.0011 0.0013 -0.0020  0.0030 -0.0025 0.0008 
 -0.07 0.85 0.43  0.54 0.59 -0.63  1.26 -0.96 0.24 
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Chapter 6 
 
General Conclusion 
 
The literature on asymmetric information and market microstructure mainly focus on 
two roles of informed trading. On the one hand, the presence of informed trading 
implies the existence of private information. On the other hand, informed trading 
improves information efficiency because informed investors move price towards the 
full information level. According to these two insights, this thesis demonstrates that 
informed trading might have two interesting implications in stock markets. First, the 
absence of informed trading combined with short-sale constraints can lead to declines 
in prices (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). Second, the presence of informed trading can 
lead to momentum effect (Chapter 5). 
 
Chapter 3, the first essay, empirically shows that stocks will have lower future returns 
if the level of informed trading is lower and when short-sale constraints are binding. 
This effect is because of a new information uncertainty risk as perceived by 
uninformed investors. Specifically, stock prices become less informative when 
binding short-sale constraints keep informed investors from trading on their private 
information. The less informative prices create a new information uncertainty risk for 
uninformed investors, since uninformed investors are unable to figure out the true 
value of the stock without knowing the private information held by informed investors. 
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Because of this new information uncertainty risk, uninformed investors are reluctant 
to hold the stock unless there is a price discount. This new information uncertainty 
risk effect is the central theme of three theoretical papers including Bai, Chang, and 
Wang (2006), Yuan (2006), and Marin and Olivier (2008). In addition, Chapter 3 
suggests that this new information uncertainty risk effect can be affected by stock’s 
information uncertainty condition, which reflects the convenience of learning the 
fundamental value of stock. The empirical results show that this new information 
uncertainty risk effect becomes strong if information uncertainty is high, and it rarely 
arises if information uncertainty is low. When information uncertainty is low and 
short-sale constraints are not binding, this new information uncertainty risk effect 
does not emerge. 
 
Chapter 4, the second essay, demonstrates low level of informed trading combined 
with binding short-sale constraints can introduce two special new information 
uncertainty risk effects under certain market conditions. In particular, Chapter 4 uses 
trading volume to capture two different market scenarios. The first kind of new 
information uncertainty risk dampens the upward price movement, which is predicted 
by the model of Yuan (2006). When volume is great, uninformed investors observe 
high buying pressure as binding short-sale constraints lead to overvaluation and large 
volume represents high noise demand. Since prices become less informative when the 
level of informed trading is low and short-sale constraints are binding, uninformed 
investors cannot distinguish noise demand from information-based buying. They will 
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demand an information-disadvantage premium to hold the stock, and therefore 
overvaluation caused by short-sale constraints will be reduced. The second kind of 
new information uncertainty risk exacerbates downward price movement, which is 
predicted by the models of Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006), and Marin and Olivier 
(2008). When volume is small, uninformed investors convince that informed investors 
have negative information as both most of investors in the market and informed 
investors stop buying. Because prices become less informative when the level of 
informed trading is low and short-sale constraints are binding, uninformed investors 
do not know how bad the information is. They will not hold the stock without an 
information-disadvantage premium, and hence future return becomes worse.  
 
While both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 highlight the absence of informed trading, 
Chapter 5, the third essay, stresses the presence of informed trading can lead to 
momentum effect. It proposes that if momentum is a result of underreaction and if 
informed trading identifies stocks with underreaction, the presence of informed 
trading predicts future momentum effect. This is because informed trading identifies 
underreaction and moves price towards the full information level, uninformed 
investors can gradually learn informed investors’ private information from the price 
movements. As a result, uninformed investors will follow the earlier informed trading 
eventually and prices continue to adjusting until reaching the full information level. 
Therefore, the momentum effect (price continuation) arises following informed 
trading.  
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Consistently, the empirical results show that momentum effect arises when informed 
trading is present. Moreover, higher informed trading leads to greater momentum 
effect. Although information uncertainty is related to both informed trading and 
momentum, the identified relationship between informed trading and momentum is 
robust after controlling for information uncertainty. The behavioural biases theory 
proposed by Zhang (2006) suggests that information uncertainty measures the degree 
of behavioural biases, which are responsible for momentum because behavioural 
biases lead to underreaction according to behavioural finance. However, Chapter 5 
provides contrary evidence to the behavioural biases theory. High level of information 
uncertainty does not produce momentum unless the level of informed trading is 
relatively high. Furthermore, past winners with higher uncertainty could earn lower 
future returns when the level of informed trading is low. According to the role of 
informed trading played in momentum effect, the empirical findings in Chapter 5 
suggest that the documented relationship between information uncertainty and 
momentum should be due to the information diffusion theory proposed by Hong, Lim 
and Stein (2000). That is, information uncertainty reflects the speed of price 
adjustment to the full information level.  
 
This thesis has several potential contributions. First, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 confirm 
that a new information uncertainty risk can arise when short-sale constraints are 
binding and the level of informed trading is low. Moreover, Chapter 3 presents the 
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general new information uncertainty risk effect and Chapter 4 demonstrates two 
special new information uncertainty risk effects. Therefore, the new information 
uncertainty risk that proposed by Bai, Chang, and Wang (2006), Yuan (2006), and 
Marin and Olivier (2008) is verified. Second, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 imply that 
short-sale constraints can influence the risk as perceived by uninformed investors, 
although previous literature generally focuses on how short-sale constraints influence 
the relation between investors’ expectations and asset prices. Third, Chapter 5 
emphasizes the importance of price discovery for understanding momentum effect by 
presenting that informed trading plays an important role in momentum. Finally, the 
empirical findings in Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5 shed light on the interaction 
between informed trading and information uncertainty. They suggest that informed 
trading has relative stronger impact on stock returns, although information uncertainty 
can contribute to the price impact of informed trading. 
 
Nevertheless, the three essays in this thesis also have important limitations. First, 
because of data limitation, the robustness checks are not enough to fully ascertain that 
the empirical findings are not caused by specific sample, specific proxies or other 
obvious explanations. Second, since the original frequencies of informed trading and 
short-sale constraints are not monthly, the results of the monthly portfolio analysis 
suffer frequency mismatch problems and hence will not absolutely accurate. Finally, 
because the empirical results in this thesis are completely based on monthly 
rebalancing of portfolio analysis, other rebalancing methods can yield different 
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outcomes. These limitations suggest that the findings documented in this thesis 
require careful caution for their robustness. 
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